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This thesis examines a controversy in Greensboro, North Carolina over proposals 
to reopen a municipal landfill to household waste. K y elements include how the 
outcome of the dispute was influenced by anti- and pro-landfill leaders and groups, or 
lack thereof, the formation of coalitions and alliances, each side’s perspectives and 
arguments, and various historical factors. The prima y data source was semi-structured 
interviews with 19 people who were directly involved in the landfill controversy. Other 
information came from local newspapers, public recods, and documents, such as agendas 
and flyers from the grassroots environmental justice organization’s meetings and rallies. 
Participant observation at several meetings and rallies was also used as a supplemental 
data source. The study’s key findings provide insight nto the importance of organization, 
the benefits of the alliances and coalitions formed among anti-landfill individuals and 
groups, how certain arguments were used to attract support and counter the opposing 
side’s claims, and how local history, culture, and traditions played a role in the 
controversy.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Most research suggests that sites for locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) in the 
United States have been disproportionately located in racial/ethnic minority and low 
socio-economic status communities, and these sites have frequently become sources of 
political controversy. Typically, large corporations or various levels of the government 
propose the construction of facilities such as landfills, incinerators, or chemical plants, 
and the government is closely involved in the decision-making process regarding the 
siting. While few city government or corporate officials would admit that a community’s 
political power balance influences their decisions regarding siting environmental hazards, 
they are undoubtedly aware of which districts have the most potential to resist LULUs 
and which have little economic and political clout. Residents in the threatened 
communities, for their part, have increasingly adopted the NIMBY (Not-In-My-
BackYard) response to these proposed sitings. In the early 1980s, NIMBY responses led 
to organized community opposition and activism thatsparked a grassroots environmental 
justice movement. In one such case, Warren County, North Carolina, in 1982, the term 
“environmental racism” was coined to describe the un qual distribution of environmental 
hazards on the basis of race. 
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In 2009, a superficially similar controversy erupted r garding the potential 
reopening of a municipal landfill site in Greensboro, North Carolina. This case was 
similar to other environmental justice disputes in ome ways, but differed from them in 
key respects. First, it involved not a new facility, but reopening an existing landfill in a 
low income, minority neighborhood to save money. Second, it was prompted by the 
election of a new city council with a majority supported by conservative, “tea party” 
oriented individuals and groups. Third, opposition t  reopening the landfill involved a 
coalition of grassroots African American and neighborhood activists and moderate whites 
concerned about the city’s image, racial harmony, ad economic development. The 
purpose of this case study was to examine how the outcome of the dispute was influenced 
by the leaders and groups on both sides, the formation of coalitions and alliances, each 
side’s perspectives and arguments, and the effects of hi torical and contextual factors.  
The White Street Landfill is located in an area of n rtheast Greensboro inhabited 
mainly by people of lower socio-economic status, the vast majority of whom are African 
American. It has existed since the 1940s. In the late 1990s, discussions began about the 
problem the city would face when the currently permitted parts of the landfill reached 
capacity in eight to ten years, and the City Council began to consider the options of using 
another landfill to dispose of the waste or expanding the existing landfill. The latter 
option was met by strong opposition from local resid nts, who had begun voicing 
complaints about the landfill as early as 1995, citing health problems, blowing trash, foul-
smelling odors, garbage truck traffic, and the racial d scrimination they believed the 
landfill symbolized. As a result, the City Council decided in 2001 to close the landfill to 
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all municipal solid (household) waste. The landfill continued to take construction waste 
and was used for a small volume of household waste in order to keep its permit valid. 
After 2006, household waste was transported approximately 62 miles to Republic 
Services’ Uwharrie Environmental Landfill in Montgomery County, costing the city a 
total of around 12 million dollars a year (Green 2011). After the 2009 municipal election 
brought a conservative majority, backed by the tea party, to power on the platform of 
cutting spending and keeping taxes low, the City Council began soliciting proposals from 
several private companies to reopen the landfill to household waste. This led to the 
revitalization of opposition to the landfill, comprised of an alliance of environmental 
justice proponents, neighborhood residents, former ayors and other politicians of 
moderate persuasion, and white progressives, which ultimately managed to block the 
proposed reopening   
Over a period of two years, local activists opposed to the landfill came together to 
form the main social movement organization of this movement, the Citizens for 
Economic and Environmental Justice (CEEJ). By early 2011, this social movement 
organization had become the major force behind the opposition movement. Coalitions 
were also formed between it and other local groups, including the League of Women 
Voters of the Piedmont Triad, making for an unusual co lition between traditional 
proponents of environmental justice and “modernizer” whites (Luebke 1998). The 
modernizers, although not directly concerned with environmental justice, were concerned 
about the landfill hindering economic development in the northeast district, as well as the 
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possibility of racial tensions making Greensboro an unattractive destination for potential 
businesses and residents.  
Several key factors thus distinguish this case from typical disputes over siting 
environmental hazards. In the typical case, a large corporation or government agency 
attempts to develop an environmentally hazardous site in a predominantly poor or 
minority neighborhood. Opposition arises, with the residents of the area, often with 
progressive groups or organizations as allies, opposing the development forces. In this 
case, however, opponents of the landfill were not battling a large corporation that wanted 
to construct a new environmental hazard; the site for the landfill already existed. Instead, 
the movement against the White Street Landfill arose a  a countermovement to the local 
wing of a national movement to keep taxes low and cut government spending, sometimes 
referred to as the “tea party” movement. This means that the local movement to keep the 
landfill closed was pitted against the effects of a competing movement focused on cutting 
the municipal spending and taxes, which had brought a conservative majority to 
Greensboro’s City Council. 
The main research question this thesis examines is: how did the grassroots 
environmental justice movement in Greensboro manage to block the reopening of the 
White Street Landfill? In particular, how did the movement utilize social movement 
strategies, mobilize resources, form coalitions, and combine environmental justice and 
other framings of the issue? Moreover, how effective or ineffective was each of these 
aspects of the movement in achieving its goal, and what were the main obstacles (e.g. 
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local conservative groups, the media, the economic state of the country/city) that the 
movement had to overcome and what strategies did ituse? 
Of particular interest are the arguments and framings used. One of the 
movement’s main arguments focused on the belief that environmental (in)justice and 
environmental racism were at work in the reopening of the landfill. The neighboring 
residents and activist groups opposed to reopening the landfill claimed that the reopening 
would result in numerous problems (health issues, loud noise, blowing trash, foul odors) 
and discrimination against the majority African American population inhabiting this 
district. They also claimed it would damage the city’s image and hinder economic 
growth. On the other side, right-wing media outlets, politically conservative City Council 
members, and other politically conservative individuals denied or ignored claims of 
environmental racism and emphasized that the reopening of the landfill would save the 
city millions of dollars by cutting municipal spendi g, as well as keeping taxes low. They 
also sometimes countered the argument by residents of the White Street area that the 
reopening represented housing discrimination by noting that the landfill existed prior to 
the neighborhood being established in the area.  
This case also reveals how the arguments of local social movements and 
governmental policies are shaped by local history, culture, and traditions.  While 
Greensboro’s white leaders have often touted the city’s progressive stance on racial 
issues (Chafe 1980), recurring racial conflicts have called the city’s progressive image 
into question. While the historic sit-in by four A&T University students at the downtown 
Greensboro Woolworth’s counter helped to ignite the civil rights movement in the early 
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1960s, the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi shooting of five members of The Communist Worker’s 
Party, a biracial group, in 1979 compromised the city’s racial relations image. The 
Greensboro Police Department’s lack of response to the shootout, followed by the 
acquittal of all the gunmen, emphasized how racial discrimination and injustices still 
persisted in the city. Racial conflict in the Greensboro Police Department has also 
emerged recently, as a former chief of police was accused of discriminating against a 
group of black police officers. The White Street Landfill controversy thus simultaneously 
heightened racial and class tensions against the backdrop of Greensboro’s history and 
manifested some aspects of the city’s progressive image. (For further historical details, 
see Appendix A.)  
The primary data source was semi-structured interviews with 19 people who were 
directly involved in the landfill controversy. Other information came from local 
newspapers, public records, and other documents, includi g video recordings of the City 
Council meetings and agendas from the grassroots environmental justice organization’s 
meetings and rallies. Participant observation at several meetings and rallies was also used 
as a supplemental data source.  
 Chapter two summarizes the relevant bodies of literature about urban politics, 
social movement theory, and grassroots environmental justice movements. Chapter three 
describes the research methods used in this study. Chapters four and five summarize and 
discuss the interview findings. Chapter six summarizes the landfill controversy and 
overarching conclusions, and discusses implications f r theory and further research.
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
 Within the social science literature, three bodies of literature are particularly 
relevant to understanding the White Street Landfill controversy: theory and research 
about urban politics, theory and research about social movements, and literature about 
grassroots environmental justice movements. This chapter reviews each of these bodies 
of literature, which guided the development of research questions for the study.  
Urban Politics 
North Carolina Politics 
In Tar Heel Politics 2000 (1998), Paul Luebke, sociologist and representative in 
North Carolina’s state legislature, provides the most c mprehensive available 
sociological analysis of the state’s politics. Luebk  notes the state’s progressive image 
and policies relative to other southern states on ec omic and political change. He 
emphasizes, however, that the state’s political picture is more complex than its image 
might suggest. The state does have a small number of modern day “progressives,” who 
incline toward the politics of the left. However, “beginning in the 1960s and continuing 
until the present, [most of] North Carolina’s politicians and business leaders have chosen 
policies consistent with one of two competing ideologies: modernism and traditionalism” 
(Luebke 1998:19). While traditionalists feel “threat ned by change and growth,” 
modernizers “expect to benefit from change and growth” (Luebke 1998:viii). “The 
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competing ideals do not correlate neatly with party label” (Luebke 1998:19); however, 
southern traditionalists tend to be Republicans, while modernizers and progressives tend 
to be Democrats.  
Traditionalists 
The main emphasis of North Carolina traditionalists ha  been reinforcement of the 
“established social order” in the state (Luebke 1998:20). Traditionalists, therefore, do not 
typically support political and economic changes that could provide everyone with equal 
rights and dilute the power of white, native-born, heterosexual, males. For example, they 
oppose policies that support affirmative action for blacks or women, immigration, and 
gay marriage. Traditionalists are also typically against increased government spending 
and tax increases, favoring small government with a limited mandate (Luebke 1998). 
Traditionalists are typically native-born, white males who subscribe to the 
fundamentalism of “the Baptist-based culture of North Carolina’s small towns and rural 
areas” (Luebke 1998:20). Tobacco farmers, other agriculturalists, and textile, furniture, or 
apparel industrialists are often traditionalists (Luebke 1998).  
Modernizers  
The main emphasis of the modernizers, by contrast, is economic expansion. 
Modernizers encourage bringing in industries that will create jobs for North Carolinians 
and bring people into the state, which, in turn, benefits the state’s economy. The 
modernizer’s ideal society is “dynamic and growing” (Luebke 1998:24), so they 
“continually seek to diversify the state’s economy” (p.23). Consequently, their stances on 
minority (e.g. race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation) rights and taxation differ 
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greatly from the traditionalists’. For the state to gr w economically, modernizers believe 
that opportunity must be available for minorities to be active in the labor force and have 
their voices heard in politics. While “modernizer ideology has been shaped by educated 
and affluent white males,” (Luebke 1998:23) it is not as devoted to maintaining the 
established social order in relationships among white men, women, and blacks, especially 
when that established order hinders economic growth. In addition, modernizers are not 
rigidly opposed to increased taxation as are the traditionalists. When economic growth is 
at stake, modernizers will choose increased taxation over policies that would hinder the 
economic development. They also oppose policies that might tarnish the positive image 
of the state and keep it from attracting outside investment or new residents. Modernizers 
are typically white males and females, more secular th n traditionalists, who reside in 
major cities in the North Carolina Piedmont (Luebke 1998). “Bankers, developers, retails 
merchants, the news media, and other representatives of the business community” are 
often modernizers (Luebke 1998:viii).  
Progressives 
 The main emphasis of progressives, the smallest of the three political groupings, 
has been promoting economic and political change for the benefit of the middle- and low-
income majority. Since the late 1940s, progressive ideology in North Carolina has also 
included advocating for racial justice (Luebke 1998). Today, progressivism emphasizes 
both racial justice and economic populism. It “oppose[s] tax breaks for the wealthy and 
big corporations and advocate[s] more direct tax benefits and government spending for 
middle- and low-income citizens” (Luebke 1998:26). Blacks politicians are typically 
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progressives, as are a small number of whites from liberal districts, although many black 
politicians have conservative views on social issue (Luebke 1998).   
Summary and Implications for Research 
Luebke’s analysis indicates that traditionalists support policies that maintain the 
established social and moral order of the state, while modernizers focus their attention on 
policies that enable continued economic growth. Progressives emphasize the importance 
of racial, political, and economic equality. Modernizers acknowledge the necessity of 
having women and blacks participating in politics and having the opportunity to 
contribute to the expansion of the state’s economy, and they are not afraid to support 
policies that require municipal spending and an increase in taxes, as long as the policies 
will be contributing to a dynamic and economically expanding state. Traditionalists, for 
their part, generally strongly oppose taxes and favor small government, while 
progressives favor a tax structure that promotes equality and an activist government.  
 Luebke’s typology proves very revealing when applied to the White Street 
Landfill controversy. Representing the traditionalists, the tea party-oriented and 
conservative citizens, media, and City Council membrs wanted to reopen the landfill in 
order to cut taxes. They also proved to be relatively insensitive to the city’s racial 
politics. In contrast, the core of the opposition t the landfill reopening came from the 
progressives, mainly black Greensboro residents. These progressives saw the reopening 
as racial and class discrimination, and supported th  higher taxes required in order to 
keep the landfill closed. Some prominent Greensboro modernizers also played a key role 
in the grassroots movement to keep the landfill closed. Several recent mayors and current 
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City Council members, in particular, clearly subscribed to the modernizer ideal that 
emphasizes economic growth over holding taxes down and saw smooth race relations as 
a way to attract business. Although reopening the landfill would clearly have reduced 
municipal spending, the modernizers insisted that it would hinder economic expansion 
not only in Greensboro’s northeast district, but in the city as a whole. Thus, these 
modernizers, whether or not they directly related the landfill issue to social justice, were 
strongly opposed to reopening the landfill to household waste.  
Luebke’s analysis suggests a close look at how the landfill issue was interpreted 
and presented by various leaders and interest groups. Several questions in the interview 
addressed this topic, beginning with asking respondents to identify particular leaders and 
groups that clearly opposed or supported a reopening of the landfill and about the kinds 
of leaders or groups that opposed or supported it. There were also questions about the 
perceived motivations and priorities of these leaders, particularly about why the 
respondent thought these leaders opposed or supported the landfill reopening.  
Urban Politics 
 Luebke’s analysis is useful for defining the parameters within which urban 
politics operate, but other literature is more usefl for analyzing the dynamics of urban 
politics. Researchers studying urban politics in the United States have developed three 
major models for understanding urban politics: the elit  model, the growth machine 
model, and the pluralist model. The elite model holds that a small group of economically 
and/or socially elite citizens controls decision-making in a city. This model was first 
developed in Floyd Hunter’s (1953) study of Atlanta. He claimed that a core group of 
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people, the city’s elite, more or less dictated decisions about almost all of the core issues 
facing the city, including how tax dollars were spent on economic development, from 
behind the scenes. Hunter found that the elite mainly came from the top of the corporate 
ladder and that its members were tightly intertwined. They had often attended the same 
schools, sat on each other’s corporate boards, joined the same elite clubs and 
organizations, and generally married people of the same social standing. They could thus 
exert great influence over major political decisions.  
Hunter’s model of community power was supported by many other urban power 
structure researchers (e.g. Miller 1970); however, Hunter’s (1980) restudy and Stone’s 
(1989) study of Atlanta criticized it. According to b th Stone and Domhoff, it is “largely 
inevitable” (Stone 1989:87) that these governing coaliti ns will include business-led 
insiders, whom Domhoff (2007) sees as mainly the downt wn land owners and 
developers in the city. 
The Pluralist Model 
The pluralist model argues that “community power is not held by a small, 
cohesive elite. Rather, power is shared among different local elites” (Phillips 1996:317). 
The key study in the development of the model and its application to local politics was 
Robert Dahl’s (1961) study of New Haven, Connecticut. In New Haven, Dahl found that 
the city had numerous interest groups focusing on issues such as education, urban 
redevelopment, and political elections. These groups focused only on the issues of 
specific interest to them in order to exert power over decisions involving those particular 
issues. While Dahl’s study on New Haven was criticized by Domhoff (1978), who 
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reexamined Dahl’s findings and argued against their support of a pluralist power 
structure, it remains a classic and oft-cited case study offering evidence of a contrasting 
power structure to the elite model.  
Interest Groups in the Pluralist Model 
In the pluralist model, “the fundamental unit of analysis is the ‘interest group’” 
(Knoke 1990:16). Truman (1971) defines an interest group as “any group that, on the 
basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in society” 
(p. 33). Interest groups may focus on various issue, including economic development, 
social and economic justice, nature conservation, and environmental justice. Typically, 
interest groups do not try to influence decisions that are irrelevant to them, so as to avoid 
using up their resources. The pluralist model, therefore, emphasizes that “each group 
pursues issues that are of narrow interest to its organization,” (p. 70) and each is usually 
able to exert at least some influence in its specialized area (Hurst 2009).  
According to Knoke (1990), the focus of interest group efforts is government. As 
each of these groups pursues its interests, it “interac s through various political 
processes” (Knoke 1990:16) to exert pressure on the gov rnment to make policy 
decisions it favors. These political processes include “competitive elections, incremental 
group negotiations and bargaining, and legislative lobbying” (Knoke 1990:16). Specific 
interest group tactics include obtaining signatures and sending petitions to local city 
council members or state representatives, lobbying politicians, organizing demonstrations 
outside of government buildings, making campaign cotributions to political candidates 
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who support their  cause, and/or publicly endorsing candidates whom they believe will 
support policies that align with their interests.  
Pluralists believe that effective political engagement primarily means working 
through particular interest groups (Dahl 1967; Petracca 1992; Hurst 2009), as individuals 
acting alone are rarely effective. In fact, individual citizens have little direct role “in the 
processes of agenda-building, policy formation, or p licy resolution, except insofar as 
they voted in competitive elections” (Petracca 1992:5).  
The ability of various interest groups to attract support for their causes, including 
building opposition to policies that conflict with eir goals, is the key factor in 
influencing policy decisions. In particular, it is important for these groups to build 
“informal networks of collective action, such as coalitions” (Diani 1992:16). In 
coalitions, groups with separate foci establish alliances with one another in order to 
maximize the support for specific issues (Diani 1992). Contending coalitions of interest 
groups are the main contenders in most political controversies. Most decisions made in 
response to such competing interests “are compromises fought out within the political 
system” (Markham 2008:16) and reflect the relative power of these contending coalitions. 
 According to the pluralist model, it is often important for weaker interest groups 
to demonstrate mass support for their cause because ma s support can influence elections 
and norms of democracy call for considering the wishes of the majority. As Knoke 
(1990) put it, “perhaps public officials take dust raised by policy battles as a sign that 
fundamental values are at stake, and that resolution requires concessions by all sides” (p. 
231). Thus, the pluralist model suggests that 
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associations that can demonstrate mass backing for their policy proposals can 
better persuade public officials that something important is at stake. Flooding 
congressional offices with bags of mail or stacking district meetings with 
constituent supporters can effectively convince vote- and dollar-conscious 
legislators to treat demands seriously (Knoke 1990:231). 
 
 
The Growth Machine 
A much more recent model of urban politics is what H rvey Molotch (1976) 
termed “the growth machine” model. Molotch (1976) noted that most urban political 
controversies center around a city’s growth and economic development. The growth 
machine is the set of interest groups, such busines owners and real estate developers, 
that often form a coalition to support economic growth, which these groups see as the 
most important factor in the city’s well-being. They are usually able to get their way 
because opposition comes only from a smaller number of weaker groups, such as 
environmentalists or neighborhood associations. 
Summary and Implications for Research 
Each of these models might well help to explain some aspects of Greensboro 
politics, such as decisions to expand the Greensboro C liseum or offer tax breaks to 
attract new employers, but they are also relevant to the White Street Landfill dispute in 
particular. The growth machine is relevant because some Greensboro residents opposed 
the reopening particularly because they believed it would hinder the city’s growth and 
economic development. Aspects of the elite model might be relevant if there was behind 
the scenes activity by local business elite to try to get the landfill reopened. The pluralist 
model, however, is most directly applicable to thiscontroversy because of the interest 
groups involved and the anti-landfill movement’s influence on the dispute’s outcome.  
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The literature about the pluralist model of power in politics argues that no central 
elite influences all policy-making; instead, various groups with particular interests are 
able to exert at least some influence over decisions relevant to their interests. The 
literature suggests that by supporting interest groups, ordinary citizens are able to 
influence policy decisions; otherwise they are usually ineffectual. As the interest group 
engages in various political processes, such as circulating petitions or endorsing political 
candidates, it emphasizes its support and ability to help or hurt the politicians who are 
making the decisions. Government then considers the demands  and relative strength of 
competing coalitions of interest groups and reflects their relative strength in its decisions.   
In the White Street Landfill controversy, various Greensboro interest groups 
aligned with the views of the progressives and the modernizers sought to keep the landfill 
closed, while “tea party” oriented conservatives, aligned with the traditionalist ideology, 
attempted to get the landfill reopened. Through interviews with knowledgeable persons 
and participants in the controversy, this thesis examines the roles, relative influence, and 
degree of success of key leaders and groups in the controversy. 
Several questions in the interview schedule address the effect of community 
power structure. I asked interviewees to identify ke leaders and groups in the 
controversy and about their perceptions of the leaders’ and groups’ motivations and 
interests in opposing or supporting the landfill reop ning.  Other questions addressed how 
much influence these leaders and groups had and how they exerted it, including questions 
about the strategies and tactics the leaders and groups used to try to influence the media, 
the City Council, and the companies that were bidding for the management of the landfill.  
17 
 
Social Movement Theory 
Social Movements 
Diani (1992) defines social movements as consisting of a network of “individuals, 
groups and/or organisations, engaged in a political and/or cultural conflict on the basis of 
a shared collective identity” (p. 3). This definition includes counter movements, which 
arise to try to oppose goals of another movement. Various theories of social movements 
exist; however, those most relevant for this study are resource mobilization theory and 
social constructionism and framing.  
Resource Mobilization Theory 
Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) focuses on how resources are acquired and 
mobilized to found and continue movements, as well as the importance of social 
movement organizations (SMOs) for the maintenance ad success of movements. RMT 
was developed in the United States following the movements and waves of protest that 
occurred in the 1960s and 1970s (Klandermans 1986).  Refuting claims that social 
movements were based on irrational actions, “resource mobilization offered an 
alternative perspective by arguing that collective action is a rational response that only 
can occur when adequate resources are available” (Caniglia and Carmin 2005:202). RMT 
argues that movement goals, objectives, and strategies need to be selected to attract 
resources and widespread support without completely alienating powerful actors who 
could block the movement. 
 The major role of SMOs is to serve as coordinating nodes for movements (Soule 
and Snow 2009). According to RMT, this involves bringing together a group of people 
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with common concerns to work together within the framework of a formally established 
organization to work for the particular change the movement desires. RMT scholars 
emphasize that the successful functioning of an SMO involves establishing clear goals, 
mobilizing resources, selecting and utilizing effective strategies and tactics, and forming 
cooperative relationships with other groups (Soule and Snow 2009).   
Strategic Leadership, Ideology, and Goals 
RMT emphasizes the key role of leaders in creating social movement ideology, 
obtaining and managing movement and SMO resources, and choosing goals, strategies, 
and tactics. According to Edwards and McCarthy (2004), coordination, strategic effort, 
and effective organizational skills are all required to acquire and pool resources and 
create collective action. 
 Leadership is particularly important in the initial stages of a movement when 
forming the movement’s ideology. “Ideology” is defined broadly as the movement’s “set 
of beliefs” about a problem’s nature, causes, and possible solutions, A movement’s 
ideology guides its strategies and is the basis of its participants’ “collective identity” 
(Diani 1992:8). Although “‘collective identity’ does not imply complete homogeneity of 
ideas and orientations within social movement networks” (p. 9), movement ideology does 
embody the shared beliefs of movement participants d can help to attract additional 
support.  
According to Soule and Snow (2009), social movement organization leadership 
can be either a single person, often with a charismatic personality, or a group of members 
who have a clear and shared sense of the organization’s mission. In the case of a group of 
19 
 
leaders, the leadership structure is often non-hierarchical, and at times less formal. Such 
leadership structures sometimes emerge when a group consciously establishes a non-
hierarchical organization that has neither formal le ders nor a centralized operational 
style. Instead, such organizations purposefully “develop a participatory democratic style 
that encourages the development of leadership skills in all members and decision making 
through consensus” (Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000:579), but it can also slow decision-
making. As Caniglia and Carmin (2005) note, a higher degree of SMO formalization can 
facilitate goal attainment, resource acquisition, and mobilization capacity. Greater 
formalization can also increase the operational effici ncy and legitimacy of the group.  
On the other hand, SMOs with looser leadership structu es can often change course more 
easily to deal with emerging issues or changing circumstances.  
Mobilizing Resources 
According to RMT scholars, the greater the access a movement’s constituents 
have to resources, and the movement’s ability to ge them to contribute these resources, 
the greater chance it has to succeed (McCarthy and Z ld 1977; Klandermans 1986). 
Resources, such as time and money, can come from those who stand to benefit from the 
movement, but SMOs often obtain financial support from conscience constituents, such 
as foundations and wealthy individuals, who support the movement financially even 
though they do not stand to directly benefit from its efforts (McCarthy and Zald 1977). 
Resources are not limited to financial contributions. Volunteer labor, as well as “moral” 
resources, such as legitimacy, solidarity, and sympathetic support from politicians or 
celebrities, and cultural resources, such as specialized knowledge, technological abilities, 
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and media/cultural products related to movement, are also needed (Edwards and 
McCarthy 2004). Interorganizational cooperation andcoalition building, can provide 
SMOs with additional access to resources (Soule and Snow 2009).   
Strategies and Tactics 
Leadership, organizational structure, and ideology are all essential factors in 
selecting movement strategies and tactics. As Markham (2008) noted in his study of 
German environmental organizations, “constituencies inside and outside of the 
organization often differ about…their assessments of he efficacy and acceptability of 
various strategies” (p. 289). For instance, movements must decide how radical or 
confrontational to be, as well as whether the potential societal benefits of the movement’s 
activities outweigh the risk to the activists (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Environmental 
organizations, in particular, often face the dilemma of using confrontational strategies, 
such as “noisy or violent demonstrations” (p. 290) or boycotts, versus cooperation with 
government and business (Markham 2008). In some cases, organizational constraints, 
such as lacking the knowledge or means to rally large groups of people, may lead the 
group to use less confrontational tactics (Soule and S ow 2009), and a costs/benefit 
analysis may be necessary to determine which approach will be most advantageous in 
achieving the organization’s goals.  
Groups lacking political connections, economic clout, and skills with coping with 
bureaucracy tend to use more confrontational tactics when trying to influence policy 
decisions.  Soule and Snow (2009) provide an example of how confrontational, non-
violent tactics and strategic planning by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the civil rights 
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movement led to the Voting Rights Act in 1965. Upon reaching Birmingham, Alabama, 
King’s peaceful demonstration was met by brutal attacks by police, which, upon being 
televised for the entire nation to see, forced the government to respond and begin to 
change policies that discriminated against African Americans.  
An SMO’s organizational structure and ideology can also influence strategies and 
tactics. The underlying values of the movement’s major constituents influence the 
campaign tactics and type of language it uses in articulating its cause (Soule and Snow 
2009). For instance, historically, peace and civil r ghts activists have based their tactics 
on their underlying principles of pacifism and religious values, which led them to use 
nonviolent protest tactics and, in cases like the civil rights movement, to employ biblical 
references in their arguments (Soule and Snow 2009).  
While present day social movements continue to use tactics and strategies from 
the protest wave of the 1960s, such as sit-ins, marches, and demonstrations, tactical 
innovation and adaptation are often needed to adapt to changed circumstances. Advanced 
technology, for instance, plays an ever larger role in modern SMO networking, 
accumulation of resources, and mobilization of actors (Soule and Snow 2009). In 
particular, many modern social movements use the Internet as a tactical innovation to 
attract constituents, cyber-social network, strategize, and communicate with other groups, 
both local and abroad. The uprising in the Middle East and North Africa, known as the 
Arab Spring, and the Occupy X protests across the United States illustrate how large-
scale cyber-social networking can work to ignite a movement. In Tunisia in January, 
2011, for example, organized unions, social activists, journalists, professors, students, 
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and hundreds of thousands of others had joined forces on the social media website known 
as Facebook, one of the few networking and video-sharing sites that had not yet been 
censored by the Tunisian government (Coll 2011). Within the next month, this cyber-
social networking led to such massive riots and revolts that Tunisia’s dictator fled the 
country.  
Building and Coordinating Coalitions 
Coalition formation can often be beneficial to organiz tions in a social movement, 
although there can also be disadvantages. Alliances and collaboration can increase the 
success of an SMO because of the pool of resources and kills made available to the 
group, which also allows for sharing responsibilities and dividing labor among the groups 
(Klandermans 1986; Soule and Snow 2009). However, Zald and McCarthy (1977) 
believe that having more organizations involved can also increase competition and 
conflicts among the SMOs (Soule and Snow 2009), particularly when there are 
differences in the goals, constituencies, and organizational styles among the groups. Such 
conflict can lead the groups to try to create distinct dentities for themselves as to not be 
in direct competition with one another for funding and resources (Soule and Snow 2009).  
Summary and Implications for Research  
 Literature about resource mobilization theory indicates that the key processes 
involved in an SMO’s success include having strong rganizational leadership, an 
ideology that attracts support and leads to workable strategies, defining clear goals, 
attracting constituents and mobilizing resources, and choosing effective strategies and 
tactics. The literature suggests that a strong leader, or group of leaders, is often key for 
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the successful functioning of an SMO and is responsible for developing an initial 
ideology of the group. Clear goals also need to be defined in the early stages of the SMO 
formation in order to attract constituents and obtain resources. Generally, these goals will 
be based on the views of the leader and the common concerns of the group. 
 An SMO’s ideology and goals serve to attract constituents to the group and guide 
the choices of strategies and tactics. The constituents play a major role in delivering 
resources to the movement. They may make financial contributions, attract additional 
support through networking, help form coalitions with other groups, which often provide 
additional resources, and/or participate in the SMO’s public action events. The 
constituents may, however, not always agree on the kinds of strategies and tactics that 
should be utilized. Strategic leadership is often neded in these decisions, and the 
ideology and goals of the SMO, in addition to costs/benefits analysis, typically guide the 
decision-making process.  
 The interview schedule included items about how various organizations formed in 
opposition to or support of the White Street Landfill, including questions about 
leadership, constituents, and how resources were mobilized. I inquired about the founding 
member(s) of the organization, the relationship among the founding members, the 
demographics of the supporters, and how the organization attracted members. Regarding 
the organization’s resources, the interview included questions about the various kinds of 
resources to which it had access, including financil, volunteer labor, and others. 
 Questions about the organization’s goals, strategies, and tactics were also 
included, including questions about the main goals f the organization, how the goals 
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were selected, whether the goals have changed since the organization first began, and 
how the goals guided the organization’s involvement in the landfill dispute. Also 
included were questions about the specific strategies that the organization used and how 
the organization chose these strategies, and whether ther  was internal opposition to any 
of the proposed the strategies/actions. Furthermore, there were questions about the 
perceived effectiveness of various strategies and actions. 
 During the dispute over the landfill, various local groups and media supported the 
effort to keep the landfill closed or have it reopened. Thus, questions about the formation 
of coalitions among these groups were also included, including questions about how the 
groups established contact, similarities and differences among the goals of the two 
groups, the problems these differences caused, and whether and how such conflicts were 
resolved.  
Social Constructionism and Framing 
The theory of social constructionism helps to understand how particular 
conditions come to be defined as social problems in need of solution. It is based on the 
assumption that acts, conditions, or occurrences ar not inherently “social problems;” 
they become so only when others, especially the media and politicians, deem them to be 
“problems” and convince the public, media, and politicians to define them that way 
(Schneider 1985). As Blumer (1971) put it years ago, social problems are “products of a 
process of collective definition rather than objective conditions and social arrangements” 
(p. 298). Clearly, persuading the public, media, and politicians to define existing 
conditions as problems in need of solution is a key aspect of building social movements.  
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Claims and Claimsmaking 
Spector and Kitsuse (1973) linked this argument to social movements by defining 
social problems as the result of “the activities of groups making assertions of grievances 
and claims to organizations, agencies and institutions about some putative conditions” (p. 
146). They and other social constructionists explain the creation of social problems, such 
as environmental problems, as the result of successful “claims,” which are often put 
forward by social movements. According to Hannigan (2006), there are “three primary 
foci for studying claimsmaking from a social construc ionist perspective: the claims 
themselves; the claims-makers; and the claims-making process” (p. 64). 
Social movement actors “use claims to legitimate and advance their agendas” 
(Gunter and Kroll-Smith 2007:16; emphasis in original). Past research suggests that 
successful claims-making depends partly on the chara teristics of the set of social actors 
making the claim (Hannigan 2006). For environmental problems, this set often includes 
scientists and experts, politicians, activists, andlocal citizens, each of whom must be 
viewed as “legitimate and authoritative sources of information” (p. 72) in order for their 
claims to be successful (Hannigan 2006). Scientists have been some of the most 
influential claims-makers due to their apparent expert knowledge and authority. In 
general, persuasive claims-makers are viewed as not making the claim based on their own 
self-interests but as working for the general good.  
One strategy for effective claimsmaking is to use evocative language and visual 
imagery and (Hannigan 2006). For example, Hannigan (2006) notes how the imagery of a 
“hole” (p. 70) in the ozone layer has created a meaningful way for people to understand 
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the damages to the atmosphere. While the processes involved with chlorofluorocarbons 
damaging the ozone layer may be difficult for non-scientists to comprehend, the image of 
the hole makes the damage easily understandable. The hole provides a framework in 
which people can then think about the ozone layer in terms that they understand. 
The media often play a key role in legitimizing or c ntesting claims 
(Schneider1985), as they can support, delegitimize, or change the definition of a claim. 
How much the media cover the issue and whether or not they are sympathetic to the 
movement or counter-movement claims-makers can also f ct r into the persuasiveness of 
the claims-makers and the popularity of a claim. 
Frames and Framing 
Also relevant to making movement claims “stick” is framing. The concept of a 
frame, first introduced in Goffman’s (1974) Frame Analysis, refers to broad “schemata of 
interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, p rceive, identify, and label” (p. 21) 
aspects of the world around them. A “primary framework,” is “one that is seen as 
rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that 
is meaningful” (Goffman 1974:21).  
Social movements engage in framing in order to create an appealing  context for 
their claims. To be successful, frames need to resonate with potential constituents, the 
media, and politicians. That is, in order for the claim to be perceived as involving a 
legitimate problem and proposed movement strategies to be seen as workable, it must fit 
into existing cultural values, beliefs, and narratives of the audience (Benford and Snow 
2000). As Benford and Snow (2000) state, “the more culturally believable the claimed 
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evidence…the more credible the framing and the broader its appe l” (p. 620). General 
framings used by many social movements, such as wasteful government spending and 
social justice, are referred to as “master frames” (Benford and Snow 2000:620). 
It is especially important that frames resonate with the media. According to 
Hannigan (2006), for social problems to be taken seriously by a wide audience, they 
“must receive media attention in which the relevant claim is ‘framed’” in a way that 
makes it seem “both real and important” (p. 77). The media can also create its own 
framing in order to “help both the journalist and the public make sense of issues and 
events and thereby inject them with meaning” (Hanniga  2006:81). With the media 
having the power to reach a wide variety of audiences, “both claims-makers and their 
opponents routinely compete to promote their favoured f ames to journalists as well as to 
potential supporters” (Hannigan 2006:81). 
“Counterframes,” are used to present the issue in a different light that leads to 
their rejection and provides a rationale for opponents’ own arguments (Benford and Snow 
2000). When counterframes are presented, the frame-makers on either side compete in 
what are generally referred to as “framing contests.” Such opposing framing can make 
movement activists defensive about their own framing. It can also force the movement 
“to develop and elaborate prognoses more clearly than otherwise might have been the 
case” (Benford and Snow 2000:617), as happens when opponents of  the pro-choice 
movement frame abortion as murder and force the proponents to elaborate their 
arguments about when life begins. According to Benford and Snow (2000), however, 
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relatively few studies have “shed much light on the factors that shape the outcomes of 
these framing contests” (p. 626). 
Summary and Implications for Research  
 Literature about social constructionism and framing indicates that conditions or 
events become problems when various social actors succeed in successfully designating 
them as such through claims-making and framing. Social movement actors thus claim 
that some situation or event is a problem and try to present their claim to others within a 
framework that gives the problem meaning and appeal. Social movements and SMOs can 
thus use claims-making and framing as a strategic tool to attract supporters and, 
ultimately, to influence political decisions and bring about change. For frames to gain 
widespread support, they must resonate with the audience to which they are presented 
and successfully compete with counter-frames, so move ents need to use framings that 
are culturally relevant and appealing to their constituents and community at large. Other 
social actors, especially the media, can serve to rinforce or delegitimize an SMO’s 
framing of the issue, and they can frame it in new ways. These various framings all play a 
role in attracting support to either side of the issue and in the eventual outcome of the 
controversy. 
To analyze the role of claims-making and framing in the White Street Landfill 
dispute, I used interview questions that addressed th  strategies, tactics, themes and 
arguments used by both the opposition and supporters of the proposed landfill reopening, 
as well as newspaper reports and other public documents for supplemental data. While it 
is fairly easy to ask people about their strategies for getting their ideas across, questions 
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about framing had to be more indirect, as it is a fairly abstract concept. I included 
questions about the claims made by the organizations involved, as well as the way in 
which the various SMOs and individuals presented th issue to others. In particular, there 
were questions about the common themes/arguments of the various social movement 
actors. The way in which the various actors presented the landfill issue were addressed by 
inquiring about whether there were certain phrases that the various actors used. Finally, 
the interviewees were asked if they believed that te way in which the organization 
presented the issue affected the outcome of the dispute.  
Grassroots Environmental Justice Movements 
Environmental Justice  
In terms of the research questions for this thesis, an especially important part of 
the social movements literature is literature about grassroots environmental justice 
movements. In such movements, claims about environmental justice are claims about the 
intersection of ecological hazards and social inequalities (Pellow 2004). According to 
Bullard (1996), environmental justice is the principle that “all people and communities 
are entitled to equal protection of environmental and public health laws and regulations” 
(p. 495). Thus, when locally unwanted land uses (LULUs), such as toxic dumps, landfills, 
incinerators, and polluting industries, are disproportionately located in low socio-
economic status and/or minority communities, justice, .e., the right of all people to a safe 
and healthy environment, is compromised.  
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Environmental Injustice in Toxic Waste Dumping 
In his classic study Dumping in Dixie, Bullard (1990) defines environmental 
discrimination as involving the “disparate treatment of a group or community based on 
race, class, or some other distinguishing characteristic” (p. 9) – the opposite of 
environmental justice. Through multiple case studies, he highlighted how low-income 
minority communities were targeted for toxic dumping across the southern United States. 
He found that such communities not only lacked the financial resources to fight the 
construction of an environmentally hazardous site through strategies such as hiring 
lawyers to file suit against the developer or government officials, but were also victims of 
institutional racism (Bullard 1990).  That is, the istory of denying minorities, especially 
African Americans, inheritance, property, and voting rights, the history of discrimination 
in educational opportunities and employment, and the racial segregation of 
neighborhoods all contributed to the environmental i justices minorities have faced 
(Brulle and Pellow 2006).  
Bullard’s research in Dumping in Dixie supported the findings of the most 
influential studies conducted during the 1980s. Comprehensive studies were also 
conducted by the General Accounting Office in 1986, the United Church of Christ 
Commission on Racial Justice in 1986, and Mohai and Bryant in 1992 to examine the 
linkages between the placement of hazardous treatment, storage, and disposal facilities 
and the racial composition of communities (Anderton, Douglas L., Andy B. Anderson, 
John Michael Oakes, and Michael R. Fraser 1994; Pellow 2004). The General 
Accounting Office study showed that the majority of the population surrounding three of 
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the four hazardous landfills studied was black, and the United Church of Christ (UCC) 
study concluded that “race proved to be the most significant variables tested in 
association with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities” (Commission, 
UCC 1987:xiii as cited in Anderton et al. 1994:231). The findings of these studies 
exemplify a specific form of environmental injustice, “environmental racism” (Agyeman 
2002:35; Edelstein 2004; Brulle and Pellow 2006), which the Reverend Benjamin 
Chavis, Jr. referred to in 1982 as “any policy, practice, or directive that differentially 
affects or disadvantages (whether intended or uninte ded) individuals, groups, or 
communities based on race or color” (Brulle and Pellow 2006).    
Some studies, such as Mohai and Bryant’s systematic eta-analysis of empirical 
studies (1992; see also Brulle and Pellow 2006), concluded that “race is more importantly 
related to the distribution of hazards than income” (p. 174), but there are also many 
examples of discrimination based on class, including Levine’s (1982) study of the toxic 
dumpsite in Love Canal, Niagara Falls, New York, and much research since then has 
supported the claim that both “communities of color and low-income neighborhoods are 
disproportionately burdened with a range of environme tal hazards” (Pellow 2004:511). 
Indeed, “scholars have produced an extensive and sophisticated literature on the 
dimensions of differential environmental risks based on race and socio-economic 
position” (Brulle and Pellow 2006:105). Reviews of empirical evidence and relevant 
literature by Brown in 1995, Szasz and Meuser in 1997, and Evans and Kantrowitz in 
2002 each demonstrated that “significant relationships exist between the ethnic and class 
characteristics of a community and levels of exposure to environmental risk”  (Brulle and 
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Pellow 2006:105). These environmental risks included such components as “proximity to 
hazardous waste sites, exposures to air and water pollution, high levels of ambient noise, 
residential crowding, quality of housing, quality of l cal schools, and the work 
environment” (Brulle and Pellow 2006:105). More recently, Ringquist (2005) found that 
this pattern has been evident throughout the past two decades, as well.            
Evidence for discrimination based on color and class in the siting of toxic dumps 
is relatively persuasive. However, several of the key studies have been questioned and 
criticized. Bowen (2002) asserts that the oft-cited General Accounting Office and United 
Church of Christ studies were deficient in their methodologies. The GAO study contained 
“no formal comparisons with other areas, no manipulations, and no controls” (p. 5), and 
the UCC’s use of zip code areas were “clearly too large a geographical area for such a 
study and are apt to lead to erroneous inferences” (p. 6). On the other hand, Kriesel and 
Centner’s 1996 study of the exposure of minorities to environmental risks, which was 
based on census blocks groups in Georgia and Ohio, s owed differences in the 
significance of race according to the independent variables included in the analysis. 
While race was significant when only race and poverty were included, Kriesel and 
Centner (1996) did not find it to be significant when education, transportation, and 
industrial location were included in the analysis. In a similar national study based on 
census tracts, Anderson et al. (1994) did not find consistent, statistically significant 
patterns in the location of the environmentally hazardous sites. Still, the weight of the 
evidence suggests that environmental injustice is a widespread and significant 
phenomenon. 
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Environmental Injustice in Siting Sanitary Landfill s 
In looking at these studies, it is important to distinguish “toxic waste sites” from  
“solid waste” sites, generally referred to as “dumps” or, “euphemistically, sanitary 
landfills” (Szasz and Meuser 1997:102). While most of the literature is about toxic 
dumps, studies of sanitary landfills have also shown environmental discrimination based 
on race and class. In Bullard’s earlier work in 1983, he had examined solid waste 
disposal in Houston to find the percentage of African Americans living near the vicinity 
of these disposal sites. Of the 25 sites Bullard identified, “six of the eight incinerators and 
15 out of 17 landfills were in predominately black neighborhoods” (Bowen 2002:5). 
Been, using improved research methods, confirmed that eight out of the nine solid waste 
sites in Houston were “located in neighborhoods with h gher, often much higher 
proportion of African Americans than the rest of the city” (Szasz and Meuser 1997:102-
103).  
On the other hand, a national-level study conducted by the General Accounting 
Office in 1995 found that “neither minorities nor lw-income people…overrepresented 
near landfills in any consistent manner” (General Accounting Office 1995:20). Also, 
Markham and Rufa’s (1997) study, which used census tracts to analyze the demographics 
of the recipients of municipal solid waste and “sewer streams” in a sample of U.S. cities, 
reports similar findings. Their results “provide little support for the hypotheses that cities 
direct their solid waste and sewage to landfills, incinerators, and sewage treatment plants 
in census tracts with higher proportions of minority and low-socioeconomic status 
residents than are found in the cities themselves” (Markham and Rufa 1997:242). In 
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general, studies about environmental discrimination in siting sanitary landfill show mixed 
results, often varying according to the research methods used.  
Explanations for Environmental Inequities 
Over the past three decades, researchers have offerd va ious explanations for 
environmental injustice, including actions of businesses and local governments that put 
private profit before public and environmental health nd pick the path of least resistance, 
siting LULUs in neighborhoods they believe will offer the least resistance (Bullard 1990; 
Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss 2001). The majority of these studies have presumed racial 
and class discrimination to be reasons behind siting toxic dumps and sanitary landfills in 
poor and minority neighborhoods. Intentionality of such discrimination is difficult to 
prove, however. 
The history of institutional racism in the US (Bullard 1990, 1996) also contributes 
to environmental injustices. Throughout the history f the United States, institutional 
racism has helped to create barriers that prevent equal protection from environmental 
hazards in minority communities. People still today are steered by real estate agents into 
certain neighborhoods based on their race/ethnicity, which typically increases the 
aggregate of political and economic clout for white communities and decreases it for non-
white communities (Pellow 2004). As Pellow (2004) emphasizes, a combination of these 
factors, in addition to corporations and local governments putting profit over 
environmental health, must be taken into account. That is, when corporations and 
government officials are seeking out the path of least resistance when locating a site for 
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an environmentally hazardous facility, the neighboro ds that typically emerge are those 
with minority and lower socio-economic status populations (Brulle and Pellow 2006).    
Summary and Implications for Research 
Literature about environmental (in)justice indicates hat minorities and the poor 
are disproportionately affected by environmental hazards in the US, although this 
conclusion has been questioned, especially in the cas of sanitary landfills. The literature 
suggests that corporate and government officials often target poor and minority 
communities for these sites because they are seen a the “paths of least resistance.” 
Compared to white and higher socio-economic status reas, these communities typically 
lack the political and economic power to keep the sites out of their neighborhoods. 
 Information was obtained from newspapers and other historical and public 
documents to address whether institutional racism may have led to the concentrations of 
minorities in the part of town where the landfill is located. It was expected that questions 
about whether race/class were factors in the decision to reopen the landfill would be 
answered in the negative by proponents; however, I asked the opponents these questions 
to see whether they perceive this as a case of environmental racism. I also asked the 
proponents about why they thought reopening the landfill was a good idea.  
NIMBY and Environmental Justice Movements 
 The siting of LULUs has often stirred up resistance from nearby communities, 
leading to so-called NIMBY (Not-In-My-BackYard) disputes. Opposition is typically 
strongest among residents who live in or near the area of the site. In some cases, the 
residents are not opposed to the facility per se – o long as it is located elsewhere. Their 
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concern is the threat it poses to their lives and the health of their families if placed in their 
neighborhood (Gunter and Kroll-Smith 2007). Oppositi n groups typically “begin by 
attempting to document a hazard and link it to a current or potential health problem, such 
as a cluster of cancer cases or a series of adverse reproductive outcomes” (Freudenberg 
and Steinsapir 1992:29). The groups often use scientists, public health officials, and 
lawyers to legitimize their efforts to keep the facility out of their neighborhoods 
(Freudenberg 1984; Freundenberg and Steinsapir 1992). Such actions have occurred for 
decades. 
 Environmental justice movements, described above, are a subset of NIMBY 
crusades conducted by less privileged communities making claims that they are 
disadvantaged on the basis of class or color, and they share many characteristics with 
NIMBY movements. Environmental justice movements began to form in the US around 
1980 (Brulle and Pellow 2006). Neighborhoods in these communities had been 
disproportionately affected by sitings of environmental hazards, and community 
organizations began to emerge to build opposition against the corporations and/or 
government officials responsible for the sitings. The framework of the environmental 
justice movement involved demanding equal protection fr m these hazards for all 
individuals and for those responsible for environmetal discrimination to redress the 
“disproportionate risk burdens” (Brulle and Pellow 2006:110) to minority and lower 
socio-economic status communities.   
Two classic environmental justice cases, Love Canal, New York in 1980 and 
Warren County, North Carolina in 1982, illustrate how citizens’ demands for equal 
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protection can jumpstart a grassroots environmental justice movement. Following the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) announcement that “toxic vapors in people’s 
basements suggested a serious health threat,” (Brown 5/15/78; NYDOH 9/78 as cited in 
Levine 1982:21) residents near Love Canal hoped that government officials would offer 
instruction or a plan to remedy the situation immediately. However, the unorganized and 
uninformative city council meetings that followed left the residents more concerned 
about the threats to their health and increasingly “distrustful and disdainful of city and 
county officials” (Levine 1982:22). Led by homemaker Lois Gibbs, residents of Love 
Canal then formed the Love Canal Homeowners Associati n nd organized constituents 
and mobilized resources to put pressure on the federal government to become involved in 
cleaning up the toxic-waste dumpsite and relocating c tizens living near the area (Levine 
1982).  
Similarly, when state officials announced that a poor, minority community in 
Warren County would become the dumping site for highly toxic, polychlorinated 
biphenyl (PCB)-contaminated roadside dirt, residents organized an opposition movement 
that attracted nationwide support (Szasz and Meuser 1997; McGurty 2000; Edelstein 
2004). The state government was taking “the path of least resistance” (Bullard 1990:4) by 
locating this toxic dumpsite in a poor, black community with little political or economic 
clout. To protest this LULU, the residents utilized activist strategies borrowed from the 
civil rights movement to try to keep the dump from being constructed (McGurty 2000). 
After meetings with local government officials failed to stop the plans for proceeding 
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with the landfill, the opposition then filed lawsuits and organized protests and mass 
demonstrations (Szasz and Meuser 1997).   
Although the activists were not able to keep the toxic site out of Warren County, 
this, along with the Love Canal crusade, helped to ignite the grassroots environmental 
movement (Agyeman 2002). Unlike older environmental movements this grassroots 
environmental movement focused on issues of “justice, equity, and rights” (Agyeman 
2002:36), the distinctive focus of the environmental justice movement. New local 
movements and grassroots groups emerged that built on lessons learned from Love Canal 
and Warren County, and environmental justice activists began to form networks with one 
another and convene “at regional and national gatherings to exchange ideas, tactics, and 
strategies” (Brulle and Pellow 2006:110). By forming to networks such as the Citizen’s 
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste and the Southwest Network for Environmental and 
Economic Justice, local community groups were able to “ ngage in coordinated joint 
actions at the state, regional, and national scales” (Brulle and Pellow 2006:110).  
Not all of these cases involved toxic waste dumps. Environmental justice 
movements have emerged in response to sanitary landfills as well. For example, a 
movement formed in Columbia County, Pennsylvania in 1989 to successfully keep a 
development company from constructing a new sanitary landfill (Couch and Kroll-Smith 
1994). Opposition movements in Los Angeles and Chicago in the late 1990s  were also 
successful in getting major incinerators and landfills closed (Brulle and Pellow 2006).  
As more environmental justice movements and groups emerged over the past few 
decades, it became “extremely difficult for firms to locate incinerators, landfills, and 
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related LULUs anywhere in the nation without a political struggle” (Brulle and Pellow 
2006:113). Moreover, by the mid-1990s, environmental justice had become a subject of 
high-level policy and administrative actions (Bowen and Wells 2002:690). In 1992, the 
EPA officially acknowledged the disproportionate pollution burdens faced by 
communities of color. The Agency’s report, Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for All 
Communities, not only “lent legitimacy to environmental justice activists’ claims,” 
(p.112) but included the first set of federal policy proposals focused on these issues and 
led to the formation of an Office of Environmental Justice in the EPA and the National 
Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) in the EPA (Brulle and Pellow 2006).  
Environmental equity bills were passed in 12 states (Oakes, Anderton, and Anderson 
1996),  and, in 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions 
to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations” 
(Bowen and Wells 2002). Under this Order, all federal agencies were required to consider 
environmental justice consequences in their decision-making and to address cases of 
environmental inequity in relation to their programs, policies, and activities (Brulle and 
Pellow 2006). In short, environmental justice had become a well institutionalized and 
successful social movement.    
Summary and Implications for Research  
The literature about NIMBY cases indicates that opposition to an environmental 
hazard builds typically among the residents of the thr atened neighborhood and that these 
are apt to become environmental justice movements in cases where disproportionate 
environmental burdens fall on racial/ethnic minorities and lower socio-economic status 
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communities. The wave of environmental justice movements in the United States over 
the past few decades resulted in the partial legitimation of such concerns and the 
enactment of various local, state, and federal policies that provide communities with 
information about environmentally hazardous sites in their area. These movements have 
also made it much more difficult for such sites to be constructed without experiencing 
strong opposition from the surrounding community. This model is only partly applicable 
to the White Street Landfill case, as the landfill site existed prior to the emergence of a 
grassroots environmental justice movement. The moveent arose not because a new site 
was to be constructed, but as a counter-movement to proposals to reopen the landfill. 
However, the literature nevertheless provided some guidance about questions to ask.  
There were questions in the interview schedule that addressed the similarities and 
differences between the White Street Landfill case, typical NIMBY cases, and 
environmental justice movements. Specifically, question  were included about why 
Greensboro residents opposed the reopening of the landfil  and their opinions about 
where instead the trash should be disposed.  
There were also questions in the interview schedule about the opposition leaders’ 
motivation to form a grassroots group and whether t leaders were inspired by 
Greensboro’s own complex race relations history. In addition, there were questions about 
the goals of the opposition movement and the demands that were made of government or 
corporate officials. These questions aided me in determining how prominent redress of 
environmental injustice concerns was in the local movement’s goals. 
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Leadership in Grassroots Environmental Justice Groups  
Resource mobilization stresses the key role of leaders in the creation and 
maintenance of SMOs, so it is important to address the characteristics and motivations of 
leaders of local environmental justice groups. Past studies have shown that such leaders 
have often been motivated by experiences of family illnesses or perceptions of 
widespread illness in their communities.  This perceived threat to the health has 
frequently caused leaders such as Lois Gibbs, who have not otherwise shown leadership 
characteristics nor an interest in environmentalism, to emerge. As Dowie (1995) notes, 
many leaders in environmental justice groups do not characterize themselves as 
environmentalists at all, and will not refer to themovement or SMO as environmental 
“without carefully adding the word justice” (p. 144).  
As  insiders in the community, these leaders are abl  to represent the residents’ 
concerns and plight well because of their own experiences. Gibbs, for example, became 
the entrepreneur for the Love Canal Homeowners Associati n (LCHA) by connecting 
with other families in the neighborhood that shared similar health experiences and 
concerns about health problems (Levine 1982).  As Couch and Kroll-Smith (1994) 
suggest, the real or perceived threat of health hazards and negative effects for the 
community encourage “the development of coherent and common beliefs about danger 
that work to create a strong social tie among residents” (p. 36). As in the Beaver 
Township case, alliances among residents often lead to the formation of a grassroots 
group and subsequent coalitions with other groups both inside and outside of the 
community (Couch and Kroll-Smith 1994). 
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The leadership structures of grassroots environmental justice groups typically 
include either a single primary leader or a small, non-hierarchical leadership group. In the 
early stages of a movement, leadership is essential i  organizing constituents and 
resources. Social movement theory suggests that a strong leader or group of leaders with 
effective organizational skills and a charismatic personality can also provide credibility to 
the movement and the organization (Soule and Snow 2009). As in many other types of 
movements, such as anti-war, feminist, and non-enviro mental justice NIMBY, 
alternative leadership structures can emerge that divide leadership and responsibility 
among each of the group members instead of one leadr or group of leaders (Fitzgerald 
and Rodgers 2000:579). 
Goals in Grassroots Environmental Justice Movements 
 In contrast to other branches of the environmental movement, which pursue a 
wide range of goals, the central concerns of the activists in almost all environmental 
justice movements are health and the protection of their neighborhoods. That is, activists 
are focused on matters very significant to their daly lives and the lives of their families 
(Dowie 1995; Edelstein 2004). The immediate goal tht usually follows is therefore 
keeping a hazardous site from being constructed or getting an existing site closed.  
Like other grassroots movements in the US, environmental justice struggles often 
manifest a “strong belief in the right of citizens to participate in environmental decision 
making” (Dowie 1995:135). For instance, there are many grassroots demands for the 
local government and corporations to obtain local input in regards to sitings and waste 
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management. Grassroots groups may also want community right-to-know laws enacted to 
obtain information on existing sites or proposed sites n the future (Dowie 1995).   
Summary and Implications for Research 
Concerns in local communities about environmental hazards often lead to the 
emergence of a leader or leadership group that organizes concerned citizens into a 
grassroots group. Leaders typically live in the threatened neighborhood and may have 
personal experiences with health problems related to the environmental hazard. Leaders 
develop the group’s ideology, build networks, and have an influential role in goal setting.  
 Interview questions and examination of relevant news reports aimed to address 
the backgrounds of the group leaders and their roles in the White Street Landfill case. If 
there were multiple leaders, questions were asked about how the leaders came to know 
one another and how they came to work on the issue together. In addition, questions were 
asked about why the leader/s were interested in the landfill issue, what their specific 
goals were, how they attracted support for their side of the issue, and how they acquired 
and used resources for the group.    
Strategies and Tactics in Grassroots Environmental Justice Movements 
Compared to the more general environmental movement, r search suggests that 
the grassroots environmental justice movement has typically chosen more direct action 
and confrontational strategies and tactics (Dowie 1995; Edelstein 2004).The civil rights 
movement has led many environmental justice activists to borrow its strategies and 
tactics (Bullard 1994; Edelstein 2004), as it is also a movement of the politically weak 
(Bullard 1990). Typically, people involved with these movements do not have political 
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connections, are less likely to vote, and have limited skills in coping with bureaucracy. 
Often, Southern black communities facing environmental threats have been distrustful of 
government officials and lacked faith in the democrati  process due to the history of 
institutionalized discrimination. Instead of trusting that the democratic process would 
render fair decision-making, they have chosen tactics that directly and publicly 
challenged the legitimacy of government officials and policies in an effort to build 
broader support and force change, such as sit-ins, rallies, and marches (Edelstein 2004).  
 These considerations have channeled local environmental justice groups toward 
particular kinds of strategies.  In order to influenc  political officials, movement 
supporters may call or write letters to local, state, nd federal government officials. The 
organization may also endorse political candidates who support their cause and voice 
opposition to those who do not (Edelstein 2004). Often, however, environmental justice 
movements move away from such mainstream movement tactics such as these. Indeed, a 
key and distinctive strategy of grassroots environme tal justice movements has been to 
use more dramatic and confrontational tactics such as protests, marches, sit-ins, and 
demonstrations (Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1992).   
In other cases, a grassroots movement and/or social movement organization may 
direct its actions towards influencing a corporation’s decisions directly, instead of 
focusing on politicians and policy-making. For example, some groups may their efforts 
specifically at corporate-level decision-making. In these cases, they may choose to not 
get involved in political debate about particular siting proposals (Dowie 1995) and 
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instead focus on such tactics as calling corporate officials, presenting them signed 
petitions, or organizing protests outside of the corporate headquarters.     
Claimsmaking and Framing Strategies of Environmental Justice Movements 
Key to the definition of an environmental justice movement is its use of the 
environmental justice frame as a mobilizing tool and  part of movement ideology 
(Capek 1993). Capek’s study of a grassroots group in Texarkana, Texas fighting 
underground toxic waste in a minority community, for example, highlighted how “the 
significance of naming the social problem helps to create solidarity among the people 
who feel that they are being discriminated against e vironmentally” (p. 5). In this case, 
the community in Texarkana, which was largely African American, adopted the rhetoric 
of environmental justice and environmental racism in order to lobby to local politicians 
for the residents’ relocation.  
The environmental justice frame tends to resonate with racial and ethnic 
minorities and lower socio-economic status populations because it is consistent with the 
existing narratives, or “master frames,” of the culture (Benford and Snow 2000). 
Historically, these groups have experienced various f rms of discrimination. Thus, 
“framing environmental problems in terms of environmental justice fits into the widely 
used master frame that people at the bottom are not treated equally” (Markham 2008:24). 
Summary and Implications for Research 
Grassroots environmental justice movements incorporate an environmental justice 
framing and typically use direct action tactics. In contrast to traditional environmentalists, 
they are less likely to work “within the system” through lobbying, and utilize instead 
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more confrontational tactics, such as protests, rallies, and public demonstrations that 
threaten the legitimacy of the governmental officials. In addition, environmental justice 
rhetoric is adopted by these groups and used as a mobilizing tool to attract supporters and 
media attention to ultimately influence policy decision-making. Controversies that 
involve the siting of an environmental hazard in a minority community may also adopt 
the rhetoric of environmental justice.  
 To investigate the strategies and framings used in the Greensboro case, I used 
interview questions that addressed the strategies, tactics, themes and arguments used by 
both the opposition of the proposed landfill reopening, as well as newspaper reports and 
documents for supplemental information. The interviw questions asked about the 
strategies, tactics, arguments, and phrases used and how and why they were selected. In 
addition, I asked interviewees about the effectiveness of each of the various strategies, 
tactics, arguments, and phrases in influencing the outcome of the controversy.  
Alliances in Grassroots Environmental Justice Movements 
Past research also suggests that the threatened placement of a LULU in a 
community can lead to alliances both among NIMBY groups and with groups outside the 
area. Freudenberg and Steinsapir (1992) mention several factors that can “spur local 
groups to join together in networks and coalitions,” (p. 30) including a need for allies, 
scientific and technical expertise, and increased recognition of how the environmental 
issues relate to politics. These networks and coaliti ns can also “provide a forum for 
exchanging experiences and developing new strategies, and enable local groups to 
advocate jointly for new policies and programs” (Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1992:30). 
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Forming alliances with other community organizations or leaders to fight off 
LULUs has also frequently proven beneficial to grass oots environmental justice 
organizations (Duffy 2003). Alliances are often formed with other local or national 
environmental groups, sympathetic government or regulatory agencies, sympathetic 
political leaders, church groups, and, although less frequently, with for-profit businesses. 
According to Duffy (2003), developing such alliances with groups and individuals with a 
variety of skills, expertise, contacts, and perspectiv s allows for different groups or 
persons to take the lead on different issues while working together on common projects. 
In large coalitions, “point people” from the various groups are often chose to play 
specific roles, such as being the spokesperson to the media, organizing constituents, or 
mobilizing resources (Duffy 2003). 
For example, the Beaver Township in Columbia County, Pennsylvania, 
experienced a siting dispute when a development company applied for a permit to set up 
a sanitary landfill in the county in 1989. While the development company claimed that 
the landfill would bring increased revenue into thecity, two groups, the Township Board 
of Supervisors (TBS) and Save Our Innocent Land (SOIL), built a strong alliance against 
the proposal. Supporting the TBS’s concern that the landfill would threaten local 
wetlands and increase truck traffic, SOIL raised money to hire attorneys, experts, and run 
media campaigns. Eventually, the collaboration of the two groups was successful in 
stopping the landfill from being developed (Couch and Kroll-Smith 1994).     
One issue that has been brought increasingly to the at ention of environmental 
justice organizations by leaders of the local groups is the need to include these groups 
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and local grassroots organizations in their coalitions. Particular emphasis has been placed 
on the inclusion of the communities of color that are experiencing environmental 
injustices in coalitions and alliances with mainstream environmental organizations. While 
such national groups as the Citizens’ Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes (CCHW) have 
supported grassroots struggles in communities of col r, there has historically been a lack 
of minority representation in these national networks and a lack of alliances with the local 
communities and grassroots groups. Further efforts t  form these alliances and have 
larger organizations advocate with rather than for communities of color are, therefore, 
still needed (Dowie 1995).  
Summary and Implications for Research  
 Literature about alliances in grassroots environmetal justice movements 
indicates that the grassroots group typically forms alliances with other environmental 
groups inside and outside of the community, political leaders and groups, and non-
environmental groups. These alliances are often beneficial to the grassroots group in 
gaining a wider base of constituents, resources, and skills. Support from established 
environmental groups can also be beneficial to the grassroots group.  
The interview schedule included questions to obtain information about the 
formation of alliances among the main groups involved in the White Street Landfill case 
and other groups inside and outside of Greensboro. I also asked about the similarities and 
differences among the goals of the various groups, any conflicts or problems that arose 
because of the differences, and whether and how such conflicts were resolved. There 
were also questions about other aspects of the relationships among the various groups, 
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such as whether and how the groups helped one another t  decide on goals and strategies, 
recruit new members, attract support at rallies or demonstrations, or connect with 
leaders/influential people in the city or community. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
This thesis includes a brief history on the landfill controversy from the mid-1990s 
up to the Greensboro City Council’s September, 2009 announcement that it intended to 
solicit proposals from companies to reopen and operate the landfill. However, the major 
focus of the study, reported in the remaining results chapters, involves the events 
following this announcement and ending with the City ouncil elections of November, 
2011, which opponents of the landfill reopening won decisively. (For additional historical 
details, see Appendix A.)   
The major data source for this reason was semi-structured interviews with 
members of the landfill opposition movement, indiviual landfill supporters, former 
mayors, current and former members of Greensboro’s City Council, and journalists who 
covered the story. In order to gather background information and better understand the 
history of, and controversy around, the White Street Landfill, I also reviewed local 
newspaper articles, press releases from the City of Greensboro and the Southern 
Coalition for Social Justice, and minutes of City Council meetings. In addition, I drew on 
information that I obtained from observation of selected CEEJ meetings and rallies and 
City Council meetings. 
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I obtained the newspaper articles, press releases, nd City Council meeting 
minutes primarily from the Internet. The newspapers on which I drew include the 
Greensboro News and Record, The Rhinoceros Times, Th  Carolina Peacemaker, and 
YES! Weekly. The Greensboro News and Record is a daily newspaper with the largest 
circulation in the Greensboro metropolitan area (Greensboro News and Record 2011). 
The Rhinoceros Times, founded in Greensboro in 1991 (The Rhinoceros Times 2011), is a 
free, weekly news and opinion paper with a politically conservative viewpoint. YES! 
Weekly, founded in Greensboro in 2005, is a free, alternaive newspaper that is devoted to 
local politics, arts and entertainment in the Piedmont Triad (YES! Weekly 2011). The 
Carolina Peacemaker, founded in Greensboro in 1967, is a minority-owned, weekly 
news publication with a focus on the African-American community (The Carolina 
Peacemaker 2011).  
The selection of the newspaper articles used were bas d on the dates of 
publication and keywords in the titles and text of he articles. Recent editions of the each 
of these newspapers are available on the newspapers’ web ites at no cost, and older 
editions of some publications are available for a fee of two to three dollars apiece. I used 
online newspaper databases such as LexisNexis, online ews search engines such as 
GoogleNews, and the newspapers’ website to search fo  t ese articles, using keywords 
and phrases such as “White Street Landfill,” “Greensboro landfill,” and “Citizens for 
Economic and Environmental Justice.”  
In reviewing the articles, I focused especially on how various leaders and groups 
in Greensboro viewed the landfill, its closing in 2006, and its proposed reopening in 2009 
52 
 
and who took strong positions on each side. I also looked at reports of the actions they 
took to try to influence the outcome of the controversy and the contents of their 
arguments. These might include speaking out at City ouncil meetings, speaking directly 
to the press, organizing and/or being actively involved in groups in their communities, 
and/or participating in rallies and demonstrations regarding the landfill. I also looked for 
reports about cooperation and coordination with other groups. To learn more about which 
City Council members and community leaders supported or opposed the landfill and the 
nature of their arguments, I also looked at the minutes and video recordings of the City 
Council meetings, which are available to download  from the City of Greensboro website.  
 To obtain my interview sample, I began with the information from local 
newspapers, documents from the CEEJ meetings and/or rallies, and  suggestions from 
knowledgeable sources, such as Dr. Bill Markham, a loc l environmental sociologist, and 
former mayor Keith Holliday to identify key leaders and knowledgeable persons. I sought 
interviews first with people mentioned in these documents, including the leaders of the 
organizations, former mayors, and former and/or curent City Council members who 
expressed opposition or support for the reopening of the landfill. The nature of interview 
questions allowed the interviewees to discuss people in the community who they believed 
played a major role in the dispute; therefore, following the first round of interviews, I 
researched key actors mentioned and obtained necessary contact information through 
their online voter registration information and online telephone directories. 
 Twenty interviews were projected. To allow for persons who could not be 
contacted or who declined my interview request, I drew an initial sample of 
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approximately 40 people and ranked them in order of pri rity. I eventually narrowed this 
list down to 30 potential interviewees based on their apparent depth of involvement in the 
dispute and recommendations from other interviewees. 
 In order to set up interviews with the participants, Dr. Markham, my thesis 
supervisor, and I first sent a formal letter of requ st to each potential interviewee and then 
followed-up with a phone call, as well as in email in a few cases. I used various public 
records, such as online telephone directories, voter registration records, and the relevant 
organizations’ websites to locate mailing addresses, e-mail addresses, and phone 
numbers. Upon receiving a statement of agreement to participate in the study, I then set 
up a time to meet with the interviewees at a locatin of their choice. 
 I contacted potential interviewees in five different rounds. I tried to contact six in 
round one (with five agreeing to be interviewed ando e non-responsive), six in round 
two (with five agreeing to be interviewed and one declining), seven in round three (with 
three agreeing to be interviewed, one declining, and three non-responsive), seven in 
round four (with five agreeing to be interviewed, one declining, and one non-responsive), 
and four in round five (with two agreeing to be interviewed and two declining). Four out 
of the five who declined to be interviewed were supporters of the landfill reopening. 
Three out of the four who declined are former City Council members, and one is a 
member of the Conservatives for Guilford County. The fifth person is a local journalist 
who frequently covered the landfill issue – she declin d the interview at the instruction of 
her editor.  
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Including all five rounds of interviews, I had attempted to locate and interview a 
total of 30 people. I interviewed 19 persons, received five refusals, and could not reach 
six potential interviewees for whom I had correct numbers to schedule the interview. Of 
course, the people for whom I left voicemail message  but did not return my calls may 
have been indirectly refusing to participate. The response rate for all persons I attempted 
to contact was thus 63 percent, for those I actually contacted 79 percent.    
 The demographics of the 19 interviewees can be describ d as follows: 11 females, 
8 males; 5 African Americans, 14 Caucasians; ages ranging from approximately 40- to 
70-years-old; and socio-economic status ranging from lower-middle income to middle-
higher income. The data on sex, race, and age, were based on the interviewees’ 
appearances and their personal narratives.  Estimates of socio-economic status was also 
based on personal narratives, as well as the intervewees’ occupations and/or education.     
 The interviewees’ involvement with the landfill dispute varied in depth and 
association. Overall, 15 of the interviewees expressed opposition to the landfill 
reopening, and four expressed support for the reopening. The number of landfill 
supporters who declined to be interviewed helps to account for their lower representation 
in the interview sample. Out of these four interviewe s, one was a local press member, 
one a former City Council member, one a former mayor, and one a member of the 
Conservatives for Guilford County. Out of the 15 anti-landfill interviewees, nine were 
CEEJ members, two were League of Women Voters members, one a member of the 
Nealtown Neighborhood Association, one a current mayor, and two were local press 
members. Out of the CEEJ members interviewed, three wer  former mayors, one current 
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City Council member, one a former City Council member, one a member of the Pulpit 
Forum, one a lawyer from the Southern Coalition for S cial Justice, and one a New 
Garden Friends Meeting member.  
 There are of course representation and bias issues inh rent in my interviewee 
sample. For example, I interviewed three times as mny Caucasians as African 
Americans. Although the majority of the Caucasian interviewees opposed the landfill, the 
majority of the people most directly involved with the landfill opposition movement were 
African American. However, my aim was to include in the sample the key Caucasian 
leaders who joined or formed alliances with the CEEJ, along with key leaders and 
ground-level members of the CEEJ, and I was able to achieve this in my sample. In 
addition, because of its strong coalition with the CEEJ, I included members of the League 
of Women Voters, whose membership has a Caucasian majority. Another issue is that my 
sample does not include the younger cohort of college students who joined forces with 
the CEEJ in the march to the plaza of the Municipal Bui ding, the last major act of protest 
before the City Council announced that it would not be reopening the landfill. Thus, it is 
not certain that the interviewees’ viewpoints fully reflect those of the younger individuals 
involved; however, their involvement seemed to be int rmittent, and their views largely 
in line with the CEEJ.  
I used semi-structured interviews to collect the data. Because the interviewees 
possessed different pools of information, the interviews were custom constructed for each 
interviewee using questions from a larger pool of items (see Appendix B for the full 
interview schedule). The interview questions were primarily be open-ended, but included 
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a few closed ended (generally yes/no) questions. Mot questions allowed the interviewees 
to elaborate and for me to ask follow-up questions. I  order to gain more complete 
information from the respondents, I included probes with my questions where 
appropriate. 
Section A included general questions designed to obain factual background 
information about the history of the landfill dispute and each interviewee’s perceptions of 
the dispute. The questions in Section B were designd to obtain information from local 
leaders involved in the dispute who were notactive members of groups/organizations that 
opposed or supported the reopening the landfill. If the interviewee was active in a 
particular group, then this section was skipped. These questions examined the 
individual’s goals, themes, framing, strategies, and tactics. I also asked about whether 
certain arguments or phrases were used by the individual to describe the issue, the kinds 
of actions the individual took to show opposition or support for reopening the landfill, 
and whether specific actions were seen as effective in influencing the outcome. Last, I 
asked about the individual’s perceptions of and alliances with other local leaders and 
groups that supported or opposed the reopening. 
Section C was designed to look at the groups in which the interviewee actively 
participated. If the interviewee was not active in a particular group, then this section was 
skipped. In this section, I examined the group’s leadership, demographics, and resources. 
For example, I inquired about the priorities and motivations of the founding member(s) of 
the organization, the demographics of the supporters, how the organization attracted 
members, and the kinds of resources to which it had access, such as funding and meeting 
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space. This section also examined the various groups’ goals, themes, framing, strategies, 
and tactics. It included questions similar to Section B, but focused on the group instead of 
the individual. Last, I asked about the group’s alliances/coalitions with other local leaders 
and groups that supported or opposed the reopening. 
Questions in sections D, E, and F were asked of all interviewees. Section D 
examined the effect the leaders and groups had on the local news media, as well as the 
role of the media outlets in the dispute. Questions n Section E examined the obstacles 
and advantages the individuals and groups faced in achieving their goals. Questions in 
Section F addressed the interviewees’ personal opinions about the future of the landfill. 
For example, I asked whether, and why or why not, the interviewee thought reopening 
the landfill would be racial discrimination against the majority African Americans 
population in the neighborhood. I also asked whether there were things about 
Greensboro’s history or the past disputes about the landfill that the interviewee thought 
have affected people’s perceptions of the recent dispute.  
During the interviews, I recorded handwritten notes and used an audio recorder. 
After the completion of each interview, I prepared a full summary of the interview based 
on my notes, using the recordings to fill in details bout any responses that I marked as 
especially significant or problematic during my note taking.  
Before coding the data, I constructed a list of codes to identify nine key topics for 
analysis: historical factors involved in the dispute, leaders and groups, goals, coalitions 
and alliances, obstacles, strategies and tactics, arguments and counter-arguments, role of 
the media, and advantages. I ranked these folders in the order in which I would analyze 
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the topics, with “1” being the highest rank and the first topic I planned to analyze, and 
“9” being the lowest rank and the last topic I planned to analyze. Bits of related 
information were often in various places throughout the interview, as the respondents 
often provided extensive details about issues that rel ed to more than one topic. 
Therefore, in order to sort the data, I printed copies of all completed interviews and 
divided the questions and answers according to their related topics. If the provided 
responses related to more than one key topic, I first put them in the highest-ranking 
relevant folder and then, once I completed analysis of that topic, I put them in the next-
highest-ranking related folder. I then sorted the contents of each folder into smaller 
stacks, coding for similar responses. For example, I grouped all relevant responses about 
interviewees’ perceptions of why people supported or opposed the landfill reopening into 
categories according to their individual opinions o whether or not the landfill should be 
reopened. 
  The main descriptor codes assigned to each individual response related to the 
interviewees’ stance on the landfill reopening. Additional codes related to the 
interviewees’ involvement in the dispute and their association with various groups. 
Specifically, these descriptor codes included whether or not the interviewees were leaders 
or “ground-level” members of the landfill opposition movement, former or current 
Greensboro City Council members, former or current Greensboro mayors, leaders or 
members of a local tea party-related group, or members of the local press. 
 The main drawbacks of using interviews as my main d ta source involve 
anonymity issues. Although I promised not to use names in my report, some interviewees 
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who see their positions and roles as identifying features of themselves may have withheld 
some of their thoughts and perspective on the landfill issue to avoid further controversy 
or feelings of ill-will. Several of the respondents are also in local government positions 
and may not have wanted to say anything that could potentially create rifts in their 
constituencies and jeopardize their future re-elections.  
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CHAPTER IV  
FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION PART I 
 
 
 This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first summarizes the 
interviewees’ perspectives on how Greensboro’s racial history influenced the landfill 
dispute. The second section summarizes the interviewees’ views about the key leaders 
and groups among the landfill opposition and landfill supporters. The third summarizes 
the goals of the landfill opposition and landfill supporters. The fourth section looks at the 
coalitions and alliances, or lack thereof, among the landfill opponents and landfill 
supporters. 
Greensboro’s Racial History as Backdrop for the Landfill Controversy 
The majority of the respondents viewed Greensboro’s history of race and class 
relations as a key factor in the landfill dispute. These relations laid the basis for landfill 
opponents’ framing it as an environmental justice dispute. Many interviewees spoke 
about how the landfill issue illustrated how many African American residents are “still 
dealing with trust issues” with the city’s white political and business leaders. The 
respondents referred to several issues to highlight the rust problems. Some of these 
involved what they saw as the City Council’s consistent lack of effort in helping 
northeast Greensboro to attract more businesses, such a  a grocery store and other shops, 
while other major trust issues center around deeply ingrained memories of past civil and 
workers’ rights conflicts. 
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Difficult race relations in Greensboro’s history are the bases of many African 
American residents’ distrust of the local government and white political and business 
leaders. Literature on environmental controversies has shown trust and betrayal to be 
common concerns among communities dealing with a loc lly unwanted land use (e.g., 
Gunter and Kroll-Smith 2007). In this case, the landfill dispute seemed to reignite the 
long-standing trust issues between many African American residents and the city’s local 
government, which has historically consisted of a majority white City Council.  
Many referred to civil rights struggles and the 1979 Klan/Nazi protest-turned-
shooting and its aftermath as major sources of these d ep-rooted feelings of distrust (see 
Appendix A for details about this event). As one interviewee noted, 
 
The fact that Greensboro’s involvement with the sit-ins ended up leading to 
citizens becoming involved in the Civil Rights Movem nt on the national scale – 
people are aware of the sit-ins and the Civil Rights museum continues awareness 
of our history and African Americans’ contribution to changing the position of 
African Americans and changing history. The second event that affects how we 
look at ourselves in history is the march in which labor members, who were social 
liberals politically, the Communist Workers’ Party, were demonstrating for 
increased rights and were opposed by members of the KKK, and members were 
injured and killed and this event. That is very important.  
 
 
Another interviewee mentioned the recent alleged racial profiling and discrimination by 
the Greensboro Police Department, which he said “kind of ratcheted up distrust within 
the community and the Council and led to this kind of gamesmanship in the Council and 
trying to out-maneuver the other side.” (See Appendix A for additional historical detail.)  
Several interviewees opposed to reopening the landfi l distinguished between the 
superficial and underlying factors in the controversy. As one interviewee put it,  
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The public reason was to save money. It was clear early on that the Council had 
very little concern about the northeast area. The rac factor was significant and 
always has been. The majority of that Council had the sense that no one would 
care if the landfill was reopened….There is much history of black settlements in 
Greensboro being near hazards, such as the treatment plant. There has been an 
absence of gas lines in their communities, paved streets, all kinds of ignoring of 
the African American community in Greensboro. 
 
 
All of the interviewees involved in the anti-landfill movement mentioned that 
residents of the landfill district saw the potential reopening as a breach of trust and a 
broken promise by the City Council. All believed tha  northeast residents expected the 
landfill closure to be permanent, and that those who had moved into the area since the 
landfill closed were operating under that assumption as well.  As one interviewee said, 
“They felt like they had been promised…people were being told the landfill was closed 
and not going to reopen; that they were not going to have to worry. And they felt 
betrayed.”  
Greensboro’s history of race relations and, subsequently, many African 
Americans’ distrust of the city’s white leaders might lead one to expect that the two sides 
in the landfill dispute would form along racial lines. However, while there were evident 
racial divides at the beginning of the dispute, it did not end this way. As I will later 
discuss, an interesting outcome involves how racial lines became blurred through the 
formation of anti-landfill coalitions and alliances.  
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Key Leaders and Groups 
Key Leaders among the Landfill Opposition  
 The interviewees were almost unanimous in nominating Goldie Wells, a former 
City Council representative for the district in whic  the landfill is located, as the leader of 
the opposition. A well-known and respected resident of this district, Dr. Wells was the 
social movement entrepreneur who organized the mainsocial movement organization 
(SMO), a grassroots environmental justice group called the Citizens for Economic and 
Environmental Justice (CEEJ).  
Several interviewees mentioned how essential leadership was to the movement’s 
existence and operations. Based on her long history of community organizing, Goldie 
Wells had the know-how to attract support and acquire the necessary resources for such 
things as court filing fees and transportation costs for the group’s lawyers. She also had 
her followers’ loyalty and her community’s trust.  
Many interviewees also mentioned current and former ayors and City Council 
members as key leaders. Most notably, the two mayors who served between 1999 and 
2009, Keith Holliday and Yvonne Johnson, were frequently said to have been very 
influential. Several interviewees listed a half-dozen or more names of those they believed 
played a major role, including the main leader’s “right-hand woman,” several women 
from the League of Women Voters of the Piedmont Triad (hereafter “the League”), and a 
couple women from the New Garden Friends Meeting (“NGFM,” a local Quaker group). 
Dr. Wells seems to have personified the strong, charism tic, and organized leader 
depicted in social movement theory. Many anti-landfill interviewees described her role 
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using  such terms as “organizer,” “motivator,” “mentor,” “inspiration,” and “passion.” 
She was the most visible spokesperson for the opposition movement, many said. She 
“kept the goal and mission in the forefront,” kept the movement’s supporters focused on 
the issue, and set clear goals and objectives.  
Mr. Holliday’s leadership role was generally viewed as complementary to Goldie 
Wells’. In one anti-landfill interviewee’s opinion, he had made the first and most 
extensive critique of the landfill and had great background knowledge of the issue. Thus, 
he provided the movement with information and guidance about the political implications 
and financial impact of reopening the landfill. As a white male leader in Greensboro, he 
was also an unexpected ally for the movement. He “brought a different face to the fight,” 
as one interviewee put it. In the words of another:  
 
People couldn’t look past that he was a white male not from the area of the 
landfill and he stood against it. There were people who were not from the 
community who were against it, and he articulated that.  
 
 
Interviewees who supported the reopening frequently mentioned Yvonne 
Johnson, a prominent community organizer and Greensboro’s first African American 
mayor, joining Goldie Wells as a key leader. The ways these interviewees described 
those two leaders’ roles were similar to the anti-landfill interviewees’ responses in some 
ways, but noticeably different in others. Several of the interviewees who supported the 
landfill mentioned that Wells and Johnson had a “recognition factor” as a result of being 
leaders in predominantly African American east Greensboro and having served on the 
City Council, which contributed to their ability tolead and influence the opposition 
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movement. One interviewee referred to Goldie Wells as the “torchbearer” for the 
opposition – a term which connotes a very different image than “motivator” and 
“mentor.” Another interviewee made a similar contras  by describing her role as “more of 
an agitator than an informer.”  
Key Groups among the Landfill Opposition  
 Overall, the anti-landfill interviewees identified two groups that were most 
influential among those that opposed to the reopening and two additional groups that also 
provided strong support to the movement. In general, the interviewees’ description of the 
organizations involved in the opposition movement is consistent with pluralist models. 
Not surprisingly, almost all the interviewees said that the most influential group was 
Citizens for Economic and Environmental Justice (CEEJ), the local social movement 
organization (SMO) formed by Wells. In some cases, interviewees referred to this group 
as the Concerned Citizens of Northeast Greensboro, and, in others, interviewees referred 
to it as the CEEJ. These two groups have heavily overlapping membership, as the latter 
group was formed out of the former explicitly for the purpose of fighting the landfill 
reopening. The two names, therefore, were often used synonymously, even by those who 
were members of both groups, and I will follow that practice here, referring to the CEEJ 
as the main grassroots group opposing the landfill. 
 According to most of the CEEJ members interviewed, the group had over 200 
people on its email list and approximately 50-75 peopl  who attended meetings, which 
took place regularly on the last Monday of each month. Females, African Americans, and 
senior citizens predominated among the active members, ut most of the members 
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interviewed noted the presence of dedicated male and white members, as well as a broad 
range of ages, from college-age to 85-years-olds who attended meetings regularly. Most 
described the majority socio-economic status to be low r-middle income, while some 
said that it ranged from low to high income. 
 The CEEJ’s role in the dispute was to provide a forum for opponents to discuss 
the landfill issue and work together to keep the landfill from being reopened to household 
waste, the classic role of a social movement organization. As one interviewee remarked, 
it “gave a framework for people to attach to, a way to express their position.” As “the 
central core opponent” to the landfill reopening, that is, the central SMO in the 
movement, the CEEJ reflected the key role of its leader by making the issue known to a 
larger community that just one section of east Greensboro.  
 The League of Women Voters of the Piedmont Triad (the League) was the second 
most frequently mentioned group opposed to the landfill reopening. Compared to the 
CEEJ, the League is a much older organization with a much broader agenda. The 
majority of the anti-landfill respondents said that the group provided strong support to the 
CEEJ, especially by signing on to the lawsuit to prevent the reopening. Several 
interviewees also mentioned that the group “brought in another segment of the 
population.” As a press member put it, the League “represented a more city-wide faction” 
for the opposition and was “really the mobilizer of whites against the landfill.”  
Several other groups were mentioned as playing a peripheral role in the 
movement, including the Simkins Political Action Committee (PAC), the Human 
Relations Commission, the Pulpit Forum, and the New Garden Friends Meeting (NGFM). 
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The extremely influential Simkins PAC, whose recommendations are mailed out to 
African American voters city-wide, endorsed candidates for the 2011 City Council 
election who opposed the landfill reopening or whom they believed would give future 
support to the African American community. The Human Relations Commission, a unit 
of Greensboro’s city government concerned with fair treatment and respect for all 
citizens, “took a stand early on,” according to an interviewee. The Commission passed a 
resolution that helped in the lawsuit against reopening – an action that the interviewee 
believed “really galvanized the community-wide sentiment against the landfill.” 
Members of the Pulpit Forum, a group of area pastors involved in social justice issues, 
were said to have “worked on the frontline with resid nts,” and the NGFM, like the 
League, was said to have helped get the west side of town involved in the issue. One 
member of the opposition movement also mentioned th Beloved Community Center, a 
local grassroots organization dedicated to racial and economic justice and community-
building, and the local chapter of the NAACP, but it was not clear what their specific 
roles were in the dispute.  
  The pro-landfill interviewees had views similar to the anti-landfill interviewees 
about the key groups among those that opposed the landfil . A former elected official 
who was very knowledgeable about the CEEJ and its key role in the dispute noted the 
organization and structure that it gave the movement. As he recalled, members of the 
group “came to the City Council meetings with t-shirts saying ‘don’t dump,’ so that was 
something that clearly had to be planned out. It didn’t just happen at the local 
convenience store.” Other than the CEEJ, the only other group mentioned by a pro-
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landfill interviewee was the Simkins PAC, but the interviewee did not elaborate on its 
particular role in the dispute. It is worth noting that none of the pro-landfill interviewees 
mentioned the League as being influential in the opposition movement. This perspective 
may be indicative of their view that the landfill opponents mainly consisted of northeast 
Greensboro residents, perhaps reflecting a “racialization” of the dispute. A lack of 
understanding of the wider concerns about the landfill may have resulted in the landfill 
advocates overlooking or neglecting to recognize the importance of the League’s 
involvement in the dispute.  
Key Leaders among the Landfill Supporters  
 There was a general consensus among the interviewees opposed to the reopening 
in naming four key individual leaders who supported the reopening. Three of these 
individuals, Trudy Wade, Mary Rakestraw, and Danny Thompson, were white, politically 
conservative, City Council members (all but Wade were voted out of office in 2011) who 
represented majority white, middle-to-higher income districts. The fourth leader was the 
mayor Bill Knight (also later voted out of office in 2011), also white and politically 
conservative, who served only a single term as mayor. The vast majority of the anti-
landfill interviewees cited all four as the key lead rs; a few did not list them all, but listed 
two or three of the four.  
 Three of these four individuals were most frequently ci ed by these respondents as 
the most influential leaders supporting the reopening, Knight, Thompson, and Wade. One 
respondent referred to them as the “pushers,” who “were very adamant that [reopening 
the landfill] would save Greensboro millions of dollars because we were in an economic 
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crisis.” A few of these interviewees described their role as being the “faces” of the push 
for reopening, but not necessarily the only major instigators behind it. None of these 
individuals functioned as SMO leader or movement entrepreneurs. As one interviewee 
put it, they were the ones “who were out in front, but I do think they were getting 
pressure from private companies.” Another interviewe  added that “they thought they 
were doing what their constituency wanted.” Thus, they were exerting influence from a 
different base than the anti-landfill social movements leaders or former elected officials. 
The pro-landfill leaders were exerting influence as elected officials; indeed, two of them 
had come to power on the coattails of the conservative sweep in the 2009 election.  
A few interviewees mentioned other key landfill supporters, whose behind-the-
scenes leadership, if true, might partly support Floyd Hunter’s (1953) elite model of 
power structure. Three respondents said that there was another former City Councilman, 
Mike Barber, who was heavily involved behind the scnes in the pro-landfill initiative. 
Barber was often credited by the local press, as well as by interviewees in this study, for 
initiating the discussion in 2008 about reopening the landfill to household waste while he 
was on the City Council. He did not seek re-election in 2009, but some interviewees 
believed that he was thereafter a “backroom motivator” in trying to get the landfill 
reopened. One interviewee mentioned that many people thought Barber was involved 
with private haulers and acting on their behalf, although that was never publicly stated. 
Interestingly, four respondents also listed local private waste management companies as 
influential actors among those supporting the reopening.  
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A local journalist described another former City Council member, Bill Burckley, 
who now works as a political consultant, as a behind the scenes operator. The journalist 
believed he played a major behind the scenes role by r searching and providing his 
clients – among them the four key leaders supporting the reopening – with information 
about the waste management policy issue, costs of transporting the trash, and the 
positions they should take to appeal to their electorates. This journalist also gave more 
weight to Dr. Wade’s role and influence in the dispute. In this respondent’s view, “out of 
the four Council members who supported the landfill, she was the most articulate…she 
stuck her neck out more for articulating the cause.” Another interviewee also listed The 
Rhinoceros Times, a local conservative-leaning news publication, as a key leader in 
supporting the reopening. No one, however, mentioned m mbers of Greensboro’s 
traditional elite, such as Jim Melvin, Mike Weaver, or the foundations with which they 
work. 
 Compared to the anti-landfill interviewees, the pro-landfill interviewees were far 
less inclined to give specifics about whom they viewed as the key individual leaders 
among those supporting the landfill reopening. One respondent simply stated that “it was 
a mixed bag.” Another gave a few more qualifiers: the key leaders were “elected 
officials” and “their constituencies.” According tohis respondent, the elected officials 
and their constituencies “were trying to be fair to all concerned – doing the homework 
and due diligence to be responsible to all.” Greensboro residents who supported the 
reopening did not, however, turn out to the City Council meetings en masse. This 
respondent believed that the landfill supporters were turned off by the “screaming and 
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yelling” from members of the landfill opposition movement and, therefore, chose not to 
come to the meetings. The editor of a conservative-leaning publication also considered 
the four current and former City Council members as being most influential. Specifically, 
he viewed Mr. Knight to be a leader in the reopening efforts because of his time spent 
performing cost analyses to try to save the city money. 
Providing the most, yet still little, detail, an elected official who was in office 
during the controversy said that “there were four members who favored it – several from 
the previous Council, who I won’t name, who provided invaluable assistance. They said 
it [reopening the landfill] was ‘a no-brainer.’” Later on, this respondent did mention 
specific names of those thought to be most influential. Danny Thompson “spent days and 
hours researching the issue and could speak very fluently about it,” and Trudy Wade “did 
her homework very well too.” The former official’s self-reflection about his involvement 
was subdued. “I was less outspoken,” the respondent said, “It is more of my nature to 
defer to others in discussions on these kinds of issue .”  
Key Groups among the Landfill Supporters  
 There was consensus among all the interviewees that, to their knowledge, no 
prominent organized groups supported the landfill reopening. Three interviewees did 
mention that the local tea party-related group (Conservatives for Guilford County) may 
have been involved, but they said that they did not k w to what extent. Two respondents 
said that the supporters were “Republicans in general” o  “just Republicans and ultra-
conservative citizens,” while two others mentioned that, while there were not organized 
groups, there was considerable support from citizens “from other parts of the city [i.e., 
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not from east Greensboro].” Another interviewee mentioned that the pro-landfill City 
Council members often tried to emphasize that “there were just as many supporters of the 
landfill as those who opposed it,” but those numbers were not reflected by their 
attendance at City Council meetings. According to this interviewee, it seemed that the 
landfill supporters did not organize themselves because “they didn’t feel the need.”  
Two members of the press explicitly mentioned the lack of formal organization by 
landfill supporters.  One member of the local press, “thought Republican groups would 
have been in support of it, but there wasn’t any kid of organizing rallies or anything in 
favor of it.” The tea party, while vocal in electing the City Council, did not function as an 
SMO for a reopening movement. Another reporter, suggested that online pontification 
took the place of formal organization, to the detriment of the pro-landfill movement:   
 
There are very vocal, ultra-conservatives that were active in the “blog-o-sphere.” 
There were a lot of comments on the Greensboro News and Record, probably 
from mostly elderly Greensboro citizens. There was an assumption that [the 
supporters] were the majority, so they didn’t really try to organize or mobilize, 
and they took it for granted that the City Council would accommodate their 
wishes and they would prevail….[The pro-landfill bloggers and commentators in 
the media] ultimately defeated themselves because they created an “echo-
chamber” and were unable to kind of co-opt the arguments of the opposition and 
isolated themselves from the community. They may have given the conservative 
City Council members a false sense of confidence. 
 
Goals 
 This section looks at the goals of the landfill oppnents and the landfill 
supporters. Landfill opponents frequently worked through organizations to try to keep the 
landfill closed. Indeed, some interviewees said that t ey first became involved as an 
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individuals, but then went on to join an anti-landfill organization, or that their initiative 
led a group to which they already belonged to join the movement. Indeed, the anti-landfill 
movement was a well organized movement centered on SMOs; only a small number of 
interviewees emphasized that they represented themselves only and did not act on behalf 
of any organization or group. In contrast, most of the landfill supporters acted as 
individuals and evidently not through organizations, although some were involved in 
informal networks.  
  Landfill Opposition SMOs 
 The SMOs and individuals involved in the landfill opposition, for the most part, 
all adopted goals related to Greensboro’s future waste management system.  
The Citizens for Economic and Environmental Justice (CEEJ)  
 The CEEJ, the core SMO in the anti-landfill movement, had one primary goal and 
several secondary goals. Every CEEJ member interviewed, as well as some non-members 
who were knowledgeable about the group’s mission, said that the group’s main goal was 
to keep the White Street Landfill closed to solid waste. According to several CEEJ 
members, a secondary goal was “to inform the City Council and help seek other 
alternatives for waste management,” such as a regional landfill. In addition, as is true of 
many environmental justice organizations, the CEEJ wanted to explore the possible 
health issues related to the locally unwanted land use.  
Other interviewees mentioned the group’s goals related to economic development 
and the 2011 City Council elections. They said thate CEEJ wanted to stress the 
importance of east Greensboro’s economic development to the City Council and that it 
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“had a clear goal of [defeating in the next election] particular people in [the City 
Council],” as one non-member commented. A couple members also mentioned the 
group’s effort to promote voter registration and getting people from the community to the 
polls. 
 Most CEEJ respondents mentioned their aim of influencing the November 2011 
City Council elections. As a CEEJ member and former el cted official stated, “the 
strategy was making it to the election, to reseat Council members who wanted it opened.” 
Another member, and former elected official, said the strategy was “to engage as many 
people as possible and make the City Council as uncomfortable as possible.”  
Nealtown Neighborhood Association 
 The Nealtown Neighborhood Association is an organiz tion made up of residents 
living in the neighborhood nearest to the White Street Landfill. A leader of the 
Association, which organized in response to the potntial reopening, stated the group’s 
goals as, simply, “to build a stronger community and to keep the landfill closed.” She 
added, 
 
It was almost a year ago that we formed the Nealtown Neighborhood Association 
after we found out about the landfill and now we have meetings still once a month 
with the CEEJ and we have our own meetings once a month. We are working to 
make sure it doesn’t reopen. We have a team of people n w that are working to 
try to find alternatives to the landfill.  
 
New Garden Friends Meeting (NGFM) 
According to a New Garden Friends Meeting (NGFM) memb r interviewed, the 
NGFM as a group did not develop a formal position regarding the landfill. While this 
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interviewee was also a CEEJ member and acted on itsbehalf, she emphasized that she 
and other individual NGFM members, not the church as a whole, actively opposed the 
landfill reopening. “The NGFM does not involve itself in politics,” she said. 
 The League of Women Voters of the Piedmont Triad 
 The League of Women Voters of the Piedmont Triad has various goals aligned 
with their environmental policies, which are based “on fairness, and stewardship of our 
resources.” Regarding the landfill issue, the respondents mentioned their aim of getting 
“the City Council to not move so precipitously.” By signing onto the lawsuit to block the 
city’s effort to reopen the landfill to household waste, it seemed that the League’s aim 
was to keep the landfill closed; however, one Leagu member clarified its position on the 
landfill as follows: 
 
It is important to know that the official position of the League was not that the 
landfill should not be reopened, but that there needed to be time taken to explore 
alternatives thoroughly. We believed there was a lack of transparency with the 
city government. We sat and watched the issue for ab ut a year before we got 
involved. Our official position was that they should wait two years and during that 
time study alternatives. They were rushing into it. So it was not accurate to say 
that we opposed the landfill….There needed to be a waiting period and we 
focused a lot on the process and the public involvement that needed to take place 
with public hearings. So it was different that just don’t open the landfill. But as it 
went on, it became important to stop it. 
 
 
Some interviewees mentioned that members of the League were interested in 
“protecting the image of Greensboro,” and that, because many of its members saw the 
reopening as environmental racism and a hindrance to economic development. 
Consequently, reopening the landfill would not be good for the city. Others noted that the 
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League wanted “to maintain trust and cohesion in the community. It didn’t want the 
racial division [the reopening] would cause.” 
Individual Actors   
 Two landfill opponents interviewed said that they, or some of their fellow group 
members, acted as individuals and not as part of a group. One, a current elected official, 
said that it was his position to opposed the reopening because it would not be “the right 
thing” for the community and would hinder economic development. Although not 
explicitly stated, the actions of several NGFM membrs implied that their efforts were 
aimed at keeping the landfill closed to household waste.  
The Landfill Supporters 
 The landfill supporters’ goals in becoming involved in the dispute did not seem as 
straightforward as the landfill opposition’s. Perhaps this vagueness existed, in part, 
because the landfill supporters worked as individuals and not through organizations. 
Whereas the landfill opponents unambiguously pushed for their goal of keeping the 
landfill closed to household waste, no interviewee in favor of the reopening said that his 
or her goal simply as getting the landfill reopened.  
Most pro-landfill interviewees, instead, referred to their goals as fulfilling their 
obligation to continue the Request for Proposals (RFP) process with waste management 
companies interested in operating the landfill, to use the landfill, a valuable resource, 
wisely, or to save money for the city’s taxpayers. One elected official who strongly 
favored reopening the landfill but was defeated for reelection described his main reason 
for supporting the reopening as follows: “I was accountable for all Greensboro citizens 
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financially. I was obligated to protect the interests of the city in that respect.” Another 
former City Council member also said that she got involved because it was her 
responsibility as an elected official. A member of the Conservatives for Guilford County 
said that he became involved because he thought keeping the landfill closed to household 
waste “was unfair to the taxpayers of Greensboro.” Taken together, these responses seem 
to be indirect ways of saying that the landfill supporters’ chief goal was to cut expenses 
and taxes. Reopening the landfill, therefore, could be understood as a means to this end 
rather than an end in itself.  
Coalitions and Alliances 
 On the landfill opposition side, informal coalitions formed among the CEEJ, the 
League, the NGFM, the Nealtown Neighborhood Association, and others. Alliances also 
formed between the CEEJ and individual leaders, several of whom emphasized economic 
development issues related to the landfill. While th se coalitions were broad-based, they 
did not come close to representing all of Greensboro. On the pro-landfill side, 
conservative City Council members and other individual citizens informally allied 
themselves in supporting the reopening.  
Among the Landfill Opposition 
 The main group opposing the landfill, the CEEJ, formed coalitions with several 
non-environmental justice-focused groups, as well as with several prominent individual 
political and community leaders. As many interviewes noted, these alliances served 
many and varied purposes in the movement. While participants may have had different 
reasons for joining the movement, they were united in their goal to stop the reopening, at 
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least until the City Council had performed adequate du  diligence about alternative waste 
management. Ultimately, as social movement theory suggests, these coalitions and 
alliances were very important in maximizing support, as they helped make the landfill a 
city-wide issue instead of just an east Greensboro issue. Yet like all alliances, they also 
involved some tensions.  
 Interviewees most frequently mentioned the League as the most influential group 
that allied itself with the CEEJ to oppose the landfill. Several interviewees mentioned that 
CEEJ members spoke to the some leaders in the League about the issue prior to the 
League members becoming heavily involved. One CEEJ member said that she helped get 
word about the landfill to the League, but that the League already knew about the issue 
before she spoke to the Board of Directors about it. This interviewee’s “aim was to let 
them know about the efforts of the CEEJ, and they got involved right away.” She 
emphasized, though, that several members were already involved, and they already had 
an environmental committee; they just then “really got involved” once she had spoken 
with them directly. One of the League members said that she became aware of the landfill 
issue because “the League on a systematic basis monitors what goes on in the city 
government.” She said they “have some people always tching the televised City 
Council meetings.”  
Another key movement leader said that the two main groups with which the CEEJ 
cooperated were the League and the Southern Coalition for Social Justice, a non-profit 
legal based in Durham, North Carolina. After being contacted by a CEEJ member, a 
SCSJ staff attorney first met with the CEEJ member in March, 2011. They began having 
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phone conversations in February of that year, and, thereafter, the case was “one of [his] 
primary, if not [his] primary,” responsibilities. According to this interviewee, she and a 
co-leader were in contact with the SCSJ attorney dail via email or text message. The 
attorney said that the SCSJ took on this case becaus  it fit their mission, as they were 
involved in “environmental justice work,” as well as “fighting for communities,” such as 
low-income and minority communities. For such communities and local SMOs that lack 
deep expertise, seeking expert support as the CEEJ did has often been found important. In 
researching the issue, the SCSJ staff attorney said th t  
 
there is literature that is established that shows that [landfills] end up in poor 
communities, and also African American communities even when you control for 
wealth. We looked at where the trash was sent in Greensboro to see if there would 
be human impact in other areas. Uwharrie has close to z ro….So it fit our 
mission. So we were trying to minimize the impact. Uwharrie is a good location. 
There is less than 100 people within a one-mile radius of the landfill; there is 
about 7500 in a one-mile radius in Greensboro. These are not comparable 
impacts.   
 
 
The NGFM seemed to be peripherally involved in the movement because of the 
key involvement of several of its members. One of these members said that she initially 
became involved in the landfill issue as “a private individual.” She attended CEEJ 
meetings on her own behalf, not on behalf of the NGFM, but she “reported back to the 
New Garden Friends, though, and other individuals who had gone to the meetings did 
too.” These NGFM members ended up spearheading the caravan and rally at the landfill, 
because, as this interviewee said, “it kept being said that this was just an east Greensboro 
issue and other people in Greensboro didn’t care. And we wanted to show that other 
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districts cared too.” In order to organize the rally, these members spoke to their social 
concerns committee and asked them to donate money s that they could rent “Port-O-
Johns and other things like that.” This joint member also arranged for a former mayor to 
come to speak to her and other NGFM members about the landfill so that they could have 
more information about the issue. 
The Nealtown Neighborhood Association also seemed to be involved in the 
movement primarily through several of its leaders. One NNA leader told me that she first 
became aware of the landfill issue at a CEEJ meeting. She then started looking into the 
issue more in-depth and reading newspaper articles about it. She said that she first got 
involved with the CEEJ, and formed the NNA thereaftr.  
A Pulpit Forum member said that he was asked to join the CEEJ by several 
people, including the main movement leader, whom he said he often has contact with. 
They had the similar goal of keeping the landfill closed, and he started becoming 
involved in the dispute by going to the CEEJ meetings. He said the Reverend at Laughlin 
Memorial United Methodist Church (UMC), where the metings took place, was also 
very much involved. Other interviewees mentioned that several local churches supported 
the movement’s efforts to keep the landfill closed. Reminiscent of recruitment methods in 
the Civil Rights Movements, several said that their church congregations were one of the 
main avenues through which CEEJ members recruited support. Laughlin UMC also 
always served as the CEEJ’s meeting place, at no cost to the group. For new, 
underfunded grassroots movements, obtaining resources like these can prove invaluable. 
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Several interviewees also said that students from local colleges and universities got 
involved as well.  
In addition to coalitions among local groups, there were also several key alliances 
´between CEEJ,  the core SMO, and prominent politica  and community leaders. Many 
interviewees mentioned the strong alliance between th  CEEJ and three former mayors, 
all of whom also considered themselves CEEJ members. One of the former mayors 
initially became involved with the CEEJ as an advisor, but that led to becoming “an 
active, dedicated member.” Another contributed to the CEEJ efforts by donating to the 
group, helping with strategy and understanding the issue, and acting as a spokesperson to 
the press. “Diametrically opposed” to the reopening of the landfill, this former mayor 
“believed that there was strength in numbers” and that would provide the best 
opportunity to stop the effort to reopen it. The former mayor began urging people to get 
involved, which led him to work with the main movemnt leader to organize an 
informational meeting and the issue. NGFM members, some of whom are also in the 
League, contacted the former mayor as well. A main movement leader echoed this former 
mayor’s description about his involvement. She repoted that she and the former mayor 
got in touch early on in the dispute when the City ouncil began talking about submitting 
RFPs for the landfill. Thereafter, they met twice, and the former mayor continued to 
provide advice throughout the dispute.  
Another former mayor was involved with the CEEJ andlso the NGFM, but 
really, “just by supporting their efforts” and trying to regularly attend CEEJ meetings, 
giving it money and collecting information on the tax parcels around the landfill, 
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although it turned out that they really did not need that information. A current elected 
official, who did not affiliate himself with the CEEJ, also said that he cooperated closely 
with the main movement leader and a former mayor to ppose the landfill reopening. He 
said they met frequently and spoke on the phone probably once a week and met in person 
about once a month.  Other elected officials opposed th  reopening publicly, but were not 
said to be actively involved in the anti-landfill SMOs or in close cooperation with their 
leaders. Nonetheless, the division among the elected officials gave the landfill opponents 
a better chance of succeeding.  
Landfill Supporters 
Other than certain City Council members jointly supporting the landfill 
reopening, there do not seem to have been formal coalitions or alliances among the 
landfill supporters. When asked whether they cooperated closely with any local leaders 
and/or groups in their efforts to have the landfill reopened, the pro-landfill interviewees 
mainly referred to their dealings with other supporters in City Council meetings. One 
commented on the ambiguous stance on the landfill issue that some Council members 
took, saying that they “received a lot of mixed signals from people on the Council. There 
were people who had been for opening it and then were against it.” The Conservatives for 
Guilford County member interviewed did not mention other people or groups that he 
worked closely with, saying only that he and the former mayor had similar views on the 
issue. Moreover, he said that he spoke to the Council as an individual businessman and 
resident, not on behalf of the tea party group.  
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Theoretical Discussion and Summary 
 The findings presented in this chapter show many differences, and some 
similarities, between the groups and individuals who made up the anti-landfill movement 
and the landfill supporters. The results illustrate insights from various theories; however, 
the most relevant connections are to Luebke’s writing about North Carolina politics, to 
the community power structure literature, and to theory and research about social 
movements, especially grassroots environmental justice movements.  
In line with Luebke’s (1998) typology of North Carolina politics, the landfill 
supporters can be characterized generally as “traditionalists,” and the landfill opponents 
as an alliance of “progressives” and “modernizers.” Among the landfill supporters, the 
four City Council members in particular – Thompson, Rakestraw, Wade, and Knight – 
aligned themselves with the traditionalist ideals of limiting government spending and 
keeping taxes low. Although they vehemently denied assertions that they did not care 
about the rights of the lower socio-economic, African American population living near 
the landfill, the landfill supporters arguably fit a traditionalist stereotype of white, native-
born citizens for whom civil rights is far from the top of the agenda (Luebke 1998). From 
the perspective of many landfill opponents, of course, the pro-landfill stance of these 
political leaders showed their support for a policy that would deny a minority population 
the right to a safe and healthy environment and run ro ghshod their opinions. 
 The landfill opposition consisted of a combination of progressives and 
modernizers. With the Citizens for Economic and Environmental Justice as the core of 
the anti-landfill movement, progressives, many of them African Americans, were very 
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well represented. Members of this group emphasized racial justice, a key aspect of 
progressivism (Luebke 1998). Racial justice was also emphasized by the Nealtown 
Neighborhood Association, members of the Pulpit Forum, and other landfill opponents. 
Especially interesting, however, are, the CEEJ’s key coalitions and alliances with groups 
better characterized as “modernizers,” specifically, members of the League of Women 
Voters and prominent political leaders. While these landfill opponents sympathized with 
the progressives’ environmental justice concerns, their primary emphasis was on the 
modernizer ideals of economic development and maintaini g a positive image for the city 
(Luebke 1998). Typical of modernizers, these individuals were willing to accept using tax 
revenues to support trucking the city’s waste elsewhere rather than accept a policy they 
believed would create further racial disharmony in the city and hinder economic 
expansion.  
 Several other differences between the characteristic and strategies of groups and 
individuals in the anti-landfill movement and the landfill supporters can be linked to 
theories about community power structure and social movements. As mentioned, the 
most vocal and visible landfill supporters were four conservative City Council members; 
yet, several interviewees mentioned that they believ d other individuals, particularly 
those connected with waste management companies, also exerted influence from behind 
the scenes. This suspected behind the scenes involvement of several prominent 
businessmen and political leaders resembles some elements of Hunter’s (1953) elite 
model of community power structure; however, I could find no evidence that 
Greensboro’s traditional business-based power elite was involved in the reopening 
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efforts. On the other hand, the lack of direct evidnce does not prove that the old elite 
were not involved, as such involvement is often secret.  In any case, if an elite was in fact 
operating behind the scenes to reopen the landfill, then the attempts to control 
governmental decisions through an elite power structu e clearly failed in this case.  
 Overall, the results concerning the White Street Landfill appear to better fit the 
pluralist model of decision-making process. In line with the pluralist model, the anti-
landfill alliance was able to influence the government and win the day, working to a 
significant extent through fairly conventional interest groups strategies to influence 
government policy (Dahl 1967; Petracca 1992; Hurst 2009). Such strategies included 
regularly attending and speaking from the floor at the City Council meetings, emailing 
and calling City Council members, writing letters to local newspaper editors, signing 
petitions, holding City Council candidate forums, and putting on “get out the vote” 
drives. The anti-landfill alliance proved quite effective in encouraging some City Council 
members to publicly oppose the reopening, as well as in influencing which members of 
the Council were reelected in the November, 2011 elections.  
 While the pluralist model helps to understand the rol of anti-landfill forces in 
influencing governmental decisions, social movement theories help explain to a) explain 
cases in which their tactics pushed a bit beyond conventional interest group tactics into 
rancorous confrontation and b) explain how the anti-landfill movement was able to 
influence the local government, as many of their tactics were those common for social 
movements. In particular, resource mobilization theory (RMT) emphasizes the 
importance of a) social movement entrepreneurs, b) clearly defined ideology and goals,  
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c) forming coalitions and alliances, d) mobilization f resources, and e) developing 
effective strategy and tactics. In the landfill case, it is evident that the landfill opponents 
were able to organize a movement by accomplishing each of these while the landfill 
supporters never mobilized to form a movement focus directly on the landfill. Clearly, 
the movement had an extremely effective social moveent entrepreneur (Edwards and 
McCarthy 2004). Indeed, Goldie Wells was the embodiment of what social movement 
theorists (e.g., Soule and Snow 2009)  consider an ffective movement organizer. She 
had a clear sense of the movement’s mission and established one clear, overarching goal 
for the CEEJ: keep the White Street Landfill closed to household waste. She also 
possessed skills in attracting supporters, mobilizing resources, and building coalitions. 
RMT scholars (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; Klandermans 1986; Soule and Snow 
2009) have widely recognized the importance of each of t ese qualities for leading a 
successful movement. 
 As resource mobilization theory and past literature on grassroots environmental 
justice movements (e.g., Duffy 2003) suggest, forming coalitions and alliances proved to 
be particularly advantageous for the anti-landfill movement. The CEEJ’s alliances with 
several key groups and prominent individuals allowed for pooling resources, skills, and 
expertise, a benefit RMT scholars have widely noted (e.g., Klandermans 1986; Soule and 
Snow 2009). Such collaborations are often particularly important for grassroots groups, 
whose members may not have as many resources as long established, well-funded 
organizations (Duffy 2003), or the technical expertis  needed to take legal action. The 
CEEJ’s close collaborations with members of the Leagu  of Women Voters, NGFM, 
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Nealtown Neighborhood Association, Pulpit Forum, Human Relations Commission, and 
of several other groups increased the available range of skills. It also provided further 
legitimacy for the movement by showing that the landfill was a concern for more than 
just northeast Greensboro residents. The CEEJ’s and the League’s collaboration with the 
Southern Coalition for Social Justice also provided the movement with the legal expertise 
necessary to file a lawsuit against the city and successfully delay the reopening 
proceedings. Furthermore, the CEEJ’s support from prominent political leaders like 
former mayors Holliday, Allen, and Johnson served as a “moral” resource (Edwards and 
McCarthy 2004). These coalitions and alliances helped to provide the anti-landfill 
movement with increased legitimacy and solidarity, which are also examples of non-
monetary, moral resources that can greatly benefit social movements (Edwards and 
McCarthy 2004).  
The lack of pro-landfill SMOs and alliances, on theother hand, offers insight into 
why the landfill supporters ultimately failed. None of my interviewees, including the 
Conservatives for Guilford County member I interviewed, could identify any formal 
groups that were organized to support the reopening, or any extant groups, such as the 
local tea party group, that publicly announced an official position on the issue. 
Individuals who favored reopening did express their op nions to the City Council, and 
some of them were known to be members of groups like the Conservatives for Guilford 
County; however, they were not officially representing these groups. The pro-landfill 
individuals thus did not use all of the tools available to obtain support for their cause; that 
is, if they did not form an SMO or “networks of collective action, such as coalitions” 
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(Diani 1992:16). It is particularly ironic in this context that the reopening proponents on 
City Council were swept into office partly by a local wing of the tea party movement, 
which then chose not to mobilize for the landfill controversy. 
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION PART II 
 
 
This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section examines the 
interviewees’ views about  the obstacles for the individuals and groups on each side of 
the landfill dispute. The second summarizes the strategies and tactics of the landfill 
opponents and supporters. The third summarizes the main arguments of the landfill 
opponents about why the landfill should not be reopened to household waste and the 
arguments of the landfill supporters for why it should be reopened. The fourth section 
discusses the interviewees’ perspectives on the role of media in the dispute. The fifth 
section examines the interviewees’ views about  the advantages for the individuals and 
groups on each side of the landfill dispute. 
Obstacles Faced by the Two Sides 
This section looks first at the obstacles landfill opponents faced in trying to keep 
the landfill closed, followed by those faced by landfill supporters trying to get it 
reopened. 
Obstacles Facing the Landfill Opposition 
In general, interviewees said the groups and individuals trying to keep the landfill 
closed faced an interrelated set of obstacles. The thre  most cited  were 1) the city and 
country’s poor economic state, which made saving money by reopening the landfill 
attractive 2) getting enough City Council votes against the reopening, and 3) broadening 
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their support by making the landfill a city-wide issue. These obstacles were interrelated 
because the second and third were affected by the first. That is, the poor state of the 
economy was a major reason why it was difficult to br aden support when the reopening 
was being presented as a cost-saving measure, and, subsequently, to get the City Council 
votes to keep the landfill closed.  
 Several interviewees explicitly said that the economy was an obstacle for those 
trying to keep the landfill closed. As a League memb r put it, there was decreasing 
revenue for the government, and landfill supporters argued that keeping the landfill 
closed was increasing costs. A former mayor added that, due to the “sorry state of the 
economy,” this argument about saving money “loomed v ry large” for some people. It 
was also difficult for the landfill opposition to combat the claim that reopening the 
landfill would be more cost effective. As one of the main movement leaders put it, “when 
taxpayers think that their money is being taken away, they don’t want that thing [that they 
believe is taking their money].”  
 About half of the interviewees said that a major obstacle was getting enough 
support from the City Council to keep the landfill closed. At first, the Council members 
who wanted the landfill reopened “had a functional m jority over people who wanted it 
closed,” said a League member. A City Council member explained that “there were four 
City Council members who wanted it reopened, and with two people not able to vote, that 
put it at four-to-three in favor of reopening.” According to several anti-landfill 
interviewees, the four in favor of reopening were “unpersuadable” and unwilling to listen 
to the northeast residents. In addition, there was no way of knowing whether the other 
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two, who had been recused because of apparent conflicts of interest, would eventually be 
able to vote on it (See Appendix A for more information about the recusals). 
 Approximately two-thirds of the interviewees said that major obstacles facing the 
landfill opposition included the need to broaden cocern about the landfill and build 
support in the northeast district and in other parts of Greensboro. Several anti-landfill 
interviewees and one pro-landfill interviewee commented about the opposition 
movement’s struggles to build deep support in neighbor oods near the landfill. A CEEJ 
member described a “lack of participation by the neighborhood…many thought that the 
Council would do what they wanted and open it anyway, that their voice didn’t matter.” 
She added that “the fight was very draining and people got tired with the issue continuing 
to come up. We lost people in the battle.” 
 The landfill opposition also “had to overcome the perception that the majority of 
citizens wanted the landfill reopened; the perception of the issue as being a quote/unquote 
‘black’ or ‘east Greensboro’ issue,” as one reporter described it. Several interviewees 
mentioned how it could seem as though “most of Greensboro didn’t care one way or the 
other,” or that “people who don’t live in the area could see it as something that they 
didn’t need to worry about.” This is a common problem of environmental justice 
movements; it was difficult for the landfill opposition to try “to broaden the scope of how 
it could affect the city of Greensboro” and show that a reopening would also hurt the 
city’s economic development, as one CEEJ member said.  
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Obstacles for the Landfill Supporters  
The three most cited obstacles the groups and individuals trying to get the landfill 
reopened faced were that the supporters, mainly the pro-landfill City Council members, 
1) were not convincing enough about the cost-savings from reopening the landfill, 2) 
were often perceived to be inconsiderate of the African American community 
neighboring the landfill, and 3) faced a very vocal and passionate opposition.  
 Several interviewees, including all but one of the pro-landfill interviewees, 
mentioned that a major obstacle for the supporters was convincing people about the cost-
savings. From the anti-landfill interviewees’ perspective, “they didn’t have enough facts” 
to back up their argument with the public. Moreover, they never came to a clear 
consensus about the exact dollar amount of savings that reopening the landfill would 
bring. As one landfill proponent stated, the numbers provided seemed to be exaggerated, 
“which really made people question the motives of the conservatives.” From the pro-
landfill interviewees’ perspective, the supporters were unable to convince the public 
because people “would not listen to the facts.” Thelandfill opponents, according a 
Conservatives for Guilford County member, “would spin the math” and “dilute [the cost-
savings] down to three million dollars” instead of the ten million dollars he calculated or 
the seven million dollars the conservative mayor had c lculated. 
 Some interviewees said that one of the major obstacles for the landfill supporters 
was that reopening the landfill seemed inconsiderate of neighboring residents and “like 
an attack on the African American community.” All three anti-landfill former mayors 
mentioned that the pro-landfill City Council members did not seem to listen to, respect, 
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or have empathy for the neighboring residents of the landfill. “Those who wanted the 
reopening refused to take the Black community into consideration. They didn’t appreciate 
the problems that it would cause,” said one. Another added, 
 
…it seemed like it was Whites trying to impose this on Blacks and there is so 
much history in Greensboro about us claiming that we do not want to do that. 
They wanted to keep it a financial argument and didn’t want to say that it was 
about human rights or demographics. 
 
 
An important movement leader echoed these sentiments. She said she believed the 
supporters’ claims about cost-saving measures were fals . But beyond this, “their 
ugliness showed through and that it was more than just about the money; it was an attack 
on the citizens.”  
 Most interviewees also mentioned the very vocal and passionate landfill 
opposition as a major obstacle for the landfill supporters. Several CEEJ members said 
that their group’s outspokenness, strength, and passion, as well as the support they 
received from other groups, were obstacles for the supporters. Another CEEJ and NGFM 
member said that the former mayor who had worked for the landfill while in office called 
them the “troublemakers,” and “said that they would have gotten it opened if it had not 
been for the troublemakers.” An elected official who was defeated mainly because of his 
opposition to the landfill agreed that the “very vocal opposition” was an obstacle for the 
landfill supporters.  
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Strategies and Tactics  
 This section looks first at the landfill opponents’ strategies and tactics in trying to 
influence the outcome of the dispute, followed by the landfill supporters’ strategies and 
tactics .  
Landfill Opposition SMOs 
 There were many common strategies and tactics used in the anti-landfill efforts, 
although some did vary by SMO and individual.  
The Citizens for Economic and Environmental Justice (CEEJ)  
The CEEJ took many kinds of actions, both direct and indirect, to prevent 
reopening the landfill. Many of its tactics were standard interest group tactics for 
influencing governmental decision-making and elections. These included regularly 
attending and speaking from the floor at the City Council meetings, e-mailing and calling 
City Council members, writing letters to the editors f local newspapers, caravanning 
from the west side of Greensboro to the landfill, marching to the plaza of the Municipal 
Building, organizing rallies, speaking to church congregations and other local groups, 
informing residents door-to-door, signing petitions, and hiring legal counsel to represent 
them in a suit against the city.   
 These actions were typically decided upon during the group’s meetings in a 
democratic style common of many social movement organizations. According to one of 
the CEEJ’s main leaders, the floor would be open for people’s ideas, and a committee of 
a few members would then discuss the ideas and choose which ones to pursue. This often 
involved coordinating with other local groups. For example, a CEEJ member and the 
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New Garden Friends Meetings (NGFM) member worked with both groups to organize 
the caravan, and the CEEJ worked with a local student group to organize the march to the 
Municipal Building and with the Beloved Community Center, a local grassroots group 
focused on economic and social justice and community-building, helped with “getting out 
the vote.”  
A few respondents commented on how the development of strategy was a 
process. Plans evolved with time, another member and current City Council member 
stated, as “it was a growing and evolving process.” Still another interviewee, a CEEJ 
member and former elected official saw the group becoming much more organized and 
strategic once the Southern Coalition for Social Justice (SCSJ) got involved. Thereafter, 
the group was “a well-oiled machine with moving parts.”  
 Many CEEJ member interviewees agreed about the actions that were most 
effective in influencing the outcome of the controversy. Keeping the City Council 
chambers packed with citizens opposed to the landfill was the one most often cited. One 
CEEJ member and current City Council member, for example, emphasized the 
importance of having large numbers of people at the City Council meetings and showing 
the Council “that we were not going away.” She added,  
 
[the Council] mostly ignored us, and they thought that doing so would make us go 
away eventually, but we didn’t. We had more and more people come to the 
meetings each time. We kept the chambers active. And now more people watch 
the meetings and attend the meetings. There are a lot of things that you don’t get 
to see by just watching it on TV, the little subtleties and comments.  
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Other oft-cited successful strategies were obtaining legal counsel from the SCSJ, 
and highlighting the health and economic development implications for the entire city if 
the landfill were reopened. One interviewee commented that “the landfill would be in 
operation right now if we hadn’t had Chris Brook [the SCSJ staff attorney].” As the 
movement leader commented, filing the lawsuit on the city was effective because it not 
only “baffled them all and showed that we would go far,” but it also attracted a good deal 
of the media attention. One CEEJ member thought the caravan to have been particularly 
effective in doing this by getting people from all over the city involved, as well as 
attracting media attention. Many respondents said that the various actions all came 
together to influence the controversy.  
 When asked whether there were any actions that were least effective or weakened 
their side’s influence in the dispute, about half of the CEEJ member respondents said that 
they could not think of any. Nonetheless, a few went on to mention such. One 
interviewee said that she did not think there were any particular actions that weakened 
her side’s influence, but that her husband did not approve of people speaking out or 
yelling during the City Council meetings. “There is a fine line with emotions getting 
involved,” she said, “and this may have turned off City Council members.” She went on 
to say that she understood the emotions, particularly anger, of some who spoke out at the 
meetings, but that she thought that “you get more flies with honey.” Another CEEJ 
member and former elected official referred to the same actions as potentially weakening 
her side’s influence. She believed that the group’s actions strengthened its influence 
overall, but the group also experienced the common social movement strategy dilemma 
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of how confrontational to be. This interviewee adde that “there were times in the City 
Council meetings when people may have acted out of line and that may have weakened it 
a bit.” 
 One key movement leader also mentioned that she did not think it was very 
effective to have the “No Dumping” yard signs posted in the northeast area of the city. 
She said that she and the initial group members “thoug t that [they] could head off the 
[potential reopening] at the beginning,” but that pu ting these yard signs in the northeast 
area was like “preaching to the choir.” As the dispute went on, they “realized that it was 
going to take a lot more than [putting signs in peopl ’s yards].” 
Nealtown Neighborhood Association 
The actions the group took to try to achieve these goals [“to build a stronger 
community and to keep the landfill closed.”], specifically the latter, included having press 
conferences at UNC Greensboro and a shopping center in east Greensboro, speaking at 
City Council meetings, “walking the streets” to tryo keep people informed in the 
neighborhood, and getting support from students at A&T University and Bennett College. 
Her main focus, the leader said, was to inform. She said she “was determined, if [she] had 
to get out of work early everyday and go around door t  door to get people informed.” 
She found most of these actions to be effective, as well as attracting attention in a local 
newspaper and on two local radio stations.  
The League of Women Voters of the Piedmont Triad 
The two League members interviewed mentioned various actions the League took 
to show their opposition to any quick landfill reopening. Most of these included typical 
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interest group strategies and relatively little confr tational social movement strategy. 
The main actions the interviewees mentioned were reaching out to “political people,” 
playing “the media game,” writing letters to editors of local newspapers, speaking out at 
City Council meetings, forming an informal coalition with the CEEJ and attending its 
meetings and helping sponsor the rallies, and, finally, becoming a litigant (they filed an 
amicus brief and attended court sessions) in the lawsuit against the city. The members 
also listed actions the group took to educate its members about the issue, such as 
communicating through the group’s newsletter and having various events in which they 
brought in a person to speak about environmental justice, a person in the waste 
management business to speak about waste management issues, and City Council 
candidates to speak about their stance on the landfill.  
One respondent viewed the League members’ community organizing as being the 
most effective tactic in influencing the dispute. She said, simply, “we just outgunned the 
City Council with our community organizing. We out-maneuvered them with our 
experience.” Such experience involved knowing how t ork together with other groups 
to accomplish what one could not alone. For example, on  member noted how the 
Southern Coalition for Social Justice did not have the ties with the local press but that she 
did, so she acted as the main contact for the press. On the other hand, the League cannot 
endorse political candidates, whereas the CEEJ could and did. Thus, the League’s key 
focus seemed to be on working with other groups in their efforts.  
The other League member interviewed also noted that the League’s strategy, 
along with the SCSJ’s, involved emphasizing the argument that reopening the landfill 
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would be a form of discrimination. She explained that t e SCSJ emphasized this 
argument in the lawsuit and that the League would have continued to highlight this issue 
if “those in favor had won one battle and gotten the first phases to go through.” She 
continued,  
 
We would have made sure that they could not go through with the phases that 
would have expanded the landfill. In the law, there ar  things about the racial 
compositions of the area, and all we would have to show is that there are other 
areas in the county that have enough space and are not inhabited by a majority of 
a racial minority. And it is clearly why the Southern Coalition for Social Justice 
saw it as such. They have a very specific mission to address issues of 
discrimination. And they developed a legal strategy around that and saw it as that 
kind of issue, and going that way was important for the case. 
 
 
 Both League members also noted the Board approval process required when 
members speak out on a certain issue. As one member explained, everything she “said 
publicly was related to the League,” and that when members “are speaking on behalf of 
the League then it has to be reviewed by our Board f Directors. The intent has to be 
approved.” This process, along with the context and history of the issue, affected the way 
she presented her stance to the public. As she put it,  
 
that process affects the tone of what I say. My tone was more cerebral, whereas 
others were more emotional, and you need both. It wouldn’t have been 
appropriate for me to get up there and be emotional not living in that area.  
 
 
Both League interviewees also commented on how their m mbers’ stance on the 
landfill issue was not unanimous; consequently, they had to discuss their position with 
the Board several different times. This situation represents a common problem among 
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organizations whose main goal is not supporting a social movement in which they have 
become involved. As one member said, “many thought that we should have stayed off of 
it.” In particular, joining the lawsuit caused some conflict among members, as some “did 
not understand the importance of [the League] joining.” Some of the members worried 
that it might make the League responsible financially for the lawsuit and obligated to pay 
the costs if the landfill opposition lost. Going to the extent of joining a lawsuit was “new 
territory” for the League, and, and one respondent said, members were also “concerned 
about this damaging our relationship with City Council and make us less effective on 
other issues that are really important to us like education and healthcare.”  Another 
member described in some detail the group members’ internal conflict and the eventual 
resolution about the issue of joining the lawsuit: 
 
…ultimately we got the majority of the Board members on board and we 
weathered the heat from the others. And one thing was that I couldn’t share 
everything with the members at large, like the legal aspects of it. Had I been able 
to do that, the controversy could have possibly been avoided. But eventually 
people came around, and we had to go back to them again to get approval to enter 
into the lawsuit about the county map and redistricting. So people began to see 
that sometimes it may be the best tool. 
 
Individual Actors 
One anti-landfill interviewee acted as an individual and not as a part of any 
organized group, other than being a member of City ouncil.  As an elected official at the 
time of the dispute and currently, his actions mainly consisted of speaking out against the 
reopening “early and often” at City Council meetings and to the press. In addition, he 
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also consistently voted to keep the landfill closed when the City Council voted on the 
issue.   
The NGFM members who became involved in the anti-ladfill movement also 
said that they acted as individuals, although they received moral support from other 
Friends Meeting members and monetary support from their social concerns committee. 
The primary actions these NGFM members took were organizing the caravan and rally at 
the landfill, and attending CEEJ meetings. Later on in the controversy, they also “started 
focusing on getting the people off Council who supported it.”  
The Landfill Supporters 
Most of the pro-landfill interviewees mentioned various ways that they were 
involved in the dispute and the actions they took to show their support for the reopening. 
These actions mainly took place during City Council meetings. Two previous Council 
members mentioned that they were involved with the Request For Proposals (RFP) 
process, in which the Council would evaluate proposals from waste management 
companies interested in operating the landfill, andttending the City Council work 
sessions. Both said that they put much work into researching the landfill issue. Another 
mentioned that he made presentations about landfills to other groups and that he spoke to 
the press about his support for the reopening. He commented that his interview with the 
press “didn’t see the light of day,” though. Moreovr, he did not think that his actions had 
any influence on the outcome of the dispute.  
A member of the Conservatives for Guilford County (C4GC), a local tea party-
related group, was also involved primarily as an individual. Although a dedicated 
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member of C4GC, this interviewee did not act explicitly as a tea party representative, and 
the C4CG did not become much involved in the dispute. Like the other pro-landfill 
interviewees, he said that he did a great deal of research on the issue. He described the 
actions he took to show his support for the reopening as making “a lot of noise” and 
speaking out at the City Council meetings. He mentioned that he was not well-received 
by one of the anti-landfill Council members, who he said told him that he should “stick 
[his] head in one of those green [garbage] bins.”  
Arguments and Counter-Arguments 
Main Arguments among the Landfill Opposition 
Three central arguments constituted the core of the main grassroots group’s 
opposition to the landfill reopening. Two of the arguments, characteristic of grassroots 
environmental justice movements, focused on justice, equity, and rights (Agyeman 2002). 
First, framing the dispute in terms of widely accepted norms, the moral argument cited a 
betrayal of trust by the city government, along with unfairness, and injustice. Second, a 
quality of life argument pointed to health concerns, smells, noises, and diminished 
property values for the close neighbors because of the landfill. Third, an economic 
development argument, framed this issue in terms of the common good. A counterframe 
to the save tax dollars argument, it said that reopening and expanding the landfill would 
greatly hinder the city’s growth. This argument framed the landfill as a city-wide issue 
about which all Greensboro citizens should be concerned. 
The interviewees were largely in agreement that members of the CEEJ believed 
that it would be morally unjust to reopen the landfill. Many anti-landfill interviewees 
103 
 
emphasized that members of the City Council had broken their promise to them that the 
landfill would not be reopened, and, by doing so, had betrayed their trust. Although 
several pro-landfill interviewees commented that they did not remember the City Council 
making any promises that the landfill would not ever b  reopened to household waste, 
most conceded that many neighboring residents believed that the landfill was a closed 
issue.  
The belief that there was a breach of trust exacerbat d many of the northeast 
residents’ feelings of mistreatment by their city government. As one interviewee stated,  
 
[some members of the City Council] didn’t consider the negative effects. They 
acted like it didn’t matter. To me, that told me that they didn’t give a damn. They 
said they wanted to save money and they didn’t care about the ramifications.  
 
 
A key aspect of an environmental justice movement’s framing of environmental 
disputes is the idea that all people have the rightto a safe and healthy environment and 
that this right is being denied. In line with this argument, many anti-landfill interviewees 
claimed that reopening the landfill would constitute “discrimination,” “environmental 
injustice,” “racial injustice,” and “environmental racism.” As one interviewee explained, 
these terms reflected their assumption that “there would not even be a question about 
reopening the landfill if it were in a white neighborhood.” This claim also fits within the 
master frame that minorities are not treated equally in the United States.  
Fairness and justice were intertwined with the quality of life argument. Whether 
themselves pro- or anti-landfill, the majority of the interviewees listed many quality of 
life issues as being used in arguments against the landfill reopening. As in many other 
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environmental justice movements, landfill opponents argued that the landfill was 
hazardous to its neighbors’ health. Many said that cancer and asthma rates were higher in 
this area due to toxic substances and poor air quality the landfill produced. Many also 
argued that the landfill, when opened to household waste, made it unpleasant for 
neighbors to be outside or have their windows open due to the smells and the loud noises 
of garbage trucks traveling to and from the site on small, residential roads. Furthermore, 
landfill opponents emphasized that the landfill drove down their property values and 
made the area unattractive for businesses and shopping centers, which residents would 
like to have nearby. (The shortage of such facilities in the area was a longstanding 
community grievance.)  
One Pulpit Forum member said that it seemed to him t at race relations had 
improved in the city, but the issue “did have a connotation of racism and classism.” 
According to another League member, these feelings of discrimination were present in 
past disputes about the landfill, as well. The recent dispute was similar to those in the 
past, she said, because “it was emblematic of the feeling of the people in that community. 
They felt like they were being treated like second class citizens because they would say 
that it wouldn’t happen in other neighborhoods.”  
 When asked whether reopening the landfill would be environmental racism, the 
Pulpit Forum member and one League member replied “y s.” Another League member 
implied that it would be, by stating: “Most landfill are environmentally racist. Landfills 
are not going to be sited in Irving Park [a majority white, affluent neighborhood]. Most 
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likely they are not going to be sited in northwest Greensboro [the city’s most prosperous 
quandrant].”  
Several landfill opponents also explicitly pointed out the role that redlining played 
in the demographics of the landfill area. As one CEEJ member – who is also a current 
City Council member – commented, 
 
The race relations aspect is huge. The area is where African American families 
were basically told to live, which is an environmental justice issue. Within a one-
mile parameter of the landfill it is 85 percent African American….The race 
relations issue was a national issue too with redlining neighborhoods.  
 
 
Arguing along the same lines, a League member noted how the race and class 
demographics of northeast Greensboro are typical of waste disposal facility sites. The 
dispute “had racial undertones,” she stated, “and certainly it is true that most facilities are 
in lower socio-economic communities and those that are less able to resist. So there were 
feelings that they were being discriminated by two standards – race and wealth.” These 
sentiments were clearly reflected in a current City ouncil member’s  view. She said that 
it is no accident that “landfills are mainly in poor and minority communities.” 
A NGFM member also commented on the city’s racial segregation and 
discrimination. She stated: 
 
It is no accident that east of downtown Greensboro has been predominantly 
African American and west of downtown has been predominantly white. The east 
part of town has not only the landfill, but they’ve got water treatment plants, and 
other things that aren’t very savory.   
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This interviewee agreed with the others that reopening the landfill would be 
environmental racism, but she said that she never used those terms in the letters she wrote 
to newspaper editors. Although she thinks “there was environmental racism in this whole 
thing,” she did not think that “throwing ugly words” at people can change their minds. A 
League member also pointed out that she rarely explicitly used the term “environmental 
racism” in her arguments. She said that “it seemed to not be as powerful, so it was a 
secondary argument.” However, it is evident that the environmental justice framing and 
argument had appeal to some segments of Greensboro’ white population.  
Two local journalists also saw race as a central issue in the dispute, and 
emphatically argued that City Council members would never even consider reopening the 
landfill if it were in a different part of town. Both said that the reopening would it be 
environmental racism and just another example of neglect and “racial insensitivity” on 
the part of the “fiscally conservative members of the City Council who wanted to cut 
costs of local government.” As one said, they “didn’t seem to think about the businesses 
that were there and the residents not wanting it.” The other stated that there was a “strong 
degree of racial insensitivity to the insult and real worries about health by the 
community.”  
Other anti-landfill arguments emphasized that reopening the landfill would not 
good for Greensboro as a whole. Many interviewees mntioned that members of the 
League focused on the health and economic development factors. Its members involved 
in the dispute argued that the landfill would pose health risks to the neighboring residents 
and hurt economic development because of its close proximity to downtown. According 
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to several interviewees, the Human Relations Commission and the NGFM echoed these 
key arguments in their opposition to the landfill reopening. 
The crux of the economic development framing involved the landfill’s effect on 
the area’s attractiveness, plus the landfill’s physical location in one of the few areas in 
Greensboro left for growth.  CEEJ members emphasized that businesses would not want 
to move into an area with a landfill nearby. Some also noted that increased racial tensions 
are not inviting to new residents or businesses. One of the former mayors stated the 
importance of fairness in a city, and added: “What does this say to the rest of the world 
about our desire to grow, and what does it say about our fairness and diversity?” 
Moreover, CEEJ members argued that these issues would repel businesses, which would 
affect more than just northeast Greensboro; it would hinder economic development for 
the entire city. Several often mentioned how the landfill is inside Greensboro’s “urban 
loop” and only a few miles from the city’s downtown area, which is very rare for US 
cities today.  
Characteristic of Luebke’s (1998) “modernizer politician,” one former mayor, as 
well as a current elected official, zeroed in on the economic development argument in 
opposing the landfill reopening. Particularly because of the emphatic stance of the former 
mayor, a well known moderate, the economic development argument, more so than any 
other, got whites from other parts of the city involved in opposing the landfill. As a 
member of the press noted, when the issue of economic development came to the 
forefront, “this was the turning point. It gave whites permission to be against the landfill 
because they weren’t seen then as ‘bleeding hearts.’” Referring to Greensboro “as a 
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desert with five wells,” – as in, five areas for economic development – the former mayor 
made clear that east Greensboro was the only “well” left in the city limits. The former 
mayor argued that, if the landfill were reopened, and, subsequently, expanded, it “would 
dry up the last well we have left [for growth].”  
Main Arguments among the Landfill Supporters 
 At the root of the landfill supporters’ main arguments was a single issue: saving 
money and reducing taxes. There were also secondary arguments, such as not wanting to 
waste the landfill property and the landfill’s benefits to Greensboro, but each of these 
pointed back to cost-saving and keeping municipal taxes low. Without exception, the 
interviewees said that the landfill supporters – most notably, the four City Council 
members – emphasized this point above all others. In this sense, the supporters 
represented “traditionalist” ideals of small government and low taxes. 
Landfill supporters often spoke about how Greensboro would benefit from saving 
money and from economic development spurred by reopening the landfill. One 
conservative former elected official argued that reopening the landfill would increase 
economic development in the northeast quadrant, not hi der it. He said that the money 
saved “could help fund the project that was supposed to happen out on Cone Boulevard – 
a connector between Nealtown Road that has been talked bout for years.” He added that 
“we could use the money and employ people at the landfill or the other things that could 
be built out there and allocate it back to [the peopl  in east Greensboro].” He argued that 
it could also “benefit all of Greensboro” by providing funds for libraries and parks. 
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 A common argument from many landfill supporters, which was also related to the 
cost-saving argument, was that the landfill was a “valuable resource.”  One former 
elected official emphasized that the landfill was an award-winning landfill and a “multi-
million dollar investment” that should be used. A me ber of the Conservatives for 
Guilford County, the local tea party-related group, shared this sentiment, and criticized 
the city’s handling of the landfill issue. He argued that,  
 
strategically speaking, [the city] did not have a vi ble, feasible option with closing 
the landfill. They didn’t do their homework. And they were spending taxpayers’ 
money. So they closed down one of the most valuable ss ts of the city. They 
didn’t have a strategic plan. It was so reckless.  
 
Landfill Supporters’ Critiques of the Opponents’ Ar guments  
Landfill supporters often countered anti-landfill arguments about residents’ health 
and quality of life by saying either that there were no proven health hazards or that the 
neighbors made the choice to live in the area. Several pro-landfill interviewees said it was 
a misunderstanding or denial of facts to believe that e landfill caused health problems. 
As one commented, 
 
If there are health issues then why would the city allow to live them there if there 
were those things? I think that there is misunderstanding or misinformation of true 
fact….Once people go into emotional mode, the information that is disseminated 
is not always as accurate and doesn’t tell the whole story.  
 
 
A member of the Conservatives for Guilford County also claimed that there was a 
difference between the reality of the landfill and neighbors’ perceptions of it. As he 
stated, “there are minorities living around the landfill. They may have consciously, 
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genuinely had concerns about health, but that doesn’t mean that it necessarily is a health 
hazard.” This interviewee also argued that “the city was not twisting anyone’s arm to buy 
houses near the landfill.” Countering the environmetal justice argument, he said that it 
“annoyed” him that residents “stood up and said that t ey didn’t have a choice and that 
there were health hazards.” 
 All the pro-landfill interviewees noted that nearby residents believed there were 
health hazards, but they attempted to invoke science to show that these claims were 
unfounded. A former elected official who had supported reopening the landfill also 
disputed the claims that the landfill posed a healt hazard to the neighboring residents 
and that reopening would be environmental racism. Two former City Council members 
and a member of the Conservatives for Guilford County each pointed out that the landfill 
was approved by the necessary authorities, such as the State Health Department, which 
would not have happened if the landfill were a health hazard. As the Conservatives for 
Guilford County member stated,  
 
There was the notion by people who lived there that t e landfill was a health 
hazard. They would say that they knew people who died from pancreatic cancer 
who lived near the landfill. Well I know people in Irving Park [a majority white, 
affluent neighborhood] who have died from pancreatic cancer too. The state 
Health Department came out to investigate and Greensboro was given high marks 
for the landfill. So the claims about health hazards couldn’t be linked. Those 
filing the suit probably wanted the health department to support their claims about 
the hazards, but they said that there were no links. But that didn’t stop them.  
 
 
The pro-landfill interviewees’ views also differed greatly from the opponents’ on 
the role Greensboro’s racial history played in the dispute. Every pro-landfill interviewee 
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disputed the environmental justice argument and emphasized that the landfill has been 
around since the 1940s, with the large majority of the African American residents moving 
into the area much later. While all of the proponents i terviewed recognized that the 
landfill opposition believed there were racial issue  involved, they gave various reasons 
for why they did not believe there was environmental racism. In the view of an elected 
official who was defeated partly because of supporting the reopening, 
 
Some could try to make the case that there were racial f tors in this; however, 
the other landfills in Winston-Salem and Raleigh are surrounded by Caucasians. 
So the racial element, I just can’t. I grew up out there. I just take that out of it. 
Many people who grew up in Greensboro share that same sentiment. It’s just not 
an issue. I guess living near the landfill has thatconnotation with it of people who 
live around the area not being as good – regardless of it being an award-winning, 
world class facility.  
 
 
This interviewee went on to say that the idea of the landfill reopening being 
environmental racism was “baloney.” Along the same lin s, a former City Council 
member asked how could the proposed reopening could  be environmental racism when 
there was an African American environmental expert on staff who said that the landfill 
should be reopened.   
 Another proponent of reopening agreed that the dispute was not about 
environmental racism. He seemed to follow a common line of argument that accuses 
someone who raises the issue of race as just inventi g discrimination and 
instrumentalizing race. From his perspective, the dispute was a political and economic 
issue that “was turned into a racial issue.” He too emphasized that the neighboring 
residents were not forced to live beside the landfill, so he did not understand how the 
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reopening would be environmental racism. As he stated, “people can buy a house 
anywhere by the law, but neighborhoods continue to be divided racially – that’s the 
housing pattern people have chosen.” This interviewee also saw the housing 
circumstances of the landfill area as an important f ctor in understanding the dispute. To 
him, the Nealtown Farms neighborhood “started the balling rolling” with making the 
landfill a racial issue. He added that, when the landfill was first constructed and before 
Nealtown Farms came to be, “the area had both black and white families there….But it 
turned into a racial issue because politics in Greensboro is very racial.”  
Counter Arguments from the Landfill Opposition 
 Members of the anti-landfill movement frequently attempted to counter the pro-
landfill argument that residents had simply chosen to live in the area and that the 
reopening would result in huge cost-savings. 
 Arguments that people had chosen to live near the landfill  were countered with 
the argument that the residents believed the landfill was permanently closed to household 
waste, as well as by arguments referencing Greensboro’  racial history. As one anti-
landfill interviewee stated,  
 
[landfill supporters] said people chose to live there and they knew the landfill was 
there. To that, our argument was that they may haveknown it was there, but they 
knew it would be closed. And we threw back, would you want it in your 
backyard? And they responded point blank: “no”.  
 
 
One NGFM member also spoke to the systemic racism that she believed factored 
into the placement of certain groups of people around the landfill. As she explained, 
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when the landfill was first constructed in the 1940s, the area was much more rural. When 
more people did start to move into the area, however, th y were mostly African 
American, which the interviewee did not see as coincidental. She recalled the following: 
 
I remember being told by some African Americans that ey were asked why they 
didn’t go other places since the landfill was there, but he said they really couldn’t. 
I think there has been some sorts of systemic or institutional racism that allowed 
African Americans to live right beside a landfill. And they were limited in where 
they could live in a way that the white community was not. And I know that area 
is not totally African American, but there is a sizable number of people in the area 
who are African American. 
  
 
Many opposed to the landfill also argued that the cost-saving argument was 
exaggerated. As one interviewee noted,  
 
[pro-landfill City Council members] were very adamant that this would save 
Greensboro millions of dollars because we were in an economic crisis. But the 
CEEJ and Chris Brook [their attorney from the Southern Coalition for Social 
Justice] came back with very valid arguments that disputed that. 
 
 
Several other anti-landfill interviewees mentioned that, according to their cost 
analysis, the savings “would not really be that much.” One reporter also noted that the 
difference in municipal spending “turned out to be inconsequential in the amount of cost 
savings” to taxpayers because there would still be operating costs with reopening the 
landfill. Concurring about the exaggerated cost-savings of the reopening, a current 
elected official stated: 
 
I think the saving money argument was blown out of pr portion because the City 
Council had closed the White Street Landfill. That pu restrictions on the land that 
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proponents of the expansion didn’t know about until la er in the process…so all 
the talk about savings millions of dollars weren’t correct.  
 
 
According to him, the pro-landfill City Council members “didn’t want to think about 
other alternatives….They didn’t take others into consideration.” Like several other 
interviewees, he alluded to the City Council members having a sense of entitlement in 
making the decision to reopen the landfill. “They took the cram-it-down approach,” he 
said, “and seemed to want to do it because they thought they could, instead of what was 
right for the community.”  
Role of the Media 
 Over half of the interviewees said that they personally received media attention as 
a result of their involvement in the landfill dispute, and a few others said that they might 
have been interviewed or been in the news because of th caravan or rallies, but they 
could not recall with certainty. The media outlets most frequently mentioned as covering 
the landfill dispute were the Greensboro New and Record, a daily newspaper with the 
largest circulation in the Greensboro metropolitan area, Yes! Weekly, an alternative 
weekly newspaper devoted to local politics, arts and e tertainment, The Rhinoceros 
Times, a weekly news and opinion paper with a politically conservative viewpoint, and 
several local television stations. A few interviewees also mentioned the Carolina 
Peacemaker, a weekly newspaper oriented to the African American ommunity, and one 
mentioned The Greensboro Times, a dedicated news outlet for Greensboro’s African 
American community. 
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Most of the interviewees said that the media influenced the outcome of the 
landfill dispute in some way. Several anti-landfill interviewees said that the media helped 
to get information about the issue out to a wider community. “Not everyone shows up at 
the rallies,” one interviewee said, “but they may hve a media outlet that they follow.” 
The majority of the interviewees mentioned numerous media outlets that covered the 
landfill dispute, although the newspapers listed above were said to have covered the 
dispute more consistently than others. Many CEEJ respondents said that journalists from 
the Greensboro News and Record and The Rhinoceros Times regularly attended the 
group’s meetings. Television news stations such as News 14 Carolina, WXII News 
Channel 12, and WFMY News 2 were also said to have co red CEEJ meetings on 
occasion, as well as the group’s rallies and demonstrations. Consistent with literature on 
social constructionism, a CEEJ member said that having the press at the group’s meetings 
also provided legitimacy for the movement. The press coverage “showed that we were 
organized,” she said, “and we had someone who could talk about the issue and [show] 
that we were not going to get rolled over.” 
Interestingly, several interviewees at first said that they did not think the media 
played a major role in the dispute, but then followed up by mentioning ways in which it 
did have a role. One CEEJ member, for example, said th t it is a “hard call” as to whether 
or not the media influenced the outcome, but also said that the media “kept it alive as an 
issue.” Another member said that the media did not play a huge part, “but it did bring 
increased awareness and showed who cared about the issue in Greensboro. So perhaps 
they did to a degree.” The SCSJ attorney said that the media, “in a narrow fashion,” did 
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not play a role in the outcome of the dispute. Interestingly, undoubtedly in part because 
of his perspective as a lawyer, he saw the outcome in relation to the landfill expansion as 
primarily a legal matter. He said, however, that the media coverage “helped with the 
long-term and composition of the City Council.” He added that “the coverage was so 
negative and folks lost seats because of it….But without the injunction and the restraining 
order, [the landfill] probably would have been expanded.”  
 While one interviewee did say that the media reported on the landfill issue in a 
fair way, almost all the rest of the interviewees said that the main media outlets showed 
bias regarding the issue. As literature on social constructionism suggests, these media 
outlets supported some claims while delegitimizing others. Several anti-landfill 
interviewees spoke specifically about The Rhinoceros Times’ bias toward having the 
landfill reopened. The SCSJ attorney mentioned that this media outlet “routinely 
belittled” one of the anti-landfill City Council members, but that it also “hammered” the 
pro-landfill mayor at the time for his poor handling of the situation.   
 Among the interviewees who thought the media influenced the outcome of the 
controversy, most saw the Greensboro News and Record has having the greatest impact. 
Several anti-landfill interviewees commented on the positive contributions they believed 
the News and Record made to their cause, such as supporting the northeast community, 
disapproving of some pro-landfill City Council members’ alleged mistreatment of the 
landfill opposition at City Council meetings, and reporting on governmental transparency 
issues. A League member detailed the News and Record’s diligence in obtaining public 
records from the City Council, and its persistent coverage of the issue. As she described, 
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…They often had to get their attorney involved because they would ask for 
documents and not get them. So they would have their attorney get in touch with 
them to remind them of what the laws say. There was regular covering of the 
community meetings. They kept it in the headlines and were important in keeping 
the community engaged. One of the concerns of the coalitions was how to help 
people understand. We needed to get people to the polls. They needed to know 
that you need to vote in May and in November, and that was hard with a 
community that often doesn’t vote at all, or just in presidential elections. The 
News and Record efinitely took a stance, in their editorial division, and kept the 
issue in the headlines.  
 
 
On the other side, all of the pro-landfill interview es criticized the News and 
Record for taking a stance on the landfill issue. Two complained that this media outlet 
“would take out a word here and a word there” or “one sentence here and there” and 
distort things, which led both to stop speaking with their reporters. One of these 
interviewees said that it was clear that the News and Record reports were one-sided but 
that they would call him if they wanted an opposing view. He added that there was 
nothing in the newspaper that explored possible alternatives to reopening the landfill. 
They simply pushed their position and “the Rhino just pushed the other way. There was 
no balance, no realistic planning.”  
Overall, most interviewees provided very brief commentary on particular media 
outlets. The interviewees mainly commented on how the media assisted in getting their 
message about the landfill out to a larger audience, and local newspapers covered the 
issue with distinctly different slants, with The Rhinoceros Times strongly advocating 
reopening the landfill and Yes! Weekly and the Carolina Peacemaker expressing 
opposition. The News and Record leaned against the reopening, but seemed to be mor 
balanced than the other publications. Other than metioning these biases, there was not 
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extensive discussion about the role of specific local newspapers and television news 
stations; instead, many interviewees said the landfill issue was covered, in general, by all 
the local media. It is likely that people’s ideas about the landfill were influenced by these 
media outlets. However, without an extensive content analysis, additional information 
from interviewees, and public opinion poll data, the media’s influence in the dispute 
cannot be known exactly. (For additional information on the media’s coverage of the 
landfill issue, see Appendix A.)  
Advantages of the Two Sides 
 This sections looks first at the landfill opponents’ advantages in keeping the 
landfill closed, followed by the landfill supporters’ advantages in trying to get it 
reopened.  
Advantages of the Landfill Opposition 
The interviewees mentioned a number of advantages for the groups and 
individuals  trying to keep the landfill closed. Many of these related to the power of the 
grassroots movements and the personal attributes of it  members. The main factors 
mentioned included the movement members’ community organizing experience, their 
sense of community and shared identity, and their determination. A few interviewees also 
mentioned the movement’s rhetoric as an advantage, while a couple mentioned its 
securing outside and expert legal counsel as an advantage.  
The advantages of community organizing experience iluded having mobilizing 
skills, political savvy, media access, and the skill to build alliances and form coalitions. 
Both League members emphasized the advantage of going into the movement already 
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well-versed in community organizing. They knew they n eded to have a strategy for 
keeping the landfill closed, and, as one member explained, they had a “two-pronged 
attack” to do so. First, they needed to take legal action to hinder the reopening, and, 
second, they needed to get people to the polls to change the makeup of the City Council 
members. While the CEEJ supporters’ strategy entailed somewhat of a different kind of 
community organizing focused more on confrontational a d direct action tactics, several 
CEEJ members agreed that having the know-how to accmplish tasks such as these was a 
major advantage. CEEJ members also knew they needed to take legal action, which they 
did through hiring the SCSJ. They also knew they needed to attract support from the 
community and get people to the polls, which they did mainly through their churches. 
Moreover, several interviewees also said an advantage for members of the opposition 
movement was their ability to build alliances and form coalitions, such as the one 
between the CEEJ and the League. 
Building alliances and forming coalitions also had, in many cases, a reciprocally 
causal relationship with people’s sense of community and shared identity. Several 
interviewees mentioned as a key advantage the fact th t many of the movement members 
shared an identity through living in the same neighbor oods and attending the same 
churches. Gaining this community support was an advantage, one interviewee from the 
neighborhood said, along with gaining city-wide support and support from former City 
Council members. As one former mayor put it, the landfill issue “really unified many 
segments of our community because many people from other districts came together…we 
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built friendships, relationships, respect. And the League getting involved was really the 
icing on the cake.”   
The movement members’ determination to keep the landfi l closed was also 
mentioned as a key advantage. Two interviewees used the term “passion” to describe the 
landfill opposition’s advantage. In the same vein, the main movement leader described 
their “persistence” and “perseverance.” And a CEEJ and NGFM member stated that 
“there was never any question that we would keep on goi g.” A press member also said 
their advantage was that they “never wavered” and they “didn’t allow themselves to be 
co-opted.” Several mentioned the key role the movement leader played. The leader’s 
“energy and determination made a huge difference,” said one respondent. She “always 
said that we will never give up,” said another. 
 A few interviewees said the rhetoric the landfill opponents used about the 
potential reopening gave the movement an advantage. As framing theory suggests, the 
movement was able to create a context for its claims, environmental justice, that 
resonated with many potential supporters and the media. A former mayor described the 
term “environmental racism” as “a low-hanging fruit that you could grab a hold of, and 
what the media grabbed.” He added that “it is a tool even if you can’t prove it, because 
the other side can’t prove that it is otherwise.” Another former mayor said that it was an 
advantage for the movement to use rhetoric “about [the landfill] being bad for health 
reasons, although,” he added, “it is an award-winning landfill.”  
 Two pro-landfill reopening interviewees – one a press member and one a 
Conservatives for Guilford County member – said that e opposition movement’s main 
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advantages involved legal facts. The land around the landfill had been re-zoned so that it 
could not be used for landfill expansion, the press member reported, which the City 
Council did not know. The City Council “got bad legal advice and continued to get bad 
legal advice,” he said, and the opposition’s “advantage turned out to be the legal system, 
the law.” The Conservatives for Guilford County member did not mention these details, 
but said that it was an advantage that “they were abl  to secure a pro-bono law firm.”  
Advantages of the Landfill Supporters  
 The main advantages interviewees attributed to the groups and individuals trying 
to get the landfill reopened were generally the same s the obstacles the landfill 
opposition faced. The main advantage mentioned was that the state of the economy 
buttressed the supporters’ argument that the landfill should be reopened to save taxpayer 
dollars. In addition, the supporters were thought to be at an advantage because of their 
strong political position, as the most visible supporters were the pro-landfill City Council 
members who had a basis for power. 
 While some interviewees said that the landfill supporters’ claims about cost-
saving were not convincing, about an equal number said the opposite. “They had a 
compelling argument,” one reporter said, as they could argue that they simply wanted to 
get municipal costs down in a time of economic crisis. “Going to people’s pocketbooks 
was a plus on their side,” as a CEEJ member put it. Another added that the Rhino Times 
often reported that the landfill would save money, and “it was a huge advantage for [the 
supporters] to get all that press.” One elected official who served at the time of the 
controversy said that offering to provide a “very definite economic boost to city’s budget 
122 
 
process” was a clear advantage for his side. As elected officials, they had visibility and 
political clout, one movement leader said. Several other CEEJ members also mentioned 
the advantage of the advocates being well representd on the Council, and how some had 
strong support from their voting constituencies.  
In some interviewees’ opinions, the landfill supporters’ positions of power were 
exercised, as well as abused, in the landfill dispute. A CEEJ member, a former mayor, 
and a member of the press all said that the supporters also had a monetary advantage by 
being on the Council. “They could take advantage of the legal arm of the city,” one said. 
Another commented, however, that “this is the government of the people and abusing 
power will backfire. It is a classic example of not using power correctly.” 
Theoretical Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings presented in this chapter show how various strategies, tactics, 
arguments, framings, and media influenced the outcome f the landfill dispute. The 
results illustrate many relevant connections to thery and research about interest groups, 
social movements – especially grassroots environmental justice movements – as well as 
to social constructionism and framing.  
The main anti-landfill movement SMO, along with members of other groups, 
used strategies and tactics typical of interest groups and social movements. CEEJ, for 
example, used tactics such as e-mailing and sending petitions to City Council members, 
organizing demonstrations outside of the municipal building and in the Council 
chambers, attempting to get their message into the press, and publicly endorsing City 
Council candidates who opposed the reopening (Knoke 1990). To the interviewees’ 
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knowledge, the CEEJ did not, however, use other comm n interest group tactics such as 
lobbying politicians or making campaign contributions. The group’s tactics were a 
hybrid, illustrative of it being on the border betwen an interest group working within the 
system and a social movement working mainly from outside.  
 As Soule and Snow (2009) note, tactical choices ar often influenced by a group’s 
political connections and economic clout. Groups with fewer political connections and 
less economic clout typically use more confrontational tactics to try to influence 
governmental policy decisions. This is evident by the newly formed CEEJ’s use of rallies 
and marches, demonstrations outside of the municipal building, attending the City 
Council meetings en masse, and at times being disrupt ve. In contrast, members of the 
League, a long established and well-funded group, focused at first on less confrontational 
strategy such as holding candidate forums and informational lunches to inform people 
about the landfill issue.  
In choosing these tactics, these groups undoubtedly had to weigh the benefits 
versus the costs of various strategies (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). As several CEEJ 
members mentioned, some group members were put off by the more confrontational 
tactics, especially loud and arguably inappropriate behavior by some members during 
City Council meetings. Environmental organizations ften face this dilemma in strategic 
and tactical decision-making (Markham 2008). For their part, not all members of the 
League initially supported the decision to join thelawsuit. As one League interviewee 
pointed out, it was not until after the injunction successfully delayed the reopening 
proceedings that some members became convinced that signing onto the suit was the best 
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thing for the group to do. Overall, it proved advantageous for the movement that the 
groups had varying strategies and used a combination of more and less confrontational 
tactics. Many interviewees agreed that a major reason why the movement was able to 
influence the outcome of the controversy because members of these groups, as well as 
others, worked together, through both standard interes  group tactics and direct action, 
confrontational tactics.  
The landfill proponents’ main strategy was to influence the local government 
decision-making. This is hardly surprising, as the most visible pro-landfill individuals 
were the four City Council members, who primarily attempted to influence the outcome 
through their participation in the City Council. Specifically, they voted in favor of 
reopening the landfill and publicly expressed their support for it to Greensboro citizens. 
Other pro-landfill individuals, including the Conservatives for Guilford County member 
interviewed, expressed their support for the reopening to the Council during its meetings 
when the floor was opened to citizens. Like the C4G member interviewed, several of 
the key supporters not on the Council were local small business people. Their tactics 
were neither radical nor confrontational; instead, it appears they were trying to work 
within the system to influence the policy decision-making.   
 Both the landfill supporters and opponents used claimsmaking and  framing as a 
strategy to attract support. Both sides made various claims about the landfill and tried to 
frame the issue in a way that would appeal to potential supporters and legitimize their 
positions and persuade other people to view the issue in a way that would attract their 
support. As social constructionists and advocates of framing theory have explained, such 
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claims often reflect how groups define an issue as a social problem (Spector and Kitsuse 
1973). For landfill supporters, the social problem was that the landfill’s closure to 
household waste had caused an increased financial burden for taxpayers and unnecessary 
government spending. By arguing these points, the landfill supporters appealed to a 
conservative master frame of minimizing governmental spending and keeping taxes low, 
and, consequently, to North Carolina traditionalists and tea party members. Indeed, this 
theme was extremely prominent in the 2009 City Council elections that swept the four 
conservative, pro-landfill officials into office. During a time in which people were 
already suffering from the nation’s economic recession, framing the landfill issue as 
being an economic issue also made these claims more “culturally believable” and more 
broadly appealing (Benford and Snow 2000:620).  
For landfill opponents, the relevant social problems were that reopening the 
landfill to household waste would represent racial and class discrimination, pose health 
risks to neighboring residents, devalue surrounding properties, increase racial tensions, 
deter potential future residents and businesses, and obstruct the city’s expansion. While 
different opposing groups emphasized differing arguments, they, as a movement, framed 
the potential reopening variously as an environmental justice, quality of life, and 
economic development issue. However, not all of the anti-landfill movement actors used 
all three of these frames to attract support. As Benford and Snow (2000) suggest, they 
used the frame(s) that best fit within potential supporters’ cultural values and beliefs. For 
example, some people did not believe that the reopening would constitute environmental 
racism because they believed it was the residents’ choice to live near the landfill. Yet, 
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they agreed with the claims, which local leaders like Keith Holliday and Robbie Perkins 
had emphasized, that the landfill’s geographic locati n would greatly hinder the city’s 
growth.  
This circumstance illustrates how well-respected politicians can legitimize claims 
(Hannigan 2006) and provide more credibility to frames to broaden their appeal (Benford 
and Snow 2000).  For some Greensboro citizens, reopening the landfill did not initially 
seem to be a problem. They were dubious of claims about environmental racism, and they 
were convinced that the landfill did not pose health concerns for the neighboring 
residents. However, when Holliday and Perkins explained in detail how the landfill’s 
geographic location would hinder the city’s expansio , they came to view the reopening 
as a problem and opposed it because of the implications for Greensboro’s economic 
development. 
Framing and social movement scholars have also noted the importance of 
choosing frames that resonate with the media (e.g., Benford and Snow 2000, Hannigan 
2006). In the landfill case, it was apparent that anti- and pro-landfill frames each 
resonated with certain media outlets, particularly with some local newspapers. Many 
interviewees said that they believed the Greensboro News and Record and The 
Rhinoceros Times played important roles in the dispute by promoting o e side or the 
other, with the former adopting some of the anti-landfill frames and arguments and the 
latter adopting the pro-landfill framing and arguments. While one news publication 
legitimized one side’s claims, the other delegitimized them and undermined their 
credibility.    
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 Both the landfill supporters and opponents developed counterclaims and 
counterframes in an effort to undermine the other side’  claims and frames. For example, 
some landfill supporters countered the environmental justice frame by arguing that 
residents were not forced to live near the landfill. In contrast to the idea that reopening 
the landfill would represent environmental discrimination, these supporters interpreted 
the residents’ proximity to the landfill as a result of the residents’ choice. As Benford and 
Snow (2000) suggest, such strategies often lead to framing contests. This counterclaim 
provoked members of the anti-landfill movement to further elaborate on their 
environmental justice argument. They emphasized that institutional racism played a 
major role in African Americans moving into the landfill area and that those who recently 
moved into the area did so on the premise that the landfill was permanently closed to 
household waste. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first summarizes the 
controversy surrounding the White Street Landfill. The second section discusses several 
overarching conclusions of the study. To conclude, th  last section discusses the 
implications for theory and further research offered from this study’s findings. 
Summary of the Controversy 
 While this thesis focuses on the most recent dispute about the White Street 
Landfill, controversy surrounding it goes back many years. In the early- to mid-1990s, a 
push began to get the landfill closed. At this time, th  land surrounding the White Street 
Landfill became the neighborhood known as Nealtown Farms. Residents living near the 
landfill were experiencing the smells, sounds, and potential health hazards from it. Thus, 
the district two City Council representative at theime, the late Claudette Burroughs-
White, took up this issue with Greensboro’s City Council. The mayor at the time, Keith 
Holliday, began to research other waste management alt rnatives and weigh the costs and 
benefits of expanding or closing the landfill.  
The key factor in former Mayor Holliday’s cost/benefit analysis of the landfill 
was the future economic development of the city of Greensboro. Holliday argued that, 
due to the geographic location of the landfill, keeping the landfill opened, and eventually 
expanding it when it reached capacity, would be a major hindrance to the city’s economic 
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development. Not only would the landfill deter people or businesses from moving  into 
the northeast Greensboro area, but it would leave only the land to the southeast of the city 
open for growth.  This is because the east is the only direction where Greensboro has 
adequate potential for growth. To the west, growth is limited by the airport. To the south, 
southwest, and northwest, the city is limited by the annexation agreements with Pleasant 
Garden, Jamestown, High Point, Oak Ridge, and Summerfield. And to the north are city 
reservoirs, which constrict growth in that direction. Holliday, therefore, proposed that a 
long-term plan for Greensboro’s waste disposal involve a regional landfill in one of the 
city’s neighboring rural counties.  
On the premise of developing a 10-year plan for a regional landfill site, the 
landfill was closed in 2006. The landfill continued to take construction waste, however, 
and was used for a small volume of household waste in order to keep its permit valid. 
After 2006, household waste was transported to the Republic Services’ Uwharrie 
Environmental Landfill in Montgomery County. At this point, controversy over the 
landfill seemed to have died down; however, the conservative-leaning newspaper, The 
Rhinoceros Times, continued to keep the costs of closing the landfill in the headlines, 
claiming  that transferring the city’s waste was coting the city around 12 million dollars 
a year. After the 2009 election, in which the tea party-fueled conservative sweep brought 
a conservative majority to power on the platform of cutting spending and keeping taxes 
low, the City Council began soliciting proposals from several private companies to 
reopen the landfill to household waste.  
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In response to these proposals, a grassroots movement formed in opposition to the 
landfill. The main movement leader, Dr. Goldie Wells, personified the effectual social 
movement entrepreneur, organizing the Citizens for Economic and Environmental Justice 
(CEEJ) and maintaining a clear focus on keeping the landfill closed to household waste. 
The group never wavered from this goal. Members worked to attract support in northeast 
Greensboro neighborhood and cooperated with members of non-environmental groups to 
broaden and diversify their support base. These groups used a combination of typical 
interest group and social movement strategies and tactics to influence the local 
government. As social movement theory suggests, support from these groups, as well as 
from several prominent political and community leadrs, helped give the anti-landfill 
movement increased legitimacy and solidarity.  
CEEJ members, many of whom resided in northeast Greensboro, consistently 
spoke from the floor at City Council meetings to voice their concerns about the landfill to 
elected officials. The group also spread its message distributing  flyers at rallies and 
demonstrations, social networking through Facebook, creating a website, and speaking 
with members of the press regularly. CEEJ allies, such as members of the League of 
Women Voters, the New Garden Friends Meeting, Nealtown Neighborhood Association, 
and the Pulpit Forum, also made their opposition known by speaking from the floor at 
City Council meetings and to local media. The League, the Southern Coalition for Social 
Justice, and Greensboro’s Human Relations Commission also made their official 
positions publicly available on their websites.  
131 
 
Some landfill opponents, particularly members of the CEEJ and Nealtown 
Neighborhood Association, insisted that the landfill should not be reopened under any 
circumstances. They believed that doing so would be unfair to northeast residents, an act 
of environmental racism and threat to their health, and would hinder economic 
development in northeast Greensboro and the city at large. Other landfill opponents, such 
as League members, Friends Meeting members, and white “modernizers” (Luebke 1998), 
emphasized the economic development argument and expressed concerns that reopening 
the landfill would heighten racial tensions and damage the city’s image. The official 
stance of some of these opponents, such as the League, was that the city needed to further 
investigate waste management alternatives before repening the landfill.   
In addition, the CEEJ gained legal support from the Southern Coalition for Social 
Justice, based in Durham, North Carolina. This legal support led to lawsuits filed against 
the city and injunctions placed against the expansion of the landfill to include new 
segments due to lack of proper zoning and permits. However, the injunction only limited 
expanding the landfill, and the City Council continued with the bidding process for a 
company to reopen and operate the landfill with the existing cells. Gate City Waste 
Management company eventually won the bid to operate the existing landfill, though the 
City Council still needed to vote to finalize the contract.  
On September 20th, 2011 the day the City Council would have had its last vote on 
the company’s contract, the CEEJ held a demonstration t the plaza of the Municipal 
Building. Students marched from A&T University’s campus to the Municipal Building to 
join the rally and stood outside the doors prior to the City Council meeting. An hour 
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before the meeting began, Gate City Waste Management withdrew its bid. During the 
bidding process, both City Council members Nancy Vaughan and Zach Matheny had 
been recused from voting due to their ties with the bidding companies (Vaughn’s 
husband had a business connection with one of the companies that bid on the contract but 
lost). However, despite a lawsuit by Gate City Waste Management to keep Vaughn from 
voting in this final vote, interim City Attorney Tom Pollard later decided that Vaughn did 
not have a conflict of interest and allowed Vaughn to participate. With her vote, and 
Matheny still recused, there would not be a majority vote to pass the motion for Gate City 
Waste Management to operate the landfill.  
The Council would have had to go back through the bidding process all over 
again for the landfill to be reopened, which was not possible before the November, 2011 
elections. By that point, members of the CEEJ had already formed the Greensboro 
Voters’ Alliance, a non-partisan group focused on vter registration, educating citizens 
about local issues, and unseating the pro-landfill City Council members. Only one 
supporter of reopening the landfill remained after the election, and the new Council made 
clear that reopening it was no longer on the agenda. With that, all signs point to the 
landfill not being reopened in the near future and  continued search for a regional 
solution, but the possibility of a future reopening continues to be discussed and advocated 
by some.  
Overarching Conclusions 
Several overarching conclusions about the landfill ispute emerged from this 
research. First, it is apparent that the anti- and pro-landfill forces’ contrasting arguments 
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derived, in part, from their embracing very different “truths” about the landfill. Second, 
the interviews provided much insight about how gaining a broader, more racially diverse 
support base benefitted the anti-landfill movement, whereas the pro-landfill side, to its 
detriment, failed to mobilize and gain organized support. Third, economic conditions 
played a major role the dispute. Fourth, various aspects of Greensboro’s history clearly 
influenced the dispute. 
Perceptions and Cultural Beliefs  
 A theme commonly voiced by pro-landfill interviewees was that the landfill 
opponents’ perceptions about various aspects of the landfill issue did not match “reality.” 
Those involved in the two sides of the landfill dispute typically had divergent beliefs 
about the history of the landfill, such as the promise that was – or was not – made to keep 
it closed to household waste, the presence or absence of health hazards, the origins of the 
demographics of the surrounding neighborhood, and whether or not reopening the landfill 
would constitute environmental racism. This disconnect between what the landfill 
supporters and landfill opponents believed to be tru , the difference between the side’s 
“realities,” provides insight into why the potential reopening led to such controversy.  
A recurring theme in the landfill opponents’ understanding of what the landfill 
dispute was all about was their belief that the advocates of reopening were proposing to 
break a promise that the landfill would never be reopened to household waste. According 
to many, the landfill was supposed to become a “closed issue” once it was closed to 
household waste in 2006. The plan, they claimed, was for the city to begin working on a 
plan for a regional landfill, using the transfer station and the Uwharrie landfill in the 
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meantime. The option to reopen the White Street Landfill was off the table, many of them 
thought. Proposals to reopen it therefore came at a shock  
This perception of betrayal rested as well on longstanding views among 
Greensboro blacks  that African Americans could not trust white government officials. 
Framing the issue as yet another betrayal of trust wa  credible, as Benford and Snow 
(2000) might suggest, precisely because the claim fit within existing beliefs and cultural 
narratives. On a national level, lack of trust in white politicians was a prevalent cultural 
belief throughout the civil rights movements, and it has continued to be so on a local 
level, in part because of the city’s handling of the 1979 Klan/Nazi shooting, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s findings about this event, and recent allegations of racism 
in the Greensboro Police Department.  
The most visible landfill supporters, city government officials, not surprisingly  
rejected the claim that they were untrustworthy. Indeed, several pro-landfill interviewees 
claimed that the city had made no promise to keep th  landfill closed to household waste 
permanently. They said that one of the reasons why the landfill remained open to non-
household waste was in order to keep its permits valid so that the city would have the 
option to reopen it to household waste if need be.  
The “facts” concerning health issues related to the landfill were also hotly 
contested. As is true in many environmental justice disputes, many anti-landfill 
interviewees cited family members and friends who had suffered from respiratory 
problems and pancreatic cancer, which they believed were caused, in part, by the landfill. 
The pro-landfill interviewees refuted these claims by referring to scientific authorities, a 
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typical strategy in environmental controversies (Hannigan 2006). They referenced studies 
that had found no health hazards related to the landfi l, and several interviewees said that 
they had family and friends living in areas outside th  landfill district who also suffered 
from these health problems. Another mentioned that he knew that the northeast residents 
believed the landfill to be hazardous to their health, but that, because the fact that some 
people believed it did not make it true. As in many similar situations (Yearley 2005), 
science proved a relatively ineffective instrument for resolving the dispute. 
Another set of divergent beliefs involved whether residents “chose” to live in the 
White Street area knowing the landfill was nearby. Several pro-landfill interviewees 
emphasized that residents had not been forced to cho se homes near the landfill; 
therefore, they did not understand how reopening the landfill could be an act of 
environmental racism. On the other hand, several anti-landfill interviewees said that 
institutional racism helped to explain a majority African American population inhabiting 
the area. They noted how redlining and steering had contributed to housing segregation, 
with minorities typically being directed into less desirable neighborhoods. Thus, they 
viewed the efforts to reopen it as being representative of the city’s white political leaders’ 
disregard of the health and well-being of the neighboring African American residents, 
which they believed would not happen if they were white. 
Importance of Organization 
A second major conclusion evident in this study wasthe importance of 
organization for the victory of the landfill opposition. The leadership of a social 
movement entrepreneur jump started the anti-landfill movement, providing the 
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organizational and motivational skills to build a strong and broad support base. One local 
journalist, who believed that Goldie Wells was opposing something that would be benefit 
the city, nevertheless described her role this way, incorporating all the key tasks a 
successful social movement entrepreneur must do well: 
 
She led the organization of the opposition group. She did a great job of getting 
people involved. She got a great attorney. She got the community involved. When 
it comes to grassroots organizing, it was really textbook. She kept people active. 
She really did an outstanding job. 
 
The strength of the CEEJ, the main anti-landfill SMO, and its coalitions and alliances 
were undoubtedly major advantages for the movement. The alliances provided the 
movement with a range of skills, including community organizing, political savvy, media 
access, and networking ability to build alliances and form coalitions.  
In contrast to the landfill opposition, the landfill supporters did not mobilize 
themselves as a social movement to target the landfi l issue. I found no evidence of a 
social movement entrepreneur, pro-landfill SMOs, coaliti ns, or alliances, although there 
may have been people in favor of the reopening who orked together behind the scenes. 
Landfill supporters acted mainly within the political system and through the media to try 
to influence the local government to reopen the landfill. Some individual citizens in favor 
of the reopening, like those opposed, sent in letters o editors of local newspapers and 
spoke from the floor at City Council meetings to express their concerns. In general, these 
speakers reiterated arguments made by the pro-landfil  Council members. They stressed 
the urgent need for fiscal responsibility and the city’s wasting of a valuable resource. 
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These individuals, however, did not speak on behalf of any organized group.  The 
proponents on the Council evidently did not try to build coalitions with other 
organizations, or if they did, they did so behind the scenes and failed.  
These City Council members, especially the first-time Mayor, Bill Knight, 
received solid support from conservative voters and the tea party organization during 
their candidacy, but were not backed with the same fervor in their efforts to reopen the 
landfill. Ironically, the very voters who subscribed to the ideals of the tea party 
movement and had pushed for the election of these officials on the premise of their desire 
to cut municipal spending and lower taxes did not organize or turn out en masse to 
support the reopening. As the controversy progressed, th  landfill supporters’ lack of 
formal organization seemed to leave the conservative C ty Council members 
outnumbered and overpowered by the anti-landfill movement’s successful community 
organizing. 
Coalition Building 
 A third key conclusion concerns the success of the two sides in building broad 
coalitions. Almost all of my interviewees agreed that, in order to succeed, the anti-landfill 
movement needed to expand its support base beyond northeast Greensboro. Without 
support from other parts of Greensboro and white residents, the landfill supporters could 
have easily claimed that only a small portion of the city’s population actually opposed the 
reopening--and that this small group opposed reopening because of false or distorted 
perceptions about the landfill. They could argue that, if the opponents really understood 
the situation, they would see that reopening an existing landfill was not environmental 
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racism and that reopening it would economically benefit all of Greensboro’s citizens. 
Thus, it was essential for the northeast Greensboro opp nents to gain the support of other, 
non-environmental justice groups and some prominent white leaders. As resource 
mobilization theory suggests, doing so gave the move ent additional manpower, skills, 
and resources, but most importantly it gave them additional legitimacy and the economic 
development argument needed to diversify their support base.  
 Several non-environmental justice groups and indivdual leaders became 
important allies of the CEEJ. In particular, many iterviewees noted that support from the 
League of Women Voters, New Garden Friends Meeting members, and prominent white 
leaders greatly strengthened the anti-landfill movement. Some of these groups’ and 
individuals’ actions were frequently cited as very consequential for the success of the 
movement, including the League signing on as a litigant in the lawsuit against the city, 
members of the NGFM organizing the caravan and rally at the landfill site, and leaders 
such as former mayors Keith Holliday and Carolyn Allen providing advice to the CEEJ 
and speaking at the group’s meetings and rallies and to the media. In addition, several 
interviewees mentioned how student involvement at local colleges and universities aided 
the movement, especially by joining the caravan to the landfill and the march from A&T 
University to the Municipal Building. As in other local environmental movements 
(Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1992; Duffy 2003), this broad network brought varied and 
necessary resources for the anti-landfill movement. It also demonstrated to the landfill 
supporters that the potential reopening was more than just a northeast Greensboro or 
African American concern.  
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The adoption of the economic development framing proved to be a particularly 
powerful way of  broadening the opponents’ support base. It is also an example of how 
framings can emerge not only out of people’s underlying beliefs about reality, but out of 
their desire to prevail politically. As many anti-landfill interviewees stated, claims about 
the reopening being environmental racism did not resonate with a wider audience as well 
as claims that the landfill would greatly hinder economic development for the city as a 
whole. Many interviewees thought some white residents who disagreed with the 
argument that landfill supporters did not care about African American residents could not 
argue with prominent leaders, such as former mayor Keith Holliday and long time 
Council member and later Mayor Robbie Perkins, who said that east Greensboro is the 
only place left for the city to grow. The Greensboro News and Record also gave this 
economic development argument considerable attention. S me interviewees also thought 
that many residents did not doubt the reopening would lead to heightened racial tensions 
in Greensboro, making the city less desirable for new residents and businesses.  
Economic Conditions 
Current economic conditions weighed heavily in the landfill dispute. At the time 
of the controversy, the US was in the depths of the greatest economic crisis since The 
Great Depression. Thus, the reasoning behind reopening the landfill seemed, for the 
proponents, to be quite clear: the city has a landfill with valid permits and reopening it 
would save the city a great deal of money during a time of economic recession. In this 
context, it is hardly surprising that many Greensboro citizens were open to arguments 
about cutting taxes and reducing municipal expenditures. This opened the door for the 
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reopening proponents to argue that citizens would be in jeopardy if municipal spending 
remained high while tax revenues were falling, leading directly to tax rate increases. 
When viewed from this perspective, it is not hard to understand why tea party rhetoric 
proved appealing and how support could have grown for the reopening. In effect, the US 
economic situation helped to legitimize the pro-landfill argument.  
Historical Factors 
Amid tough economic conditions, the nation’s – and Greensboro’s – history of 
discrimination and racism was not to be forgotten, for no matter how much landfill 
supporters emphasized that their desire for reopening was solely based in economics, the 
social and psychological impacts of discrimination – whether past or present, real or 
perceived – played a major role in why the reopening was fought so vehemently. Many 
African American residents saw the push for the reopening as just another example of 
“traditionalist” (Luebke 1998) white political leaders not caring about them. They viewed 
the push for the reopening as part of a familiar pattern of putting their desire to save tax 
dollars and maintain the standard of living of white residents ahead to the health and 
well-being of African American residents in northeast Greensboro. It is no accident, 
many anti-landfill respondents claimed, that the area around the landfill is inhabited 
largely by African Americans. One can look at a demographic map of Greensboro and 
see that housing segregation continues still today. Some may say that this is the housing 
structure that people have chosen for themselves; however, such decisions are rarely 
made arbitrarily. 
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According to the east Greensboro opponents of the landfill, claims that African 
American residents chose to live around the landfill brazenly disregard thehistory of 
white dominance in the US and in Greensboro. Some landfill supporters pointed out that 
the landfill had been in existence since the 1940s, but African American residents did not 
really begin moving to the area in great numbers until the Nealtown Farms neighborhood 
was constructed in the early 1990s. They argued that no one was forced to live in 
Nealtown Farms and that those who did so had willingly chosen to move there, all the 
while knowing that a landfill nearby was down the street. While one can argue that no 
one forced people to move to Nealtown Farms, there is g nerally accepted knowledge 
about the history of redlining neighborhoods to segregate them according to race, and the 
steering practices that still occur today, with real estate agents showing homes in different 
areas according to a potential buyer’s race or ethnici y (Pellow 2004). Nealtown Farms 
was constructed to provide more affordable housing in Greensboro. It offered new 
homes, many with sizable yards, in a quiet, neighbor o d setting for people who would 
have not likely been able to afford them in most areas of Greensboro. In Greensboro, as 
elsewhere in the US, African Americans still face major obstacles to becoming 
homeowners due to the lower incomes and lack of assets resulting from centuries of 
discrimination in housing, educational opportunities and employment (Brulle and Pellow 
2006). Thus, it is difficult to believe that some of these factors did not come into play as 
Nealtown Farms became increasingly inhabited by African Americans. 
Beyond this, Greensboro’s racial history played a major role in the landfill 
dispute. Longtime Greensboro residents have a deep understanding of the city’s racial 
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tensions and the recurring events that have comprised it  progressive image. Thus, no 
matter what the intentions of the proponents, proposals to reopen a landfill in a majority 
African American community reopened wounds left from a history of being treated as 
second-class citizens. As much environmental justice research shows, such history is also 
often called upon in organizing and mobilizing threatened minority communities. In this 
case, many anti-landfill movement members had lived experiences of the civil rights 
movements and successfully utilized its organizing models, strategies, and tactics to 
influence the outcome of the landfill dispute.  
Implications for Theory and Further Research 
 This study’s findings are, for the most part, consistent with Luebke’s (1998) 
description of major factions in North Carolina politics, some elements of elite and 
pluralist theories of community power structure, social movement theory, and literature 
on environmental justice movements. However, the cas  also contains some interesting 
and atypical elements that offer implications for theory and point to several broad issues 
for further consideration and research. The most interesting of these involve the potential 
of the current US economic crisis and budget cutting emphasis  to spawn other, similar  
controversies in other US cities.  
 Existing literature about environmental justice disputes provides limited insight 
into movements that spring from newly ascendant tea party ideals. Past environmental 
justice controversies have typically stemmed from effort by a government agency or 
corporation to construct an environmentally hazardous site. This case was different. Not 
only did the landfill site already exist, but proposals to reopen it were launched primarily 
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because of the increasing influence of the tea party movement, which focused on 
minimizing government spending and cutting taxes. The conservative majority was swept 
into office in Greensboro’s City Council in 2009 in part due to the mobilization of this 
movement, and, although the group did not mobilize for the landfill controversy, the 
newly elected officials based their argument for reopening the landfill on its ideals.  
Arguments about saving money, cutting spending, and lowering taxes are sure to 
remain a staple of local political and economic debat s for the foreseeable future. And it 
is not unlikely that there will be other situations i  which such controversies produce 
rancorous controversies like the landfill dispute in Greensboro that go beyond routine 
complaints from neighborhoods that suffer from delay d street paving or reduced 
services. Typically, tea party members, operating within longstanding conservative 
framings of wasteful government spending, suggest cutting, or seriously altering, public 
programs and services they view as unnecessary government expenditures in order to cut 
taxes. It is thus likely that such programs and servic s, including welfare, public health, 
public housing, and public education, will continue to be threatened especially if the 
budget pressures resulting from the Great recession continue.  In this context, it would be 
interesting to develop theory and conduct research bout the conditions under which tea 
party-inspired budgets cuts lead to other local social movements and how those 
movements fare in their struggles. 
The White Street landfill controversy illustrates that grassroots movements can 
succeed in turning back cost cutting measures that threaten local communities, but it also 
suggests that some special conditions might be necessary for success. Indeed, it is far 
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from certain that the CEEJ would have successfully kept the landfill closed had it not had 
a skilled and experienced leader, organized effectiv  SMOs, developed attractive 
framings, and formed coalitions and alliances with ell-established groups. Further 
research might thus look at how groups with a history of organizing, such as those 
focused on education or women’s reproductive rights, fare against tea party-proposed 
program cuts in comparison with groups that have to organize from scratch, as might be 
the case for cuts in welfare services or public transit. Also of interest is the ability of such 
groups to develop appealing framings and form alliances.  
This case also shows that budget cutting decisions are not made in a vacuum, 
devoid of history and local idiosyncrasies. The pro-landfill argument about cost-savings 
was unable to stand on its economic merits alone against the anti-landfill movement for 
this reason. This suggests that budget decisions that connect to a history of social 
division, seem unfair or to break past promises are especially apt to evoke bitter conflict.  
An issue to explore further is how can local governme ts might better engage with 
communities about policy issues prior to policy formation.  
Such conflicts may also reignite in the Greensboro area. Signaling the inevitably 
of future social, political, and economic debate, Rpublicans, again fueled in part by the 
Conservatives for Guilford County, took control of the Guilford County (the county in 
which Greensboro is located) Board of Commissioners in the November, 2012 elections. 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the landfill dispute, a chasm evidently remains between 
the anti-landfill movement and those who subscribe to the tea party, and proposals for 
reopening the landfill continue to circulate. How great might the chasm have been if the 
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landfill supporters had won? Had African American residents living around the landfill 
come to believe that they had been denied their right to a safe and healthy environment 
would Greensboro be healing the wounds of its racist history? 
On the other hand, many residents in northeast Greensboro and other parts of the 
city were drawn together by their fight against the reopening. Some interviewees said that 
it actually strengthened their community, as well as ties with other groups and individuals 
in other districts. Does the African American community now feel more a part of the 
larger Greensboro community? Or did the controversy deepen the racial divide in 
Greensboro?  It would be interesting to study how the city’s race relations fares currently 
and to study the effects of ascendant tea party ideals on inter- and intra-racial relations.
 
 
146 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Agyeman, Julian. 2002. “Constructing Environmental (in)Justice: Transatlantic Tales.”  
Environmental Politics 11(3):31-53. 
Anderton, Douglas L., Andy B. Anderson, John Michael Oakes, and Michael R. Fraser.  
1994. “Environmental Equity: The Demographics of Dumping.” Demography 
31(2):229-48. 
Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social  
Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26:611-
639. 
Blumer, Herbert. 1971. “Social Problems as Collective Behavior.” Social Problems  
18(3):298-306. 
Bowen, William. 2002. “An Analytical Review of Environmental Justice Research: What  
Do We Really Know?” Environmental Management 29(1):3.15. 
Bowen, William M. and Michael V. Wells. 2002. “The Politics and Reality of  
Environmental Justice: A History and Considerations for Public Administrators 
and Policy Makers.” Public Administration Review 62(6):688-98. 
Brulle, Robert J. and David N. Pellow. 2006. “Environmental Justice: Human Health and  
Environmental Inequalities.” Annual Review of Public Health 27:103-24. 
Bullard, Robert D. 1990. Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class and Environmental Quality.  
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
 
147 
 
Bullard, Robert D. 1996. “Environmental Justice: It’s More Than Waste Facility Siting.”  
Social Science Quarterly 77(3):493-499. 
Caniglia, Beth Schaeffer, and JoAnn Carmin. 2005. “Scholarship on Social Movement  
Organizations: Classic Views and Emerging Trends.” Mobilization: An 
International Journal 10(2):201-212. 
Čapek, Stella M. 1993. “The ‘Environmental Justice’ Frame: A Conceptual Discussion  
and an Application.” Social Problems 40(1):5-24. 
Chafe, William H. 1980. Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and  
the Black Struggle for Freedom. New York, NY: Oxford University Press:  
Coll, Steve. 2011. “Democratic Movements,” New Yorker, January 31. (Retrieved from  
EBSCO on February 11, 2011.) 
Couch, Steven R. and Steve Kroll-Smith. 1994. “Environmental Controversies,  
Interactional Resources, and Rural Communities: Siting Versus Exposure 
Disputes.” Rural Sociology 59(1):25-44. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1958. “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model.” American Political  
Science Review 52:463-469. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New  
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1967. “The City in the Future of Democracy.” Political Science Review  
61(4):953-970. 
Diani, Mario. 1992. “The Concept of Social Movement.” The Sociological Review  
40(1):1-25. 
148 
 
Domhoff, G. William. 1978. Who Really Rules?: New Haven and Community Power  
Reexamined. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Domhoff, G. William. 1983. Who Rules America Now?: A View for the '80s. Englewood  
Cliffs, NY: Prentice-Hall. 
Domhoff, G. William. 2007. “C. Wright Mills, Power Structure Research, and the  
Failures of Mainstream Political Science.” New Political Science 29(1):97-114. 
Dowie, Mark. 1995. Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close f the  
Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Edelstein, Michael R. 2004. “Sustainable Innovation and the Siting Dilemma: Thoughts  
on the Stigmatization of Projects and Proponents, Good and Bad.” Journal of Risk 
Research 7 (2):233–250. 
Edwards, Bob and John D. McCarthy. 2004. “Resource and Social Movement  
Mobilization.” In The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. 
Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Pp. 116-
152. 
Fitzgerald, Kathleen J. and Diane M. Rodgers. 2000. “Radical Social Movement  
Organizations: A Theoretical Model.” The Sociology Quarterly 41(4):573–592. 
Freudenberg, Nicholas. 1984. “Citizen Action for Environmental Health: Report on a  
Survey of Community Organizations.” American Journal of Public Health 
74(5):444-8. 
Freudenberg, Nicholas and Carol Steinsapir. 1992. “Not in Our Backyards: The  
149 
 
Grassroots Environmental Movement,” in R. G. Dunlap and A.G. Mertig (eds.), 
American Environmentalism: The U.S. Environmental Movement, 1970-1990, 
Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis.  
United States General Accounting Office. 1995. “Hazardous and Nonhazardous Waste:  
Demographics of People Living Near Waste Facilities.” Report to Congressional 
Requesters GAO/RCED-95-84. 
Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience.  
Boston, MA:Northeastern University Press. 
Green, Jordan. 2011. “Greensboro Council Considers Solid Waste Proposals.” YES!  
Weekly. < http://www.yesweekly.com/triad/article-11802-greensboro-council-
considers-solid-waste-proposals.html> Retrieved on April 22, 2011. 
Gunter, Valerie and Steve Kroll-Smith. 2007. Volatile Places: A Sociology of  
Communities and Environmental Controversies. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge 
Press. 
Hannigan, John. 2006. Environmental Sociology: Second Edition. London: Routledge.  
Hunter, Floyd. 1953. Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers. Chapel  
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
Hunter, Floyd. 1980. Community Power Succession. Chapel Hill, NC: University of  
North Carolina Press. 
Hurst, Charles E. 2009. Social Inequality. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
Klandermans, Bert. 1986. “New Social Movements and Resource Mobilization: The  
150 
 
European and the American Approach.” International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters 4(2):13-37. 
Knoke, David. 1990. Organizing for Collective Action: The Political Econ mies of  
Associations. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Kriesel, Warren and Terence J. Centner. 1996. “Neighborhood Exposure to Toxic  
Releases: Are There Racial Inequities?” Growth & Change 27(4):479-500. 
Levine, Adeline Gordon. 1982. Love Canal: Science, Politics and People. L xington,  
MA: Lexington Books. 
Luebke, Paul. 1998. Tar Heel Politics 2000. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North  
Carolina Press.  
Markham, William T. 2008. Environmental Organizations in Modern Germany: Hardy  
Survivors in the Twentieth Century and Beyond. New York: Berghahn Books.  
Markham, William T. and Eric Rufa. 1997. “Class, Race, and the Disposal of Urban  
Waste: Locations of Landfills, Incinerators, and Sewage Treatment Plants.” 
Sociological Spectrum 17(2):235-248. 
McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social  
Movements: A Partial Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 82 (6):1212-1241. 
McGurty, Eileen M. 2000. “Warren County, NC, and the Emergence of the  
Environmental Justice Movement: Unlikely Coalitions and Shared Meanings in 
Local Collective Action.” Society and Natural Resources 13:373-387. 
Miller, Delbert, C. 1970. International Community Power Structures: Comparative  
Studies of Four World Cities. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
151 
 
Mohai, Paul and Bunyan Bryant, eds. 1992. Race and the Incidence of Environmental  
Hazards: A Time for Discourse. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Molotch, Harvey. 1976. “The City as Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of  
Place.” American Journal of Sociology 82:309-332. 
Oakes, John Michael, Douglas L. Anderton, and Andy B. Anderson. 1996. “A  
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Equity in Communities with Hazardous 
Waste Facilities.” Social Science Research 25(2):125-148. 
Petracca, Mark P., ed. 1992. The Politics Of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed.  
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Pellow, David N. 2004. “The Politics of Illegal Dumping: An Environmental. Justice  
Framework.” Qualitative Sociology 27(4):511-525. 
Phillips, Barbara. 1996. City Lights. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Ringquist, Evan J. 2005. “Assessing Evidence of Enviro mental Inequities: A Meta- 
Analysis.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 24(2):223-247. 
Roberts, J. Timmons and Melissa M. Toffolon-Weiss. 2001. Chronicles from the  
Environmental Justice Frontline. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Schaeffer, Nora Cate and Presser, Stanley. 2003. “The Science of Asking Questions.”  
Annual Review of Sociology 29:65-88.  
Schneider, Joseph W. 1985. “Social Problems Theory: The Constructionist View.”  
Annual Review of Sociology 11(1):209-229. 
Snow, David A. and Soule, Sarah A. 2009. A Primer on Social Movements. New York,  
NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
152 
 
Spector, M. and J. Kitsuse. 1973.“Toward a Sociology f Social Problems: Social  
Conditions, Value-Judgements, and Social Problems.” Social Problems 
20(4):407-19.  
Stone, Clarence N. 1989. Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988. Lawrence, KS:  
University Press of Kansas.  
Szasz, Andrew and Michael Meuser. 1997. “Environmental I equalities: Literature  
Review and Proposals for New Directions in Research nd Theory.” Current 
Sociology 45(3):99-120. 
Truman,  David B. 1971.The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public  
Opinion. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Knopf, Inc. 
Yearly, Steven. 2005. Making Sense of Science: Understanding the Social Study of  
Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc.
 
 
153 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE WHITE STREET LANDFILL 
CONTROVERSY 
 
 
Introduction 
Greensboro, North Carolina has a long history of civil rights activism. Most 
notably, the first sit-in of the civil rights movement took place at Greensboro’s 
Woolworth’s drugstore in 1960. Due in part to the city’s iconic role in the movement, 
Greensboro’s white leaders have often touted the city’s progressive stance on racial 
issues (Chafe 1980); however, there have also been recurring racial conflicts over the last 
half century.  
In 1979, the Ku Klux Klan/Nazi shooting of five members of The Communist 
Worker’s Party, a biracial group, considerably tarnished Greensboro’s racial relations 
reputation. The Greensboro Police Department failed to respond promptly to the 
shootout, and all of the gunmen were later acquitted. Racial conflicts in the police 
department have characterized the past decade, as the former chief of police was accused 
of discriminating against a group of black police officers because of racial prejudice. 
The recent White Street Landfill case represents a continuation of both traditions. 
Racial and class tensions were heightened by the plan of a conservative majority of the 
City Council to reopen the landfill, but other white leaders argued for keeping it closed in 
order to ensure racial justice and harmony . 
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Initial Stages of Controversy about the White Street Landfill  
The White Street Landfill was first constructed in the 1940s. For 50 years, the 
surrounding approximately 500 acres were used as a buffer zone to insulate 
neighborhoods from the noise, smells, and traffic caused by the landfill. However, in the 
early- to mid-1990s, affordable housing and land were becoming a major issue in 
Greensboro, which, like other cities around the South, was experiencing high rates of 
immigration. The push for affordable housing in Greensboro led the city to sell cheaply 
this land for the construction of new homes. Because of the proximity to the landfill, the 
houses were affordably priced for working to middle class buyers. Thus, even though it 
was located beside of the landfill, people, many of whom were African American, moved 
into the new homes in the Nealtown Farms neighborhood. Some residents later said that 
they were unaware of their close proximity to the landfill when they purchased their 
homes. Subsequently, the city bought back some homes in Nealtown Farms and then 
resold them, with a covenant stating that the landfill was down the street.    
A 1995 Greensboro City Council proposal to expand the landfill led to protests by 
neighboring residents, who began their push to have the landfill closed. Residents 
claimed that living near the landfill was not only subjecting them to unpleasant smells 
and noises, but to serious health hazards. Many also claimed that expanding the landfill 
would be an act of environmental racism. 
Greensboro City Council Deliberates over Closing the Landfill 
A 10-month study on the landfill’s capacity was conducted in 1996. The study 
concluded that the City Council should begin looking for a 600-acre site for a new 
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landfill immediately, as the White Street Landfill would be reaching capacity in the next 
ten to fifteen years. However, no decision was made, nd it was not until three years later 
that the Council began considering the city’s waste management options seriously. 
Throughout 1999 and 2000, three main underlying factors were affecting the City 
Council’s decision making, or lack thereof: how much time remained until the landfill 
would be full, how important it would be for the candidates to address the issue in the 
upcoming Council elections, and how great the opposition to the expansion from certain 
Council members and residents of the northeast Greensboro district was. The two most 
prominent solutions were finding another location fr a landfill or expanding the existing 
White Street landfill. Several Council members, as well as residents of northeast 
Greensboro, had expressed strong opposition to the possibility of expanding the White 
Street Landfill.  
The City Council representative from the affected district, the late Claudette 
Burroughs-White, played a prominent role in the opposition. She supported the residents’ 
demands that the landfill be closed, and she persist ntly presented the issue to the 
Council in an effort to build support. Because of these efforts, the mayor at the time, 
Keith Holliday, began to explore other waste management alternatives and weigh the 
costs and benefits of expanding or closing the landfill. Nevertheless, as of June 2001, 
frustrated northeast residents were continuing to express their dissatisfaction with the 
City Council’s handling of this issue.  
During the second half of 2001, the City Council finally went from having no 
solution to the city’s waste management problem to deciding upon a definitive plan. The 
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City Council election of November, 2001, brought the opic back into focus. The White 
Street Landfill was an important issue, as it related to budget concerns, the appeal and 
attractiveness of the city, and the livelihoods of n rtheast Greensboro residents. Much 
was at stake in the November elections, especially for the District Two residents, who 
lived near the landfill.  
One of the key factors in Mayor Holliday’s cost/benefit analysis of the landfill 
involved Greensboro’s economic development. Holliday argued that, due to the 
geographic location of the landfill, keeping it open and expanding it on land the city 
already owned at the site when it reached capacity would be a major hindrance to the 
city’s economic development. Currently, the landfill is situated on approximately 500 
acres of land. In order to sustain waste disposal for another 40-50 years, it would need to 
be expanded at least another 500 acres. In addition, it would need, ideally, an additional 
500 acres of buffer land surrounding it. Moreover, the presence of the landfill would 
discourage people or businesses from moving into the northeast Greensboro area, leaving 
only the area to the southeast open for expansion, as other incorporated communities and 
the airport blocked expansion in other directions. 
City Council Proposes Closing the Landfill  
A week before the 2001 elections, the City Council tentatively decided not to 
expand the landfill, claiming that the pollution the expansion would cause, was not only 
bad for the residents, but also made Greensboro seem an unattractive place to live. At the 
end of October, 2001 the City Council and the majority of candidates seemed to have 
reached a consensus that the landfill needed to go.  
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In May, 2002 the first significant action of the year took place in regards to the 
landfill. On a five to three vote, the Zoning Commission members decided “against 
creating a so-called borrow pit, an area from which dirt would be taken to cover trash 
placed in the landfill” (GNR). About 40 residents from the northeast Greensboro area 
attended the Council meeting to express their opposition to the potential borrow pit. The 
ruling was a relief to these residents, whose organization over this issue foreshadowed the 
grassroots environmental movement that would form almost a decade later.  
Greensboro News and Record Accentuates Divergent Perspectives about the Landfill 
Closing  
In June, 2002 the issue of municipal spending and higher taxes began to appear in 
the GNR headlines. Two headlines, appearing within just three days of each other, 
highlighted the predicted costs of closing the landfill. The articles mentioned how 
residents might have to pay higher taxes and fees i the landfill were to be closed, as a 
transfer station might cost twice as much to operate. A conservative weekly newspaper 
with a large circulation, The Rhinoceros Times, also emphasized this issue.  
During the couple months following, the antagonism between those who preferred 
having the landfill closed versus those who favored cutting back on spending and keeping 
taxes low began to take shape. While residents of District Two reminded the Council that 
it needed to be actively working on getting the landfill closed, other reports in the press 
kept the conversation about rising taxes that would accompany the closing going. 
Readers were reminded that there were “budget woes” that Greensboro citizens needed to 
be aware of not only regarding their own city, but also for the United States as a whole. 
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As one article stated that there was “no end in sight to the current economic malaise of 
the entire country,” while another detailed the potential cost increase from closing the 
landfill and transferring the city’s household waste. If the landfill closed earlier than it 
expected, “residential garbage collection rates could jump to between $19.87 and $23.10 
a month” (GNR).   
 Some debate participants argued that keeping the landfi l open could not be 
considered environmental racism because the landfill existed before the neighborhoods in 
the White Street area. Many residents of northeast Greensboro disagree with this 
statement, however, as some residents had lived on White Street since the 1920s, and the 
landfill was not constructed until the 1940s. The author of one opinion piece in the GNR 
distinguished between a waste disposal site that is built in an established community 
versus a hazardous site that existed before a community formed in the area.  It appears 
that this opinion piece may have been in response to counterclaims by residents in an 
August, 2002 hearing. One day after this piece appered in the GNR, another article 
commented on the public hearing, stating how those on both sides of the issue were had 
been articulate in presenting their support or opposition in closing the landfill.  
The Landfill is Closed to Household Waste 
The City Council made its final decision in December, 2002 to close the landfill. 
Mayor Holliday proposed that a long-term plan for Greensboro’s waste disposal involve a 
regional landfill in one of the city’s neighboring rural counties. Operating on the premise 
of development of a 10-year plan for a regional landfill site, the landfill was finally 
closed in 2006. Since then, Greensboro’s household waste has been transported 
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approximately 62 miles to the Republic Services’ Uwharrie Environmental Landfill in 
Montgomery County. The landfill has continued to take construction waste and is used 
for a very small amount of household waste in order to keep its permit valid. 
The Rhinoceros Times Keeps Waste Management Costs in Headlines  
Throughout the years following the City Council’s decision to close the landfill to 
household waste, the GNR continued to periodically present the opposing side  of the 
White Street landfill issue – those who wanted the landfill to be closed and those who 
wanted the city to take the cheapest option in its wa te disposal, reopening and expanding 
the existing landfill. On the one side, some residents saw the landfill as an environmental 
racism issue; on the other, many residents worried about the increased taxes they were 
having to pay for shipping the household waste out of Greensboro. Nevertheless, by 
2006, controversy over the landfill seemed to have died down. Residents in northeast 
Greensboro who had been energized by the closing of the landfill were now working on 
other ways to better their community, such as improving housing conditions. 
The exception was the conservative-leaning newspaper, Th  Rhinoceros Times, 
which continued to keep the costs of closing the landfill in the headlines, emphasizing 
that transferring the city’s waste was costing the city around 12 million dollars a year. 
(However, it is important to note that later reports would show the net amount that the 
city could save is not 12 million, but closer to two and a half to three million dollars.)  
City Council Considers Reopening the Landfill   
 In March, 2008 City Councilman Mike Barber suggested that the landfill be 
reopened to household waste. According to Barber, “the city is wasting millions,” with 
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the costs estimated at around $3 million per year to ship Greensboro’s household waste to 
Montgomery County. Soon, the dispute picked up right w ere it left off, begging the 
questions: does the city keep the landfill closed an  have higher taxes or does it reopen 
the landfill to cut spending and lower taxes?  
Neighbors of the landfill voiced their opposition to Barber’s suggestion loudly. 
They emphasized that the City Council knew when it decided to close the landfill that it 
would be cheaper to keep it open than to transport the rash, but there were other reasons 
to close it that trumped the costs. One of the most important was that the landfill would 
be approaching its capacity in the near future anyway. On April 1, 2008 the deputy city 
manager reiterated this fact. (It is important to note, however, that the life of the landfill 
was very much in dispute, as its capacity depended on how many new cells were 
opened.) The next night the City Council voted 6-3 to keep the White Street Landfill 
closed to municipal waste.  
In July, 2009 the GNR predicted the major themes for the candidates in the 
November elections of that year. One major theme suggested was avoiding a tax increase. 
Although the GNR did not mention the issue of reopening the landfill irectly, it was 
clear that the national economic crisis that begun in 2008 and was especially severe in 
Greensboro was beginning to shape Greensboro’s political agenda. On the other hand, in 
mid-September, Councilman Robbie Perkins, a strong advocate of keeping the landfill 
closed, suggested that a long-term solution was needed for the city’s waste. He argued 
that resorting to reopening the White Street Landfill would only provide a short-term 
solution. At the next meeting, however, “the council decided it wanted to talk yet again 
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about the possibility of once again dumping household waste there” (GNR). Proposals 
were also made to construct a very advanced waste recovery system at the site. While 
Goldie Wells, City Council representative for District 2 at the time, emphatically stated 
that “the landfill was supposed to be a closed issue,” a majority of the Council asked for 
proposals the following week about options for Greensboro’s waste management.  
A Conservative Majority Wins Council Seats and Vows to Cut Spending and Hold 
Taxes   
The November, 2009 election brought a conservative majority to power on the 
platform of cutting spending and keeping taxes low. The conservatives enjoyed strong 
turnout from affluent, predominantly white northwest Greensboro and tea party 
advocates, while voter turnout in Greensboro’s predominately African American 
precincts was low. In an unexpected mayoral victory, conservative Bill Knight ousted the 
incumbent mayor Yvonne Johnson, who had served on the City Council for the 16 years. 
Knight, a retired certified public accountant, had promised to make severe budget cuts the 
focus of the new City Council, which many voters favored in light of the country’s 
economic recession. Knight had also been a supporter of he former Greensboro police 
chief David Wray, who had been fired on account of  a racial discrimination controversy 
with some of the police force’s black officers. Thus, the win for Knight also exacerbated 
racial tensions in the city. 
The new City Council began soliciting proposals from several private companies 
to reopen the landfill to household waste, and no more than a week after the elections, 
citizens of northeast Greensboro came before the Council to discuss the landfill issue. 
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During this same time, both the GNR and YES! Weekly reported that cancer cases had 
been found to be higher in the area around the landfi l (although the GNR later states that 
this information is flawed and needs more investigation). 
Controversy Heightens between Opposition and Supporters of the Landfill 
Reopening 
The dispute between the opposition and supporters of the reopening of the landfill 
deepened in early 2010 as residents of northeast Greensboro continued to fight against 
reopening the landfill. They were joined by some prominent white moderate politicians 
who continued to argue that Greensboro’s northeast district was one of the few areas left 
available in which the city could expand, and that reopening the landfill would hinder 
future expansion. They also claimed that neither businesses nor future residents would 
want to move to a city with an operating landfill within its city limits. Finally, they said 
that reopening the landfill would represent racial discrimination, which would make 
Greensboro unappealing for future companies and resi ent . Nevertheless, several 
members of the City Council, including Trudy Wade, Mary Rakestraw, Danny 
Thompson, and Bill Knight, conservative citizens, and The Rhinoceros Times continued 
to push for spending cuts and low taxes, which theysaid reopening the landfill could help 
facilitate.  
In the northeast district, a grassroots environmental justice group with the goal of 
keeping the landfill closed emerged. In March, 2011, Goldie Wells, a former City 
Council member, formally organized residents and activists in opposition to the 
reopening of the landfill into the Citizens for Economic and Environmental Justice 
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(CEEJ). CEEJ was able to form informal coalitions with other local groups, such as the 
Nealtown Neighborhood Association and the League of W men Voters. The CEEJ held 
rallies, protests, and meetings in local churches to ge  out its message about the further 
destruction and discrimination it believed that reop ning the landfill would cause. In 
addition, it gained legal support from the Southern Coalition for Social Justice, based in 
Durham, North Carolina. This legal support led to lawsuits filed against the city and 
injunctions placed against the expansion of the landfill to include new segments due to 
lack of proper zoning and permits. However, the injunction only limited expanding the 
landfill, and the City Council continued with the bidding process for a company to 
operate the landfill with the existing cells. Gate City Waste Management company 
eventually won the bid to operate the existing landfill, though the City Council still 
needed to vote to finalize the contract.  
Likelihood Diminishes of the Landfill Reopening in the Near Future 
 On September 20th, 2011 the day the City Council would have had its last vote on 
the company’s contract, the CEEJ held a demonstration t the plaza of the Municipal 
Building. Students marched from A&T University’s campus to the Municipal Building to 
join the rally and stood outside the doors prior to the City Council meeting. An hour 
before the meeting began, Gate City Waste Management withdrew its bid. During the 
bidding process, both City Council members Nancy Vaughan and Zach Matheny had 
been recused from voting due to their ties with the bidding companies (Vaughn’s 
husband had a business connection with one of the companies that bid on the contract but 
lost). However, despite a lawsuit by Gate City Waste Management to keep Vaughn from 
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voting in this final vote, interim City Attorney Tom Pollard later decided that Vaughn did 
not have a conflict of interest and allowed Vaughn to participate. With her vote, and 
Matheny still recused, there would not be a majority vote to pass the motion for Gate City 
Waste Management to operate the landfill.  
The Council would have had to go back through the bidding process all over 
again for the landfill to be reopened, which was not possible before the November, 2011 
elections. By that point, members of the CEEJ had already formed the Greensboro 
Voters’ Alliance, a non-partisan group focused on vter registration, educating citizens 
about local issues, and unseating the pro-landfill City Council members. The high voter 
turnout in east Greensboro reflected the citizens’ de ire to keep the landfill closed. Voter 
turnout there was much higher than in the 2009 elections, and higher than the voter 
turnout rate in northwest Greensboro. In the 2009 elections, northwest Greensboro voters 
made their concern and anger about government spending evident at the polls. In 2011, 
they had less of a vested interest than east Greensboro citizens in one of the key issues of 
the election: the White Street Landfill. Only one supporter of reopening the landfill 
remained after the election, and the new Council made clear that reopening it was no 
longer on the agenda. With that, all signs point to the landfill not being reopened and the 
City Council going back to working on a long-term solution to handling the city’s waste. 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 
Thank you for speaking with me today about the White Street Landfill. I want to talk with 
you about the recent controversy that began around September, 2009 when the City 
Council announced that it would begin soliciting pro osals to reopen the landfill and 
ended when the new City Council that was elected in November, 2011 announced that it 
would not reopen the landfill. 
SECTION A  ASK TO ALL INTERVIEWEES 
 
General questions about the interviewee’s understanding of and involvement in the 
White Street Landfill dispute   
When and how did you first become aware that there was a new dispute about the 
landfill? 
Could you briefly describe your view of what the recent dispute around the landfill was 
all about?  
Probes: What kinds of arguments arose about the landfill? 
Are you familiar with past disputes about the landfill? 
[If yes]: Was the recent dispute similar to past disputes about the landfill or different? 
 Probe: How was it different? 
IF PRESS, SKIP NOW TO SECTION B, PART II 
Were you an active member of any group or organization that supported or opposed 
reopening the landfill? 
IF NO, PROCEED TO SECTION B  
IF YES, SKIP TO SECTION C                                
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SECTION B 
Part I. Individual’s Goals, Themes, Strategies, and Tactics DO NOT ASK TO 
MEMBERS OF GROUPS OR PRESS 
Why did you become involved in the recent landfill d spute? 
What were your main goals in becoming involved? 
What kinds of arguments did you personally make for or against reopening the landfill? 
Were there any key words or phrases that you used repeatedly in your arguments? 
 If so, what were they? 
 Probes: What did these words or phrases emphasize bout the landfill? 
What kinds of actions did you take to show your opposition to/support for reopening the 
landfill? 
How did you decide upon these actions? 
Probes: Were these actions part of an overall strategy?  
If so, what was the strategy? 
Which persons or groups were you trying to influence with your actions? 
 Why did you want to influence these people/groups? 
Do you think that your actions actually influenced the outcome of the landfill dispute? 
Which action(s) had the most impact? 
Which action(s) had the least impact? 
Did any of your actions turn out to weaken your side’s influence?   
Which ones? 
Part II. Other Local Leaders and Groups that Opposed the Reopening; Alliances 
PROCEED HERE WITH PRESS 
Who do see as the key individual leaders among those who opposed the reopening? I am 
asking here about individuals, not organized groups.  
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Probes: Were any current or former members of the City Council leaders in 
opposing the reopening? 
Who were the two most important individual leaders? 
Which particular groups opposed the reopening?  
Probes: Did any other political or activist groups in Greensboro oppose the 
reopening? 
Which were the two most important groups? 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What role do you think ________  played in the recent dispute over reopening the 
landfill?  
     Leader/Group  Role in landfill dispute  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Why do you think ________ opposed the landfill reopning? 
Probe: What do you think ________ had to gain by the landfill staying closed? 
     Leader/Group  Reason for opposing the reopening  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
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ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What kinds of arguments did ________ make against reopening the landfill? 
     Leader/Group  Arguments against reopening  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Were there certain phrases or words that ________ used in his/her/their arguments? 
 If so, what were they? 
     Leader/Group  Phrases or key words in arguments   
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
In your opinion were the individuals who were influential in trying to keep the landfill 
closed part of Greensboro’s elite? 
 Probe: Do you see the push to keep the landfill closed as issue for Greensboro’s 
elite?  
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DO NOT ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO SUPPORTERS OR PRESS;  
IF SUPPORTERS OR PRESS, SKIP TO PART III 
 
Did you cooperate closely with any of these leaders or groups, or any other key people in 
Greensboro, in your efforts to keep the landfill closed? 
Which were the two most important leaders/key peopl with whom you 
cooperated? 
Which were the two most important groups with which you cooperated? 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
How did you make contact with __________? 
How often did you meet with ________ or representatives of ________ when you first 
started working together on the issue? 
Did this increase or decrease over time?                  
Leader/Group                        How contacted     Meeting Freq.   Increased?           
(Y/N) 
L1.   
 
  
L2.   
 
  
G1.   
 
  
G2.   
 
  
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
[If not already mentioned]: What similar goals did you and ________ have? 
     Leader/Group  Similar Goals  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
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G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Did you and ________ have any dissimilar or conflicting goals about the landfill? 
 Probes: If so, what were they? 
     Leader/Group  Dissimilar goals  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Did this ever create a conflict between you and ____ _? 
If so, did this affect the success of either you or ________ in achieving your 
goals? 
 Was the conflict ever resolved? 
  Probe: If so, how?  
    Conflict?   Affect?   Resolved? 
Leader/Group   (Y/N)        (Y/N)         (Y/N)           If conflict resolved, how?  
L1.   
 
   
L2.   
 
   
G1.   
 
   
G2.   
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ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What do you think were the main benefits of your cooperation with ________?  
Benefits for you? 
Benefits for ________? 
 Leader/Group  Benefits for interviewee               Benefits for other  
leader/group  
L1.   
 
 
L2.   
 
 
G1.   
 
 
G2.   
 
 
 
Part III. Other Local Leaders and Groups that Supported the Reopening; Alliances 
PROCEED HERE WITH SUPPORTERS AND PRESS 
 
Who do see as the key individual leaders among those who supported the reopening? I 
am asking here about individuals, not organized groups.  
Probes: Were any current or former members of the City Council leaders in 
supporting the reopening?  
Who were the two most important leaders? 
Which particular groups in Greensboro supported the reopening? 
Probes: Did any political or activist groups in Greensboro support the reopening? 
What were the two most important groups? 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What role do you think ________ played in the recent dispute?  
     Leader/Group  Role in landfill dispute  
L1.   
 
L2.   
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G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Why do you think ________ supported the landfill reop ning? 
Probe: What do you think ________ had to gain by the landfill reopening? 
 
     Leader/Group  Reason for supporting the reopening  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What kinds of arguments did ________ use for reopening the landfill? 
     Leader/Group  Arguments for reopening  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Were there certain phrases or key words that ________ used in his/her/their arguments? 
 If so, what were they? 
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     Leader/Group  Phrases or key words in arguments   
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
 In your opinion were the individuals who were influential in trying to get the landfill 
reopened part of Greensboro’s elite? 
 Probe: Do you see the push to get the landfill reopened as an elite issue?  
 
DO NOT ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO OPPOSITION OR PRESS;  
IF OPPOSITION, SKIP TO SECTION D 
 IF PRESS, SKIP TO SECTION E 
 
Did you cooperate closely with any of these or other local leaders or groups/organizations 
in your efforts to have the landfill reopened? 
 Which were the two most important leaders with whom you cooperated? 
Which were the two most important group with which you cooperated? 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
How did you make contact with __________? 
How often did you meet with ________ or representatives of ________ when you first 
started working together? 
Did this increase or decrease over time?                  
Leader/Group                        How contacted     Meeting Freq.   Increased?           
          (Y/N) 
L1.   
 
  
L2.   
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G1.   
 
  
G2.   
 
  
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
[If not already mentioned]: What similar goals did you and ________ have? 
     Leader/Group  Similar Goals  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Did you and ________ have any dissimilar or conflicting goals about the landfill? 
 Probes: If so, what were they? 
     Leader/Group  Dissimilar goals  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Did this ever create a conflict between you and ____ _? 
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If so, did this affect the success of either you or ________ in achieving your 
goals? 
 Was the conflict ever resolved? 
  Probe: If so, how?  
    Conflict?   Affect?   Resolved? 
Leader/Group   (Y/N)        (Y/N)         (Y/N)           If conflict resolved, how?  
L1.   
 
   
L2.   
 
   
G1.   
 
   
G2.   
 
   
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What do you think were the main benefits of the cooperation with ________?  
Benefits for you? 
Benefits for ________? 
Leader/Group Benefits for interviewee           Benefits for other  
                     leader/group  
L1.   
 
 
L2.   
 
 
G1.   
 
 
G2.   
 
 
 
IF PREVIOUS SECTION ASKED, SKIP NOW TO SECTION D 
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SECTION C  ASK ONLY TO MEMBERS OF GROUPS 
Part I. Group/Organizational Leadership, Demographics, and Resources 
In which group(s) were you an active member? 
            If involved with more than one group, in which group were you most active? 
What was <NAME OF GROUP/ORGANIZATION>’s stance on the landfill being 
reopened? 
What did you personally do as a member of ________? 
Who were the founding member(s) of this group?  
 [If multiple founding members]: How did the founding members know one another 
before forming ________? 
Why did the founding member(s) oppose/support the landfill reopening? 
[Ask to non-founding members:] Why did you become interested in the 
issue/joining the group? 
About how many supporters did ________  have at the tim  it was most active? 
About how many people attended meetings regularly at the time the group was most 
active?  
Did the membership increase, decline, or remain stable s the dispute went on? 
What kinds of people supported ________? 
Probes: Was the majority male or female? 
Was there a majority race? If so, what? 
Was there a majority socio-economic class, such as well-to-do or ordinary 
working people? If so, what?  
Was there a main age-range? If so, what? 
How did the group attract supporters? 
Probes: Was any kind of publicity used (flyers, websites, newspapers)? 
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Did the group have enough money to do its work well? 
What was its major source of money? 
Did the group have good access to the media? 
Did the group have access to office and/or meeting space? How did the group get its 
meeting and office space? 
Did the group have support from prominent politicians or other well known and respected 
persons? 
Did the group have enough volunteer labor? 
Who in the group typically decided how these resources would be used? 
Part II. Group/Organization’s Goals, Themes, Strategies, and Tactics 
What were the main goals of ________? 
How were these goals selected? 
What kinds of arguments did ________ make for/against reopening the landfill? 
Were there certain phrases or key words that it used in its arguments? 
 If so, what were they? 
What did these phrases or key words emphasize about the landfill? 
What kinds of actions did _______take to show opposition to/support for reopening the 
landfill? 
How did ________ decide upon these actions? 
Probes: Were these actions part of an overall strategy? If so, what was the 
strategy? 
Do you think these actions were effective in helping ________ reach its goal(s)? 
Which action(s) do you think were the most effective? 
Which do you think were the least effective? 
Overall, were the group’s actions effective in attrac ing media attention? 
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Which action(s) were the most effective? 
Which were ineffective? 
Do you think that the actions actually influenced the outcome of the landfill dispute? 
Which action(s) had the most impact? 
Which action(s) had the least impact? 
Did any actions turn out to weaken your side’s influence?   
Which ones? 
Part III. Local Leaders and Groups that Opposed the Reopening; 
Alliances/Coalitions 
Who do see as the key individual leaders among those who opposed the reopening? I am 
asking here about individuals, not organized groups.  
Probes: Were any former or current members of the City Council leaders in 
opposing the reopening? 
In your opinion were the individuals who were influential in trying to keep the landfill 
closed part of Greensboro’s elite? 
 Probe: Do you see the push to keep the landfill closed as issue for Greensboro’s 
elite?  
Who were the two most important leaders? 
Which particular groups opposed the reopening?  
Probes: Did any political or activist groups in Greensboro oppose the reopening? 
Which were the two most important groups? 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What role did ________ play in the recent dispute ov r reopening the landfill?  
     Leader/Group  Role in dispute  
L1.   
 
L2.   
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G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Why do you think ________ opposed the landfill reopning? 
Probe: What do you think ________ had to gain by the landfill staying closed? 
     Leader/Group  Reason for opposing the reopening  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What kinds of arguments did ________ make against reopening the landfill? 
     Leader/Group  Arguments against reopening  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Were there certain phrases or key words that ________ used in his/her/their arguments? 
 If so, what were they? 
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     Leader/Group  Phrases or key words  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
 ASK ONLY IF INTERVIEWEE’S GROUP OPPOSED REOPENING;                                 
IF SUPPORTED, SKIP TO PART IV  
Did your group/organization cooperate closely with any local leaders or 
groups/organizations in its efforts to keep the landfill closed? 
Which were the two most important leaders with whom you cooperated? 
Which were the two most important groups with which you cooperated? 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
How did your group/organization make contact with ___ ____? 
How often did representatives of your group/organiztion and ________ meet with one 
another when they first started working together? 
Did this increase or decrease over time?                 
Leader/Group                    How contacted                 Meeting Freq.   Increased? 
                     (Y/N) 
L1. 
 
   
L2. 
 
   
G1.   
 
  
G2.   
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ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
[If not already mentioned]: What similar goals did your group/organization and 
________ have? 
     Leader/Group  Similar Goals  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Did ________ have any dissimilar or conflicting goals bout the landfill? 
 Probes: If so, what were they? 
     Leader/Group  Dissimilar goals  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
Did this ever create a conflict between the groups or groups and leaders? 
If so, with which particular group or leader did your group/organization 
have conflicts? 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Did the conflict with ______ affect the success of either group or leader in 
achieving its goals? 
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  Was the conflict ever resolved? 
   Probe: If so, how?  
    Conflict?   Affect?   Resolved? 
Leader/Group   (Y/N)        (Y/N)         (Y/N)           If conflict resolved, how?  
L1.   
 
   
L2.   
 
   
G1.   
 
   
G2.   
 
   
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What do you think were the main benefits of the cooperation?  
Benefits for your group/organization? 
Benefits for _______? 
 Leader/Group Benefits for interviewee’ groups           Benefits for other  
leader/group  
L1.   
 
 
L2.   
 
 
G1.   
 
 
G2.   
 
 
 
Part IV. Local Leaders and Groups that Supported the Reopening; 
Alliances/Coalitions 
Who do see as the key individual leaders among those who supported the reopening? I 
am asking here about individuals, not organized groups.  
Probes: Were any former or current members of the City Council leaders in 
supporting the reopening? 
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In your opinion were the individuals who were influential in trying to get the landfill 
reopened part of Greensboro’s elite? 
 Probe: Do you see the push to get the landfill reopened as issue for Greensboro’s 
elite?  
Who were the two most important leaders? 
Which particular groups upported the reopening?  
Probes: Did any political or activist groups in Greensboro support the reopening? 
Which were the two most important groups? 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What role do you think ________ played in the recent dispute?  
     Leader/Group  Role in dispute  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Why do you think ________ supported the landfill reop ning? 
Probe: What do you think ________ had to gain by the landfill reopening? 
     Leader/Group  Reason for supporting the reopening  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
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ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What kinds of arguments did ________ use for reopening the landfill? 
     Leader/Group  Arguments in support of reopening  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Were there certain phrases or key words that ________ used in his/her/their arguments? 
 If so, what were they? 
     Leader/Group  Phrases or Buzzwords  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ONLY IF INTERVIEWEE’S GROUP SUPPORTED REOPENING;                                      
IF OPPOSED, SKIP TO SECTION D 
Did your group cooperate closely with any other loca  leaders or groups/organizations in 
its efforts to have the landfill reopened? 
Which were the two most important leaders with whom you cooperated? 
Which were the two most important group with which you cooperated? 
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ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
How did your group/organization make contact with ___ ____? 
How often did representatives of your group/organiztion and ________ meet with one 
another when they first started working together? 
Did this increase or decrease over time?                    
Leader/Group                    How contacted                  Meeting Freq.  Increased? 
                     (Y/N) 
L1. 
 
   
L2. 
 
   
G1.   
 
  
G2.   
 
  
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
[If not already mentioned]: What similar goals did your group/organization and 
________ have? 
     Leader/Group  Similar Goals  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Did ________ have any dissimilar or conflicting goals bout the landfill? 
 Probes: If so, what were they? 
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     Leader/Group  Dissimilar goals  
L1.   
 
L2.   
 
G1.   
 
G2.   
 
 
Did this ever create a conflict between the groups or groups and leaders? 
If so, with which particular group or leader did your group/organization 
have conflicts? 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
Did the conflict with ______ affect the success of either group or leader in 
achieving its goals? 
  Was the conflict ever resolved? 
   Probe: If so, how?  
    Conflict?   Affect?   Resolved? 
Leader/Group   (Y/N)        (Y/N)         (Y/N)           If conflict resolved, how?  
L1.   
 
   
L2.   
 
   
G1.   
 
   
G2.   
 
   
 
ASK ABOUT EACH LEADER AND GROUP 
 
What do you think were the main benefits of the cooperation?  
Benefits for your group/organization? 
Benefits for _______? 
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 Leader/Group Benefits for interviewee’ groups           Benefits for other  
leader/group  
L1.   
 
 
L2.   
 
 
G1.   
 
 
G2.   
 
 
 
SECTION D 
Local News Media  ASK TO ALL INTERVIEWEES EXCEPT PRESS  
 
Did you personally receive media attention for your involvement in the dispute? 
 If yes, from which media outlets in Greensboro? 
[If member of a group/organization] Did <NAME OF GROUP/ORGANIZATION> 
receive any media attention for its involvement in the dispute? 
 If yes, from which media outlets in Greensboro? 
[If cooperated with other groups/leaders] Did any of the groups or leaders you 
cooperated with receive any media attention for their involvement in the dispute? 
Do you think that the media actually influenced the outcome of the landfill dispute? 
Which media outlets had the most impact? 
Which media outlets had the least impact? 
 
SECTION E  
Obstacles and Advantages  ASK TO ALL INTERVIEWEES 
 
What do you think were the main obstacles facing the groups and individuals trying to 
keep the landfill closed? 
What do you think were the main advantages the groups and individuals that were trying 
to keep the landfill closed had in their fight? 
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What do you think were the main obstacles for the groups and individuals trying to get 
the landfill reopened? 
In general, what do you think were the main advantages the groups and individuals that 
were trying to get the landfill reopened had? 
 
SECTION F 
Interviewee’s Opinions on the Landfill Reopening  ASK TO ALL INTERVIEWEES 
[If not answered previously]: Do you personally think reopening the landfill is a good 
idea?  
 Why or why not? 
[If not answered previously]: Are there any better solutions to Greensboro’s waste 
management problem than reopening the landfill? 
 If no, why not?  
 If yes, what might those solutions be? 
Are there things about Greensboro’s history that you see as important to understanding 
the landfill controversy? 
Are there things about Greensboro’s history or the past disputes about the landfill that 
you think have affected people’s perceptions of the rec nt dispute?  
In your opinion, would reopening the landfill be environmental racism? 
 Why or why not? 
That concludes the interview. Thank you so much for your time and patience in helping 
me with my study. 
(MARK ACCORDING TO APPEARANCE) Gender  Race 
 
